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Abstract
Previous research has revealed that negotiators with asymmetric best alternatives to the 
negotiated agreement (BATNAs) reach more efficient agreements than those with equal 
BATNAs. Conflicting hypotheses have been proposed to explain the relationship 
between BATNA-asymmetry and efficiency, and research exploring various 
possibilities has been relatively inconclusive. This thesis sets out to contribute to this 
domain, arguing that it is important to consider parties’ knowledge states of 
BATNA-asymmetries. In addition, relationships among knowledge, aspiration and 
distributive outcomes are explored.
A simulated job contract negotiation between an employer and employee was used. The 
data used in the investigation is the product o f three experiments in which 112, 114, and 
96 dyads participated respectively. Study 1 examines whether knowledge given to 
different negotiators affects agreement efficiency, aspiration levels and the nature of 
distributive outcomes. Study 2 investigates how this knowledge affects efficiency by 
exploring the relationship between knowledge and communications between parties. 
Finally, Study 3 focuses on why knowledge affects efficiency, examining its impact on 
negotiators’ motivation, approach and mind-set.
With the 5% significance level adopted, the key findings are that (a) aspiration levels of
strong (weak) negotiators increase (decrease) with levels o f knowledge; (b) knowledge
increases the piece o f resource pie that strong negotiators receive; (c) strong
negotiators’ knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries increases focus on dominance and
judgement errors about opponents’ interests, hindering information-exchange and the
search for efficient outcomes; (d) weak negotiators’ knowledge increases motivation
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and fosters communications, leading to more efficient agreements; and (e) the 
detrimental impact o f strong negotiators’ knowledge on efficiency is more powerful 
than the benefit of weak negotiators’ knowledge. The findings suggest that knowledge 
of BATNA-asymmetries shapes negotiators’ behaviour, and ultimately the structure and 
quality o f outcomes. More importantly, the impact of knowledge on efficiency differs, 
relying on which party (strong and/or weak) has access to it.
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1.1 Concepts of the Thesis and Definitions
Negotiations begin when we see that others have something that we want and that we 
are prepared to give up something in exchange for it. In other words, people negotiate 
when they think there is something to be gained. It is, in essence, an inter-dependence 
process by which two (or more) people decide how to allocate resources. Negotiation 
can be about anything -  how much we get paid, who will do what, when it will be 
done -  and can be with anyone -  business partners, friends, colleagues, spouses, 
families and customers. For example, co-workers decide who pays for the next round of 
drinks in the pub; couples decide who baby-sits this evening; or employees and 
companies negotiate over wages, working hours and opportunities for training. It is, 
therefore, common that negotiations occur on a day-to-day, hour-by-hour basis.
Negotiation is a subject that has been addressed in fields as diverse as economics, 
social psychology, the study of business management, o f organisations and of 
communications. Many of the terms used in this thesis are specialist terms from these 
fields. It is best to begin by giving some definitions of relevant terms.
1.1.1 BATNA vs. Outside Option
Economists and social psychologists sometimes use very different language, although 
they mean the same thing. Here is an example. Fisher and Ury (1981) introduced the
- 18 -
Chapter One  -  Introduction
term BATNA to describe Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement. A BATNA 
indicates what a negotiator could get if s/he failed to reach an agreement, and thus the 
value o f the BATNA determines the point at which a negotiator should walk away from 
a negotiation (Fisher and Ury, 1981, Neale and Northcraft, 1991). In practice, this 
means that negotiators should be willing to accept any set o f terms that is superior to 
their BATNAs and reject any outcomes that are worse than their BATNAs. For instance, 
in a negotiation over the sale price of a flat, assuming that the price is the only issue to 
be negotiated, the best offer that the seller has received prior to the negotiation with 
another buyer might be his BATNA. Alternatively, if  the seller is optimistic about the 
property market; letting the property is also a possible BATNA.
Economists have used the term ‘Outside Option’ which refers to the payoff that a 
negotiator would obtain by quitting the negotiation permanently (Shaken and Sutton, 
1984). Both BATNA and outside option refer to the payoff that a negotiator would 
receive in case o f a disagreement. Also, once taking up the BATNA or outside option, 
the opportunity for going back to the negotiation is forfeited1. In this thesis the term 
BATNA, has been used since it has been widely used in social psychology literature 
(see, for example, Mannix & Neale, 1993; Pinkley, 1995; Roloff & Dailey, 1987).
1 Note that they are different from ‘threat point’ which refers to the pay-off that a negotiator receives 
when the negotiation goes on forever and no agreement is reached. A lso, adopting a threat point action 
does not rule out co-operation in the future.
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1.1.2 Distributive and Integrative Negotiations
Negotiations can be divided into two fundamental types: distributive and integrative. 
Distributive negotiation centres on how negotiators divide the bargaining surplus 
among themselves (slicing the resource pie). Some people believe that distributive 
negotiation involves only one issue. Negotiations that involve more than one issue are 
still distributive as long as the intensity of preferences across issues is the same for both 
negotiators. In distributive negotiations, one’s gain in payoffs represents a loss to 
another2. Using the same example, a higher selling price o f the flat represents a gain for 
the seller but a loss for the buyer.
However, purely distributive negotiations are relatively rare. Most negotiations contain 
both distributive and integrative elements (Bazerman and Neale, 1983, Pinkley, Griffith 
and Northcraft, 1995, Raiffa, 1982, Thompson, 1991, Thompson, 2001, Thompson and 
Hastie, 1990). The integrative element regards how negotiators expand the resource pie 
to be divided. Integrative negotiations involve multiple issues where negotiators have 
different priorities across the issues. Trade-offs can be made across issues (sometimes 
known as log-rolling) to increase the bargaining surplus to be divided.
Returning to the example of flat-sale negotiation, an assumption is made that there are 
two issues to be negotiated: sale price and contract-exchange date. I f  the seller is more 
concerned with the price than the buyer is, whereas the buyer is more concerned with 
the contract-exchange date than the seller is, integrative potential exists. Instead of
2 Note that these values do not necessarily sum to zero, and so these distributive negotiations are not 
necessarily zero-sum games.
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compromising on a middle position on each issue, a concession on the 
contract-exchange date by the seller in exchange for a reciprocal concession on the 
price by the buyer can make both parties better off than a compromise solution.
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1.1.3 Agreement Efficiency
An agreement is said to be efficient when the agreement leaves no portion of the total 
amount of resources unallocated. Simply put, an efficient agreement is one that is 
impossible to improve upon from the perspective o f at least one party without hurting 
the other (Nash, 1950, Nash, 1953, Thompson, 2001). In case of a purely distributive 
bargaining situation, any mutually beneficial agreements reached are efficient. 
However, in negotiations where integrative potential exists , some feasible agreements 
are inefficient -  there are other agreements that can at least make one of the parties 
better off. For instance, in the flat-sale example described above one inefficient 
agreement is that the buyer and seller settle on the mid-points on both issues (price and 
contract-exchange date). Making trade-offs across these issues could result in an 
increase in agreement efficiency.
1.1.4 Nash Bargaining Solutions
The final definition covered in this chapter is the Nash bargaining solution and it 
specifies the outcome of resource allocation (Dixit and Skeath, 2004, Nash, 1950). 
Imagine two negotiators, A and B, seek to divide the resource pie o f a total value v. 
Negotiators A and B have BATNAs o f a and b respectively. Each player is to be given 
his BATNA plus a share of the surplus, a fraction h of the surplus for A and a fraction k 
for B, such that h + k = 1. Suppose A and B obtain x and y  and the surplus (v -  a -  b) 
gets divided between the two negotiators in the proportions o f h : k. Also, for all the
3 Unless a negotiation involves only one compatible issue (in which on e’s interests are perfectly 
compatible with the other party’s), there are no purely integrative negotiations. Even in negotiations with 
integrative potential, the resource pie created by negotiators eventually has to be sliced.
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bargaining surplus to be claim ed, x an d ;; must also satisfy x + y  =  v.
Figure 1.1 The Nash Bargaining Solution in the Simplest Case
y
(y  -  b)/(x -  a) = kJh
v
b
va
Source: Figure 1.1 is obtained from Dixit and Skeath (2004), Chapter 16, pg. 525.
Figure 1.1 illustrates an example o f  the Nash bargaining solution. Point P  represents 
negotiators' BATNAs, with coordinates (a , b). All points (x, v) that divide the pie in 
proportions h : k  between negotiators lie along the straight line passing through P with 
gradient k/h. All points (x, y )  that use up the entire surplus lie along the straight line 
jo in ing  (v, 0) and (0, v). The intersection point, Q, o f  these lines is the Nash bargaining 
solution.
Note that Nash (1950) does not suggest how or why such a solution is obtained. Instead, 
it is thought o f  a description o f a unique outcom e o f  bargaining process. Also, the 
theory requires bargains to meet the following four conditions (M orrow, 1994):
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1) Joint efficiency: The solution must be located on the Pareto-frontier x + y  =1.
2) Symmetry: If two negotiators have the same utility function, they divide the 
difference between their BATNAs equally.
3) Liner invariance: The solution should be invariant under linear transformations of 
each negotiator’s utility function.
4) Independence of irrelevant alternatives: If we remove possible bargains while 
retaining the solution and the conflict point, the solution should remain unchanged.
Unfortunately, some of these assumptions may be unrealistic. For instance, research on 
negotiations and decision-making shows that individuals behave irrationally (as 
opposed to Nash’s theory) under experimental conditions as well as in real-life 
situations (Ariely and Wallsten, 1995, Colman, Pulford and Bolger, in press, Doyle, 
O'Connor, Reynolds and Bottomley, 1999, Roth and Mumighan, 1982, Straub and 
Mumighan, 1995). Also, implicit in the Nash bargaining solution’s assumptions is that 
negotiators’ utility functions, BATNAs and the amount of surplus to be divided are 
common knowledge to both players. However, others’ BATNAs are not commonly 
available to negotiators and individual utility is not directly observable (Thompson, 
2001, Thompson and Hastie, 1990, von Neumann and Morgenstem, 1947). In real-life 
negotiations, negotiators may never be certain what the opponent’s real interests or 
BATNAs are and they must count on indirect evidence such as statements and 
opponents’ behaviour. Moreover, the Nash bargaining solution focuses on purely 
distributive bargaining and the potential of integrative bargaining is neglected.
The simulated negotiation adopted in this thesis is different from the game-theoretic
situation in a number of ways. First, along with other research on negotiation (see, for
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example, Pinkley et al. (1994), Pinkley (1995), and Thompson (1990)), negotiators’ 
preference functions are not made available to opponents. Second, the negotiation task 
approximates the main characteristics of real-life negotiation, involves multiple issues 
and contains integrative potential. And, negotiators have different interests across these 
issues; their preference functions, as opposed to Nash’s (1950) assumption, are 
different from each other’s. As a result, negotiators are uncertain of the size of 
bargaining surplus to be divided. Finally, negotiators under certain experimental 
conditions do not know their opponents’ BATNAs (details to follow in Chapter 3).
1.2 Substance of the Thesis
As stated in the title, this thesis is related to power-asymmetric negotiations. Power can 
derive from different sources, such as status, position o f authority (French and Raven, 
1959, Pfeffer, 1992), dependence on others for scarce resources (Emerson, 1962), 
and/or the quality of BATNA (Fisher and Ury, 1981, Pinkley, Neale and Bennett, 1994). 
The particular form of negotiators’ power considered in this thesis is the quality of 
BATNA. It is commonly held that the relative quality o f one’s BATNA reflects the 
relative power o f the negotiator (Nash, 1950, Nash, 1953, Pinkley et al., 1994, Raiffa, 
1982). It is, therefore, not surprising that studies on negotiation are replete with 
theoretical suggestions and prescriptions for ways to realise and improve one’s own 
BATNA prior to negotiations (Lewicki and Litterer, 1985, Thompson, 2001).
In the thesis, I have looked at the specific context of dyadic negotiations where 
negotiators have asymmetrical BATNAs. Even more specifically, I have focussed on 
the role o f knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries made available to negotiators, when
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negotiations involve multiple to-be-negotiated issues and contain integrative potential. 
To study the role o f this knowledge, the current thesis, like many studies on negotiation 
behaviour (e.g. Pinkley et al., 1994; Pinkley, 1995; Thompson & Hastie, 1990; 
Thompson, 1991), uses a controlled experimental setting. The rationale for this 
methodological approach is that it allows for the isolation of identified variables (i.e. 
knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries) while the influence o f other variables “in the 
wild” can be controlled.
This thesis contains three empirical studies. Study 1 considers how the quality of 
negotiators’ BATNAs affects their perceptions about the quality o f others’ BATNAs. 
Also, Study 1 examines whether knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries changes 
aspiration levels, the structure of agreements, and the efficiency of outcomes. To 
anticipate, I find that knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries can have an impact on 
negotiators’ aspiration, and that it is effective in shaping negotiated outcomes from the 
perspective o f distributive and integrative negotiations (i.e. slicing the pie and 
expanding the pie). However, this knowledge does not uniformly influence these 
variables; it depends on the quality of one’s own BATNA relative to the opponent’s.
The second study examines how this knowledge affects negotiation dyads’ ability to 
reach efficient solutions. In particular, I consider communications that take place 
between negotiation parties, and focus on how the communication mediates the 
relationship between knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries and agreement efficiency.
Extending the findings from the first two empirical studies, Study 3 focuses on why
knowledge influences dyads’ ability to reach efficient solutions. Given that the impact
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of knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries, when given to negotiators with a relatively 
attractive BATNA and those with an unattractive BATNA, is very different, I argue that 
the mechanisms involve different routes to result in agreements with different degrees 
of efficiency.
1.3 Structure of the Thesis
The thesis can be divided into three main parts.
Part I explores the literature concerned with the substantive and conceptual topics of 
the thesis (Chapter 2). Four areas have been covered. In the first o f these, Perceptions 
of Opponents’ Positions, I review the literature on negotiators’ perceptions about their 
opponents. The second section, Aspiration Levels, describes the importance of 
negotiators’ aspiration to the structure of final outcomes. Specifically, empirical studies 
considering the association between BATNAs and aspiration levels in the context of 
BATNA-asymmetric negotiations are discussed. In the third section, Bargaining 
Strength, I review some of the major research on the relationship between the quality 
of BATNAs and negotiators’ bargaining strength (i.e. slicing the resource pie). In the 
final section, Agreement Efficiency, I consider the diverse literature around agreement 
efficiency in the context o f BATNA-asymmetric negotiations, discussing both empirical 
findings and limitations in the existing studies.
In Part II, the three experimental studies in the thesis are presented (in Chapter 3 - 5  
respectively). For each study, I first state my research questions and discuss the set-up 
of testing hypotheses. Then, I detail and justify the research design, including the
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choice of data type and explain the analytic approach. At the end o f each experimental 
study, a detailed discussion is presented, including a brief summary o f results and their 
meanings, answers to the research questions addressed, and questions that remain 
unanswered.
Part III: Conclusions, Implications of Findings, Contribution to Knowledge, 
Limitations, and Suggestions for Future Research: summaries the results and then 
presents them as an integrated whole; considers what the results might imply for 
scholars and practitioners; discusses contribution to knowledge o f the current thesis and 
limitations of findings, and suggests possible further studies building on the empirical 
findings from the thesis.
Part I -  Literature Review
Chapter Two
Literature Review of Research on BATNA-Asymmetric
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Chapter Two -  Literature Review of Research on BATNA-Asymmetric 
Negotiations
The use of BATNA is among the most fundamental aspect o f negotiations. It is seldom 
the case that both parties in a negotiation have equal BATNAs other than in the 
laboratory. In most bargaining situations, negotiators’ BATNAs are different in terms of 
quality and attractiveness. Also, it is common that negotiators do not have knowledge 
of their opponents’ position. Assumptions that negotiators have equal BATNAs and that 
they have complete knowledge about negotiation situations entail a significant loss of 
generality. It is not surprising, therefore, that the study o f negotiation behaviour has 
begun to examine the effects of BATNA-asymmetries on negotiated outcomes (Brett, 
Pinkley and Jackofsky, 1996, Mannix and Neale, 1993, Pinkley, 1995, Pinkley et a l , 
1994, Roloff and Dailey, 1987) and how knowledge o f opponents’ situation shapes 
negotiations (Roth and Malouf, 1979, Roth, Malouf and Mumighan, 1981, Roth and 
Murnighan, 1982, Thompson, 1990b, Thompson and Hastie, 1990, Thompson, 1991). 
What is surprising is that research on BATNA-asymmetries and knowledge about 
opponents’ positions has seemed to proceed independently.
The next section will give a quick review of prior research on BATNA-asymmetric 
bargaining situations. Although the research discussed is one step removed from the 
specific research questions that will be later discussed in the thesis, it is still worth 
considering what has been investigated in the existing negotiation literatures and how 
research on BATNA-asymmetric negotiations has developed, in order to provide
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context. The review is divided into two parts: (1) structured negotiation and (2) 
unstructured negotiation.
In structured negotiation, the details of how the negotiation proceeds (i.e. the type of 
messages negotiators can send, the order in which they make offers, and so forth) are 
specified by the experimenter. In unstructured negotiation, the details o f the procedure 
are left up to the negotiators. Structured experiments have the advantage of enabling an 
observer to predict what bargaining outcomes might occur from theories of 
non-cooperative equilibrium behaviour. Unstructured negotiation tells us what results 
when negotiators are free to invent their own rules, and is arguably a better model of 
naturally occurring bargaining (Camerer, 2003).
Structured Negotiation
In two Rubinstein-Stahl altemating-offer bargaining games, a fixed amount of surplus 
is to be divided between two players, players 1 and 2: one player makes an offer which 
the other decides to either accept or reject (Rubinstein, 1982). In both games, player 2 
is given an opportunity o f quitting the game permanently; in this event he will obtain a 
fixed BATNA payoff (or outside option payoff) (less than the amount o f the surplus to 
be divided), while player 1 will receive a zero payoff (Binmore, Rubinstein and 
Wolinsky, 1986, Binmore, Shaked and Sutton, 1989, Camerer, 2003, Osborne and 
Rubinstein, 1990). Note that both players are given complete information about the 
amount of surplus and player 2’s BATNA and all the information is common 
knowledge.
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These two games differ in the times at which player 2 is allowed to quit. In the first 
model, player 2 can take up his BATNA only after he has rejected an offer, whereas he 
can opt out only after player 1 has rejected an offer in the second model. Binmore et al. 
(1989) show that when the BATNA is binding (the BATNA payoff is greater than what 
the player could otherwise acquire in the absence of the BATNA), player 2 in the first 
game accepts an offer that simply matches his BATNA. When the BATNA is not 
binding, the presence of the BATNA does not affect player 2 ’s payoff and it coincides 
with the subgame perfect equilibrium of the game in which player 2 has no BATNA. In 
the second model, when the BATNA is not binding, it has no effect on the outcomes. If 
the BATNA is binding, the result obtained is quite different from that in the first model 
(Osborne and Rubinstein, 1990). There are equilibria in which player 2 receives a 
payoff that exceeds the value of his BATNA.
Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) argue that in the first model player 2 may not make 
take-it-or-leave-it offers, but in the second model he may make credible threat and that 
player 2 is in a stronger position in the second model than in the first. In light of the 
different results from these two models, it is construed that the assumption that only the 
responder can opt out loses generality.
As we have so far discussed, the focus is on the competitive aspect o f negotiations -  
distributive bargaining. An integrative agreement is made impossible to achieve in 
these studies, although most real-life negotiation contains both distributive and 
integrative elements (Bazerman and Neale, 1983, Pinkley et a l ,  1995, Raiffa, 1982, 
Thompson, 2001). Bargaining games of alternating offers may not capture the main
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characteristics of real-life negotiation. Also, common knowledge is assumed in the 
research mentioned above. For instance, the size of the resource pie to be divided, 
which player has a BATNA, and the BATNA payoffs are known to both players. Next, 
the discussion will consider research on unstructured negotiations in which some of 
these assumptions are relaxed.
Unstructured Negotiation
A large body of psychological research on negotiation has begun to consider situations 
where negotiators have different power or BATNAs (Anderson and Thompson, 2004, 
Giebels, De Dreu and Van De Vliert, 2000, Kim and Fragale, 2005, Kray, Reb, 
Galinsky and Thompson, 2004, Magee, Galinsky and Gruenfeld, 2007, Pinkley, 1995, 
Pinkley et al., 1994, Roloff and Dailey, 1987, Van Kleef, De Dreu, Pietroni and 
Manstead, 2006, Wolfe and Mcginn, 2005). The researchers adopt simulated 
negotiation games in which negotiators can freely communicate with their opponents 
and how the negotiation proceeds is left up to negotiators. This freer setting allows for 
examinations of how the factor(s) considered (i.e. different operationalisations of power, 
negotiators’ emotion and social motive) affects negotiators’ behaviour and outcomes in 
power-asymmetric negotiations. Below is a brief review o f issues addressed in 
psychological experimental literatures.
Kim and Fragale (2005) consider different forms o f power -  one’s BATNA and 
contribution (i.e. contributing more to the relationship than one’s counterpart) -  and 
examine which has an impact on negotiators’ value-claiming power in purely
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distributive negotiations. Their impacts on resource allocations vary, depending on the 
size of the resource pie (small or large). When the resource pie is small, BATNAs exert 
a stronger effect on resource allocations than contributions. In contrast, when the pie is 
large a benefit in contributions exerts a stronger impact on resource allocations than 
BATNAs.
Apart from the effect o f one’s power advantage on negotiated outcomes, work has been 
conducted to consider the importance of powerful negotiators’ emotion or affect in 
power-asymmetric negotiations. Van Kleef et al. (2006) focus on distributive 
negotiations and examine the relationship between negotiators’ emotion and concession 
making. They find that low-power negotiators concede more to their powerful angry 
counterparts than to happy ones, but high-power negotiators are not affected by 
counterparts’ emotion. Moreover, the findings show that different forms of power (i.e. 
BATNA and number of alternatives) yield the same pattern o f results. Anderson and 
Thompson (2004) investigate how the positive affect o f powerful negotiators shapes the 
development o f efficient agreements in settings other than distributive negotiations. 
They suggest that powerful individuals’ positive affect is a better predictor of whether 
dyads search for and reach efficient outcomes than the positive affect o f less powerful 
negotiators. Further, the results suggest that the relationship between powerful 
negotiators’ positive affect and integrative outcomes was partly due to the mutual trust 
it fostered. These studies have provided a fuller understanding of how negotiators’ 
affect shapes distributive and integrative outcomes.
Most of the studies discussed consider situations where one o f the negotiation parties
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has an existing power advantage. Giebels et a l  (2000) create phantom  
power-asymmetries between negotiators by giving only one o f them an opportunity to 
negotiate with someone else. They address the importance of a social motive that 
negotiators bring to the bargaining table in power-asymmetric negotiations. With an 
egoistic (maximising own outcomes) rather than prosocial (considering both own and 
the other’s outcomes) motive, dyads with a one-sided exit option engaged in more 
distributive and less integrative behaviour and as a result reached less efficient 
outcomes than those having either two-sided or no exit options.
An assumption o f complete knowledge about others’ power status was also made in the 
majority o f the studies discussed (Binmore et al., 1989, Giebels et al., 2000, Kim and 
Fragale, 2005, Magee et a l,  2007, Osbome and Rubinstein, 1990, Van Kleef et a l, 
2006); only Anderson and Thompson (2004) did not make knowledge of 
power-asymmetries available to negotiators. As a result, it is difficult for us to predict 
whether the pattern o f results remains the same if  this assumption is relaxed. More 
importantly, the assumption of complete knowledge may entail a significant loss of 
generality. In this thesis, it is argued that knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries may be 
an important focus in research on negotiations.
The research presented in this thesis will examine the importance o f knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries to the structure of negotiated outcomes in BATNA-asymmetric 
negotiations. Specifically, it will consider whether this knowledge, when given to 
different members o f the dyad, affects both distributive and integrative negotiations. In 
this thesis, negotiators with a more attractive BATNA will be referred as to strong
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negotiators, and those with a less attractive BATNA will be referred as to weak 
negotiators.
Before proceeding to the research questions, this chapter will provide a review of prior 
work that addressed knowledge of opponents’ situations and BATNA-asymmetries. 
This will help us recognise gaps in the existing research on BATNA-asymmetric 
negotiations. This chapter will cover four different areas. The first two regard 
pre-negotiation parameters that have been shown to have substantial impact on 
negotiated outcomes: (1) negotiators’ perceptions about opponents’ positions and (2) 
negotiators’ aspiration levels. The other two areas covered are (3) distributive 
negotiation and (4) integrative negotiation.
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2.1 Formation of Negotiators’ Perceptions about Opponents
It is common that information regarding opponents’ positions is not available to 
negotiators. Negotiators often have their own expectations about opponents before 
beginning negotiations, for example, opponents’ payoff structure, interests, BATNA, 
etc. Given this lack o f common knowledge we are left to wonder how negotiators’ 
expectations of the other’s position are formed. Experimental psychological and 
economic literature addressing the importance of information about opponents may be 
helpful in shedding light on this issue (Roth and Malouf, 1979, Roth et a l , 1981, 
Thompson and Hastie, 1990).
Roth and M alouf (1979) use a class of ‘binary lottery games’ in which players bargain 
over the distribution of lottery tickets that determine the probability of each player 
winning his personal lottery, to investigate negotiators’ perceptions. For example, two 
players, who agree to a 35-65 division of 100 tickets, would have a 35% and 65% 
chance, respectively, of winning their personal lotteries. In some cases, both players 
stand to receive $1 while in other cases some players stand to receive $3.75 and others 
only $1.25. When prizes vary, information significantly affects the division of tickets. 
Players with partial information (knowledge of their own prize only) generally split the 
tickets equally, although they have different prizes. In contrast, players with full 
information (knowledge o f both prizes) tend to make an agreement that gives equal 
expected value for both players. Roth and Malouf (1979) suggest that when no 
information about opponents’ prize is available to players, they tend to assume that 
their opponents have the same prize.
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Another stream of research considers how negotiators’ expectations about opponents 
are formed when negotiations involve multiple issues and contain potential for 
integrative agreements (Raiffa, 1982, Thompson, 1990b, Thompson and Hastie, 1990, 
Thompson, 1991). Essentially, Thompson (1990) and Thompson & Hastie (1990) have 
examined negotiators’ perceptions of their opponents’ preferences. These studies show 
that when no information about opponents is available, negotiators often assume that 
the other party’s intensity of preferences across issues is the same as their own and that 
others’ interests within issues are completely opposed to their own within issues.
Together, these findings are consistent with Thompson & Hastie’s (1990) ‘projection 
hypothesis’ -  negotiators tend to base their perceptions o f others on their own situations. 
In other words, when negotiators are in different situations to their opponents (i.e. 
different preferences or different prizes), their estimations about opponents tend to be 
inaccurate. Knowledge of opponents’ positions is therefore o f great importance. On the 
other hand, when negotiators have the same preferences or prizes as their opponents, 
knowledge about others may matter little.
Knowledge o f opponents’ BATNAs is probably the most important information 
negotiators can have in a negotiation, but it is rare that opponents will reveal their 
BATNAs. In order to reach advantageous outcomes, negotiators should spend a lot of 
time and effort to find out about others’ BATNAs prior to negotiations. For example, 
when purchasing houses, they should obtain information about the nature of the market, 
which can be used to determine the sellers’ BATNAs. However, most negotiators 
underresearch their opponents’ BATNAs (Thompson, 2001). And, we know very little
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about how negotiators’ perceptions about others’ BATNAs are formed in 
BATNA-imbalanced negotiations. Does the quality of negotiators’ BATNAs affect their 
perceptions of the quality of opponents’ BATNAs? More research is necessary to 
address this issue, and this will be examined in Study 1 (Chapter Three).
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2.2 BATNA-Asymmetries and A spiration
Apart from estimating opponents’ BATNAs, negotiators usually identify their 
aspiration levels prior to negotiations. A number o f studies have emphasised the 
importance o f negotiators’ aspirations and they have been shown to have an impact on 
initial offers and rates of concession, thus affecting the structure of negotiation 
outcomes. In particular, negotiators with high aspirations generally make higher 
demands from their opponents and tend to be less willing to concede (Brodt, 1994, 
Cummings and Harnett, 1969, Hamner and Harnett, 1975). As a result, they end up 
with more of the pie and greater profits than those with low aspirations (Hamner and 
Harnett, 1975, Thompson, 1995).
Given the importance of aspiration to the structure of negotiated outcomes, research on 
BATNA-asymmetric negotiations has examined the impact of the quality of 
negotiators’ BATNAs on their aspiration levels (Pinkley et a l , 1994). Three different 
levels of BATNAs (High, Low and No BATNA) were .considered. Pinkley et a l  (1994) 
showed that negotiators with high BATNAs (i.e. worth more than a compromise 
solution) reported higher aspirations than those with low (i.e. worth less than a 
compromise solution) or no BATNAs, but there was no difference between negotiators 
with low BATNAs and those with no BATNAs. Note that these findings indicate that a 
‘strong BATNA’ increases aspiration levels. In other words, it assumes that a strong 
BATNA is defined in absolute terms. However, when BATNAs are in the low level, 
they have no impact on negotiators’ aspiration levels.
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It is widely held that the relative quality of the BATNA available to a negotiator reflects 
the relative power o f the negotiator (Lewicki and Litterer, 1985, Raiffa, 1982). It is, 
however, unclear as to why the relative strength o f a BATNA does not affect 
negotiators’ aspiration. As suggested, we are uncertain in BATNA-imbalanced 
negotiations how negotiators’ perceptions of the other’s BATNA are formed, and 
whether their perceptions follow Thompson & Hastie’s (1990) projection hypothesis. It 
is worth considering whether knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries influences 
negotiators’ aspiration levels. Such a relationship has not been explored in past research 
and will be addressed in this thesis.
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2.3 BATNA-Asymmetries and Bargaining Strength
Central to the discussion below is an explanation o f why, in the context of 
BATNA-asymmetric negotiations, possessing a relatively attractive BATNA has been 
thought o f as a source of power. Also, the discussion focuses on literatures that address 
how negotiators’ BATNAs affect their bargaining strength and individual outcomes 
they attain. Then, I will show that the impact of BATNA-asymmetries on bargaining 
strength may be associated with other mediating factors.
2.3.1 Defining Power and BATNA vs. Bargaining Strength
In accordance with most theorists, I view power as an interactive function of the forces 
mobilised by the negotiating parties (Anderson and Thompson, 2004, Emerson, 1962, 
Mannix, 1993). Simply put, power is a relational variable, in that negotiators’ power 
can be understood only in relation to their opponents’. Mannix (1993) shows that 
power in social exchange relationships may be broadly defined as the inverse of 
dependence. Specifically, the more dependent negotiators are on opponents for their 
outcomes and the more negotiators value those outcomes, the more power their 
opponents have over them.
Fisher & Ury (1981) contend that the value of a negotiator’s BATNA is a source of 
power, from which theoretical and empirical attention has been drawn. The possession 
of an attractive BATNA not only protects one from a poor agreement but also helps 
generate a good agreement (Fisher and Ury, 1981). As a result, when negotiators have
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different BATNAs, strong negotiators are often considered to have greater bargaining 
strength over their weaker counterparts, given that reaching a deal requires a mutual 
agreement and that weak negotiators have a greater reliance on the existing negotiation 
to obtain favourable profits (Fisher and Ury, 1981, Lewicki and Litterer, 1985, Pinkley, 
1995, Pinkley et a l,  1994, Raiffa, 1982). This is because their better quality of BATNA 
is converted into a higher portion of the bargaining surplus (Komorita and Leung, 1985, 
Pinkley et a l,  1994). Magee et a l (2007) focus on how the possession of a better 
BATNA changes negotiators’ intention to make the first offer in BATNA-asymmetric 
negotiations. In particular, it was found that strong negotiators are more likely than 
weak negotiators to make the first offer and making the first offer produced a 
bargaining advantage.
Other than the existing psychological literatures, economic theory has also looked into 
this problem by specifying how negotiators should divide the resource pie (Nash, 1950, 
Nash, 1953). As discussed in section 1.1.4, Nash’s bargaining theory makes a specific 
point prediction o f the outcome of negotiation, the Nash solution, which specifies the 
outcome of a negotiation provided that negotiators are rational. This theory suggests 
that if negotiators have unequal BATNAs (or outside options), the proportion of surplus 
they receive is predicted to be the ratio of their BATNA to the sum of both parties’ 
BATNAs (Camerer, 2003).
However, it is suspected that possessing a relatively attractive BATNA is necessary but 
not sufficient for improvements in claiming negotiation surplus, and there are broader 
questions that concern the generality o f the greater bargaining strength of strong
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negotiators. Strong negotiators may not always do better, as defined by payoffs, than 
their weaker counterparts.
Evidence can be found in a study that examines the impact o f an attractive BATNA on 
negotiators’ bargaining strength (Pinkley, 1995). The author adopted a job cofltract 
negotiation between a recruiter and candidate. Recruiters were randomly assigned to 
one of the two BATNA conditions -  BATNA or no BATNA. Candidates did not have a 
BATNA under any conditions. Bargaining strength o f recruiters was measured by 
individual payoffs that they received. The author compared the difference in recruiters’ 
bargaining strength between ‘BATNA’ and ‘no BATNA’ conditions. However, the effect 
o f an attractive BATNA on recruiters’ payoff was found to be insignificant. The results 
indicated that possessing a good BATNA does not seem to give recruiters the advantage 
to obtain higher individual outcomes.
This could mean that an attractive BATNA does not increase negotiators’ bargaining 
strength, but this may be due to the fact that absolute payoffs may not truly reflect 
negotiators’ actual bargaining strength -  the ability to claim bargaining surplus, For 
instance, if the size of the resource pie is different across conditions, the same arrtount 
of individual payoffs may not represent the same bargaining strength.
Instead, I looked at Pinkley’s (1995) empirical data with a different perspective. I have 
calculated the distribution o f the resource pie to negotiators (in percentages) for 
different experimental conditions as a measurement of their bargaining strength. The 
empirical data indicated that when recruiters were assigned an attractive BATNA, they
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did not appear to claim a significantly higher proportion o f bargaining surplus than 
when they lacked an attractive BATNA. This suggests that the possession of an 
attractive BATNA alone is not sufficient to increase negotiators’ bargaining strength 
vis-a-vis their opponents.
In short, previous empirical research has provided mixed results on whether an 
attractive BATNA leads to greater bargaining strength, garnering a larger size of the 
resource pie. These findings beg the question: under what circumstances would strong 
negotiators outperform their weaker opponents? It may be that strong negotiators’ 
bargaining strength is mediated by other factors. This question will be addressed in 
Study 1 (Chapter Three).
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2.4 BATNA-Asymmetries and Negotiation Efficiency
Previously, this chapter has centred on studies that addressed the relationship between 
BATNA-asymmetries and distributive negotiation -  claiming values. Here the focus is 
on the research that addressed the impact of BATNA-asymmetries on negotiation 
efficiency -  creating values. The following section: (1) examines past findings 
regarding the relationship between BATNA-asymmetries and efficiency; (2) describes 
past attempts that considered the process by which this occurs; (3) discusses limitations 
in these studies; and finally (4) suggests questions that remain unanswered.
Studies have shown that BATNA-asymmetries can have an impact on agreement 
efficiency (Pinkley, 1995, Pinkley et a l,  1994, Roloff and Dailey, 1987). Specifically, 
Pinkley et al. (1994) and Roloff & Dailey (1987) have found that negotiation dyads 
with unequal BATNAs reach more efficient agreements than those with equal 
BATNAs.
When studies find that settlements between negotiators with unequal BATNAs are 
more efficient -  they compare them to negotiations where BATNAs are equal. Thus, 
one place to begin to explain the finding would be to speculate as to why equal 
BATNAs create relatively inefficient outcomes. Negotiators with attractive BATNAs 
more often walk away from negotiations than those with less attractive BATNAs. This 
is because the amount of surplus available through a negotiation is likely to be 
relatively small for negotiators with very good outside alternatives. In the case o f both 
negotiators having very attractive BATNAs, impasses should be even more common.
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On the other hand, when both parties have equally poor or mid-level BATNAs, they are 
likely to settle quickly on a sub-optimal outcome that provides a ‘fair’ share to each 
party. As neither negotiator has any objective basis for demanding a larger share, there 
is no external incentive to look for better and more efficient solutions.
In addition to reasons why equal BATNAs create relatively inefficient agreements, we 
need to explore reasons why efficiency is found to be greater in situations of unequal 
BATNAs and define the conditions under which the increased efficiency occurs. Two 
experimental psychological studies -  one by Pinkley (1995) and the other by Roloff 
and Dailey (1987) -  have attempted to address these research questions, and they are in 
direct contradiction with each other. Specifically, both of these studies explain why 
there is an increase in agreement efficiency in BATNA-imbalanced negotiations by 
reference to which party (weak or strong negotiator) is ‘responsible’ for this. The 
assignation of responsibility to one party can be questioned. It is unclear whether 
responsibility can be assigned to only one negotiator. In negotiations, parties make 
mutual decisions rather than acting unilaterally to determine outcomes. Despite the 
debateable use of ‘responsibility’, Pinkley’s (1995) and Roloff & Dailey’s (1987) work 
is still useful and gives some insight. I will attempt to clarify what they mean by 
responsibility and each of these explanations is described below.
Roloff and Dailey
Roloff and Dailey (1987) argue that weak negotiators are under pressure and must 
develop creative solutions in order to make the negotiated settlement more appealing
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than their opponents’ already attractive BATNAs and, yet, not transfer the entire 
bargaining surplus to their opponents. As a result, this can improve dyads’ ability to 
find and make integrative trade-offs, which will in turn increase the efficiency of 
agreements (Roloff and Dailey, 1987).
Pinkley
In contrast, Pinkley (1995) argues that the existence o f an attractive BATNA may give 
strong negotiators more freedom to find creative ways to expand the resource pie 
(Pinkley, 1995). This leads to an improvement in dyads’ ability to create joint benefit 
for both parties. Each approach is backed by some experimental findings of the 
respective authors, but due to the limitations in their experimental designs, the 
explanations remain confounded.
- 48 -
Chapter Two -  Literature Review o f  Research on BATNA-Asymmetric Negotiations
2.4.1 Roloff & Dailey’s Design and Limitations
Roloff & Dailey (1987) provide a first look at whether relative BATNA-asymmetries 
affect negotiation efficiency and why dyads with asymmetric BATNAs reached more 
efficient agreements. However, this study is not free from limitations. There are two 
main problems in Roloff and Dailey’s (1987) design that makes the findings 
problematic. The first problem is embedded in their operationalisation o f BATNA. 
Participants assigned to the ‘No BATNA’ condition were given no alternative to the 
current negotiation, so they would receive zero points in the case of an impasse. In 
contrast, those in the ‘BATNA’ condition were given a BATNA worth 2,150 points. 
However, negotiators in both conditions were instructed to obtain a minimum of 2,200 
points from the negotiation for them to agree to a settlement. The authors failed to 
separate negotiators’ BATNAs from their reservation point -  a point where negotiators 
are indifferent between reaching a deal and walking away from the negotiation 
(Thompson, 2001).
This can be problematic. The manipulated BATNA was a very poor alternative, since it 
generated points below the minimum number subjects were required to reach an 
agreement in the current negotiation. Moreover, the result o f a pure compromise 
strategy (i.e. settling at mid-point for each issue) was only worth 2,000 points to each 
negotiator, thus excluding compromise solution as a viable outcome if the subjects 
were to meet their assigned minimally acceptable profit figure. As a result, this study 
did not allow negotiators freedom to use the whole gamut of negotiation strategies.
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The second issue regards the generalisation of their explanation about why outcomes 
with greater efficiency were reached by dyads with asymmetric BATNAs. The 
explanation was based on the finding that in BATNA-imbalanced negotiations, weak 
negotiators were more willing to settle for an agreement than strong negotiators. 
Unfortunately, this finding does not necessarily mean that weak negotiators were under 
pressure to find efficient agreements. Also, the authors failed to specify the condition 
under which weak negotiators’ increased pressure would occur. These limitations in 
Roloff & Dailey’s (1987) research undermine the plausibility o f their explanation and it 
remains conjecture at this stage.
2.4.2 Pinkley’s Design and Limitations
Pinkley (1995) tested both explanations o f why BATNA-asymmetries lead to 
agreement efficiency: (1) Strong Negotiators’ Freedom and (2) Weak Negotiators’ 
Pressure. In essence, the author suggested that possessing a relatively attractive 
BATNA provides strong negotiators with freedom and that knowledge of opponents’ 
BATNA fosters weak negotiators’ incentive to find creative solutions. This allowed for 
examination of which of these factors contributes to producing documented patterns 
regarding dyads’ ability to find efficient agreements. Again, the design of this study is 
not limit free. Before understanding the limits of Pinkley’s (1995) experimental results, 
it is necessary to first discuss the experimental design and some o f the major findings in 
some details.
Pinkley (1995) focused on dyadic bargaining situations where negotiators may have
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very different BATNAs. Strong negotiators’ BATNAs were worth 4,500 points whereas 
those assigned to the role of weak negotiators would receive 0 points in the case of an 
impasse. The maximum possible surplus was 13,200 points. A compromise solution 
(settling at the midpoint for each issue) was worth 2,400 points. To provide tests o f 
both Pinkley’s (1995) and Roloff & Dailey’s (1987) explanations, information 
regarding strong negotiators’ BATNAs was manipulated in two ways. First, strong 
negotiators were either informed (strong negotiators’ knowledge) or not informed (no 
strong negotiators’ knowledge) of their own BATNAs. Note that strong negotiators in 
the latter condition were unaware of the existence of an attractive BATNA and they 
would behave as if they did not have one (i.e. accepting any deals that were worth more 
than 0 points). This resulted in an equal-BATNA situation and allowed for examination 
of the impact o f strong negotiators’ attractive BATNA on efficiency. Secondly, weak 
negotiators were either informed (opponents’ knowledge) or not informed (no 
opponents’ knowledge) of strong negotiators’ BATNAs. The combination of these 
manipulations resulted in a 2x2 factorial design4.
4 When assessing the effect o f  strong negotiators’ knowledge about their own BATNAs, both ‘no strong 
negotiators’ know ledge’ conditions were combined as a control group. When examining the impact o f  
opponents’ knowledge, both ‘no opponents’ know ledge’ conditions were combined as a control group.
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Table 2.1 Experimental Results from Pinkley’s (1995) study
Outcome
Measure
Strong Negotiators’ Knowledge 
(Strong negotiators know their 
actual BATNAs)
No Strong Negotiators’ knowledge 
(Strong negotiators did not know 
their actual BATNAs)
Opponents’ No Opponents’ 
knowledge knowledge
Opponents’ No Opponents’ 
knowledge knowledge
Joint gain 11,134 10,989 9,508 10,468
Note. This table is obtained from Pinkley’s (1995) paper, pg. 409. Joint profits were used to 
measure agreement efficiency -  higher joint profits indicated higher agreement efficiency.
Table 2.1 reports some of the major findings: A significant main effect for strong 
negotiators’ knowledge was found on negotiators’ joint gain. Joint gain was found to be 
greater when strong negotiators were informed o f their actual BATNA than when they 
were not (M = 11,063 vs. M — 10,010). In contrast, no impact o f opponents’ knowledge 
about strong negotiators’ BATNAs on joint outcomes was found.
As a result, Pinkley (1995) concluded that strong negotiators’ recognition of their own 
BATNAs is necessary and sufficient to produce an increase in agreement efficiency. 
This is consistent with the explanation that the existence of an attractive BATNA may 
give strong negotiators the freedom to signal relevant information and find creative 
ways to expand the resource pie. On the other hand, the author ruled out Roloff & 
Dailey’s (1987) explanation that weak negotiators were under pressure to create 
efficient solutions, since providing them with information about their stronger 
counterparts’ BATNAs did not appear to substantially improve dyads’ ability to seek 
efficient agreements.
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However, Pinkley’s (1995) design has two general problems that render these findings 
questionable. The first problem is that the findings may be due to an experimental 
artefact. The second problem concerns the manipulation o f opponents’ knowledge 
about strong negotiators’ attractive BATNAs. I will now describe these two problems 
in some details.
Level o f  Strong Negotiators ’ Attractive BATNAs
As stated before, the value of strong negotiators’ BATNAs was worth 4,500 points to 
them whereas a compromise solution only generated 2,400 points. This means that the 
compromise solution was excluded as a viable outcome in Pinkley’s (1995) study. This 
may be problematic. A large body o f research on negotiations shows that negotiators 
often settle for sub-optimal agreements (e.g. settling at the mid-point for each issue) 
because they are apparent to negotiators, even when there are other agreements that 
make both parties better off (Pinkley et al., 1995, Thompson, 1990a, Thompson and 
Hastie, 1990, Thompson, 1991). Central to Pinkley’s (1995) study was an exploration 
of why dyads with unequal BATNAs were more capable of reaching efficient 
agreements than those with equal BATNAs, even though the compromise solution was 
a feasible outcome. Therefore, the compromise solution should be considered a 
possible outcome in Pinkley’s (1995) study.
The finding that strong negotiators’ recognition of their own BATNAs leads to efficient 
agreements may be an experimental artefact. This observed increase in efficiency may 
not be due to their higher freedom to find creative ways to expand the resource pie.
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Rather, it may be that strong negotiators could not accept the compromise solution and 
that they had to make trade-off across issues to some degree in order to provide them 
with sufficient surplus that was more appealing than their own BATNAs.
Manipulations o f  Opponents ’ Knowledge
Weak negotiators were provided with information about strong negotiators’ BATNA in 
two o f the experimental conditions -  ‘no strong negotiators’ knowledge and opponents’ 
knowledge' condition and ‘strong negotiators’ knowledge and opponents’ knowledge’ 
condition. However, manipulations o f opponents’ knowledge in these conditions were 
problematic. First, under ‘no strong negotiators’ knowledge and opponents’ 
knowledge’ condition (see Table 2.1) strong negotiators did not know that they had an 
attractive BATNA whereas weak negotiators were informed that their stronger 
counterparts had an attractive BATNA. Note that weak negotiators under this condition 
were clearly instructed not to disclose any information about strong negotiators’ 
BATNAs and were told that the individual with whom they were about to negotiate did 
not know that s/he had an attractive BATNA. This instruction suggested that strong 
negotiators would be willing to accept any agreement that gave them positive surplus. 
Given the fact that strong negotiators did not even know their actual BATNAs, weak 
negotiators could then easily and freely disguise themselves as a high-BATNA member 
of the dyad. The effect of BATNA-asymmetries would therefore be severely reduced. 
In addition, the freedom given to weak negotiators to misrepresent their BATNAs 
(position) could lead to a more competitive situation and more inefficient agreements.
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On a more important point, weak negotiators under this condition may have been under 
little or no pressure to find or create efficient agreements, in order to keep their stronger 
counterparts at the table -  that is, to avoid a failure to reach agreements. Therefore, it is 
likely that the manipulation of opponents’ knowledge would not be effective as 
intended. It is speculated that weak negotiators’ certainty about strong negotiators not 
knowing their own BATNAs accounts for the low agreement efficiency in ‘no strong 
negotiators’ knowledge and opponents’ knowledge’ condition (see Table 2.1).
This logic can be extended and generalised. When it is common knowledge that strong 
negotiators do not know both BATNAs, then weak negotiators are free to make any 
assertion about their own BATNAs without fear o f contradiction. That is, weak 
negotiators, when knowing that strong negotiators only know their own BATNAs, are 
free  to behave in precisely the same way (or any other way) as their stronger 
counterparts.
Second, in the ‘strong negotiators’ knowledge and opponents’ knowledge’ condition, 
both strong and weak negotiators knew that strong negotiators had an attractive 
BATNA. This information available to weak negotiators was not given directly by the 
experimenter. Rather, strong negotiators were instructed by the experimenter to tell 
opponents the value of their own BATNAs. The credibility o f this information may 
therefore be rendered doubtful and weak negotiators may regard this information as 
invalid, which may in turn affect their incentive to search for efficient agreements. In 
other words, when this information was provided by strong negotiators themselves, it 
may not be as powerful as when it was given directly by an impartial third party such as
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the experimenter. As a result, in both ‘opponent knowledge’ conditions this 
manipulation may be less effective in creating pressure on weak negotiators than 
intended.
2.4.3 Implications o f  Pinkley’s (1995) Limitations
There are two main implications o f the limitations in Pinkley’s (1995) experimental 
design. First, we are unable to conclude that Roloff & Dailey’s (1987) explanation -  
weak negotiators’ knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries leads to more efficient 
outcomes -  was incorrect, because the findings were confounded. As argued above, the 
confounding variables were: (1) their uncertainty about whether their BATNAs have 
been revealed to strong negotiators, and (2) the source of information of 
BATNA-asymmetries. To test Roloff & Dailey’s (1987) explanation, the confounding 
variables need to be addressed.
The second implication is that strong negotiators’ realisation of their attractive 
BATNAs might not lead to efficient agreements as Pinkley (1995) suggested due to the 
possible experimental artefact and problematic manipulations o f opponents’ knowledge. 
Since the manipulations of opponents’ knowledge in Pinkley’s (1995) study are 
contentious, it is necessary to re-examine the impact of the existence o f an attractive 
BATNA on agreement efficiency with ‘opponent knowledge’ conditions removed. That 
is, the attention is confined only to ‘strong negotiators’ knowledge and no opponents’ 
knowledge’ condition and ‘no strong negotiators’ knowledge and no opponents’
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knowledge’ condition (see Table 2.2)5. If Pinkley (1995) was correct that possessing an 
attractive BATNA alone gives strong negotiators the freedom to find creative ways to 
expand the resource pie, then joint gains in both conditions should be significantly 
different.
Table 2.2 Main Findings in Pinkley’s (1995) study (Opponents’ Knowledge 
Conditions Removed)
Strong Negotiators’
No Strong Negotiators’ knowledge
Knowledge
(Strong negotiators did not know their
(Strong negotiators know
actual BATNA)
their actual BATNA)
Joint gain 10 ,989  10 ,468
Note. T h is data is  obtained  from  P in k ley  (1 9 9 5 ) paper, pg. 4 0 9
Table 2.2 illustrates the effect of strong negotiators’ knowledge about their own 
BATNAs on agreement efficiency. The difference in joint gains between these two 
groups was about 500 points; however, when ‘opponent knowledge’ conditions were 
included the difference in joint gains was over 1,000 points (see Table 2.1). Clearly, the 
effect size o f strong negotiators’ possession o f an attractive BATNA was reduced when 
dropping both ‘opponent knowledge’ conditions. It is uncertain whether this effect 
would have been statistically significant. This indicates that strong negotiators’ 
knowledge o f their own BATNAs alone may not improve dyads’ ability to search for 
efficient outcomes.
5 Under ‘no strong negotiators’ know ledge’ condition, strong negotiators did not know that they had an 
attractive BATNA. A s a result, negotiation dyads in this condition should be considered to have equal 
BATNAs.
Outcome
Measure
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Evidence o f this conjecture can be found in another study considering the impact of 
BATNA-asymmetries on integrative negotiations (Brett et a l ,  1996). They adopted 
Pinkley’s (1995) negotiation simulation in their study. In the control group, neither 
party was provided with a BATNA, whereas in another condition, one member of the 
dyad was given an attractive BATNA. This results in a comparison between dyads with 
unequal BATNAs and those with equal BATNAs. In support o f the assertion above, it 
was found that when negotiators know only their own BATNAs, dyads with unequal 
BATNAs were not able to reach agreement with greater efficiency than those with 
equal BATNAs.
2.4.4 Importance o f  Interpersonal BATNA Comparisons
Both Pinkley (1995) and Brett et a l  (1996) showed that only providing one member of 
the dyad with an attractive BATNA could not improve the dyads’ ability to reach 
efficient agreements. This could mean that Pinkley’s (1995) explanation that possessing 
an attractive BATNA gives strong negotiators enough freedom to find creative ways to 
expand the resource pie was incorrect. One possibility is that the possession of an 
attractive BATNA is necessary but not sufficient to grant strong negotiators this 
freedom, and more may be needed.
Note that negotiators were asked not to reveal their BATNAs to opponents and that 
knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries was never revealed to strong negotiators under any 
conditions in Pinkley’s (1995) and Brett et a l.’s (1996) experimental design. It is 
expected that weak negotiators would often make no mention o f their BATNA status,
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particularly when they knew that their BATNAs were less attractive than strong 
negotiators’. On the other hand, other studies that suggest BATNA-asymmetries 
improve agreement efficiency did not make such a restriction (Pinkley et al., 1994, 
Roloff and Dailey, 1987). So, not informing strong negotiators of 
BATNA-asymmetries, they were unable to make any interpersonal BATNA 
comparisons. In order to further explore the effect of knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries, Pinkley’s (1995) hypothesis about the development of efficient 
agreements needs refining. It is possible that knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries is 
essential to provide strong negotiators with the freedom required for reaching efficient 
agreements, because it allows for interpersonal BATNA comparisons.
At this stage, it is still uncertain as to why dyads with asymmetric BATNAs reach more 
efficient agreements. As described above, it would be useful to know whose knowledge 
o f BATNA-asymmetries can have an impact on agreement efficiency. This will allow 
for examination of Roloff & Dailey’s (1987) hypothesis and Pinkley’s (1995) refined 
hypothesis, addressed in Study 1 (Chapter Three).
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2.5 Summary of Literature Review
/
The existing literature review on BATNA-asymmetric negotiations has focused on four 
different aspects: (1) negotiators’ perceptions about others, (2) aspiration levels, (3) 
bargaining strength, and (4) agreement efficiency. First, it is known that negotiators 
tend to base their perceptions about opponents’ situations on their own (Thompson and 
Hastie, 1990). Also, it is clear that negotiators’ aspiration can have an impact on the 
structure o f outcomes (Thompson, 1995) and the quality o f BATNAs sometimes affects 
negotiators’ aspiration levels: high levels of negotiators’ BATNAs increase aspiration 
but mid-level BATNAs do not (Pinkley et al., 1994). In terms of bargaining strength, 
we also know that strong negotiators tend to outperform their weaker opponents 
(Komorita and Hamilton, 1984, Pinkley et al., 1994); however, this is not always the 
case (Pinkley, 1995). Finally, we know that BATNA-asymmetries can have an impact 
on agreement efficiency. In essence, when negotiators have unequal BATNAs, they 
tend to reach more efficient outcomes than when they have equal BATNAs.
Unfortunately, there are a number of issues that remain unclear. Regarding negotiators’ 
perceptions, it is unclear as to whether negotiators’ perceptions about their opponents’ 
BATNAs follow the prediction of Thompson & Hastie’s (1990) projection hypothesis. 
Also, we do not know why strong and weak negotiators show the same aspiration levels 
when the strength of their BATNAs is defined relative to the other’s. The answer may 
lie in negotiators’ perceptions about others’ BATNAs. Whether knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries may influence their aspiration levels has not been explored. 
Regarding distributive negotiation, we are uncertain under what circumstances strong
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negotiators will express their superiority to garner a larger section o f the resource pie. 
Finally, it is unclear why BATNA-asymmetries improve agreement efficiency. As 
discussed, past research attempted to answer this issue, but it has been suggested that 
Roloff & Dailey’s (1987) hypothesis needs to be re-examined and Pinkley’s (1995) 
hypothesis needs to be refined. In order to address this question, it is necessary to find 
out whether and whose knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries leads to greater agreement 
efficiency.
The answers to these questions will be sought in the next chapter.
Part II -  Empirical Studies
Chapter Three
Importance of Knowledge of BATNA-Asymmetries (Study 1)
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Chapter Three -  Importance of Knowledge o f BATNA-Asymmetries (Study 1)
Chapter Three describes the structure of a series of experiments that will form the core 
o f this thesis. The thesis will focus on BATNA-imbalanced negotiations and explore the 
effects o f knowledge and BATNA-asymmetries on negotiators’ perceptions and the 
structure of negotiation outcomes. Specifically, the experiments have been designed to 
address the following questions: (i) how does the perceived quality o f one’s own 
BATNA affect one’s perception of the quality o f the other’s BATNA?; (ii) how does 
information regarding one’s BATNA being made available to an opponent affect 
aspiration levels?; (iii) under what circumstances would negotiators with a more 
attractive BATNA have greater bargaining strength over their opponents?; and (iv) 
whose knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries can improve the efficiency of agreements?
During the course of the implementation of this design, it might become necessary to 
simplify the experiment. To guard against any limits this might impose, the study was 
designed so that one of the experimental conditions could be dropped without affecting 
the quality and practicality of the remaining parts. I did not anticipate that this would be 
necessary, but recognised the possibility and incorporated this into the overall design. 
No simplification of the experiment was carried out and it remained the same as 
originally designed.
This chapter contains three different sections that include both theoretical and empirical 
aspects o f the first study in this thesis. It first gives an overview of the hypotheses set
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up in relation to the research questions raised above. The second part covers the 
methodology and empirical results of Study 1. Finally, the discussion section considers 
the meaning of the findings in relation to the existing literature. Links to other 
literatures relevant to the same theme will be explored. Finally, I will consider potential 
limitations and future directions o f the current research.
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3.1 Negotiators’ Perceptions of Others’ BATNAs Prior to Negotiations
It is not clear as to whether negotiators assume that their opponents’ BATNAs are 
similar to their own BATNAs. Pinkley, Neale and Bennett (1994) authored the first 
study in an attempt to test this contention. Specifically, it was hypothesised that 
negotiators’ perceptions of others’ BATNAs are anchored to some extent on their own 
BATNAs, because negotiators would be inclined to make insufficient adjustments from 
their own BATNAs when making assumptions about their opponents’. While this a 
priori sounds plausible, Pinkley et a l  (1994) reject it. Yet, it is unclear whether 
projection hypothesis is false or design flaws in the study led to the wrong conclusion.
Measurement of negotiators’ perceptions o f the other’s BATNA was taken at the end of 
the Pinkley et al. (1994) experiment. In effect, subjects were asked to retrospectively 
recall what they estimated the other’s BATNA to. This may have been difficult given 
that the subjects might have Ieamt about the other party’s BATNA in the course of 
negotiations. This is because people have predictable biases in their responses to many 
questions when reconstructing the past, such as hindsight bias. Hindsight bias leads 
people to be retrospectively adept at inferring a process once the outcome is known, but 
unable to predict outcomes before the event (Fischhoff, 1975, Fischhoff, 1982, Huber 
and Power, 1985, Thompson, 2001). The hindsight bias makes BATNA-asymmetric 
situations appear obvious when negotiators see them in retrospect, although the 
characteristic o f the bargaining situations might appear to be BATNA-symmetric before 
negotiating. Acting as if they did not know this information, they would therefore more 
accurately report the other’s BATNA, regardless of the pre-negotiation information
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level.
The current research will test the basic projection hypothesis and remove this possible 
confounding explanation by measuring negotiators’ perceptions before negotiations 
begin. The speculation is that in the context of BATNA-asymmetric negotiations, 
strong and weak negotiators are likely to anchor to the quality o f their own BATNAs 
when making judgements about their opponents’ BATNAs. Thus, the first hypothesis is 
as follows:
Hypothesis la: Negotiators’ perceptions of their opponents’ BATNA would NOT 
significantly differ from their own when no other information about their opponents’ is 
given.
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3.1.1 Effect o f  Range o f  Possible BATNAs on Negotiators’ Perceptions
In real-life negotiations, although it is often the case that negotiators would not know 
precisely about the value of others’ BATNAs, at most times they have at least some 
information about others’ position (i.e. range of possible BATNAs). For example, most 
people, when purchasing cars, can access information about dealers’ costs and selling 
prices of other cars in the same model. This valuable information helps them to 
determine the range of sellers’ possible BATNAs to some degree. To tighten external 
validity, here I will consider the effect of a range of possible BATNAs on negotiators’ 
perception about others’ BATNAs.
Being given the range of possible BATNAs provides negotiators with knowledge of 
‘where they are’, for instance, where their BATNAs are within the range. Accordingly, 
it allows them to identify to a certain extent, whether their BATNAs are relatively 
attractive or not. Whether this range affects negotiators’ perceptions about opponents’ 
BATNAs depends on where their BATNAs are.
Assuming that negotiators’ possible BATNAs are normally distributed, the best 
estimate of opponents’ BATNAs would be the range median. When negotiators’ 
BATNAs are in the extremes of the range (i.e. weak negotiators in this study), they 
would know that their opponents’ BATNAs are likely to be better than their own. It is 
speculated that this range median can alleviate the anchoring effect of their own 
BATNAs on perceptions about the others’. In effect, it is likely that they are more 
inclined to adjust their estimates from their own BATNAs to the range median, than
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those without knowledge about the range o f possible BATNAs. On the other hand, 
when negotiators’ BATNAs are close to the range median, the range of possible 
BATNAs will have no impact on their perception about the others’. To test the effect of 
BATNA-range on weak negotiators’ perceptions of others’ BATNAs, I propose the 
following hypothesis:
Hypothesis lb: Weak negotiators adjust their estimates about others’ BATNAs farther 
away from their own BATNAs, when the range o f possible BATNAs is given than 
when it is not.
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3.2 Knowledge of BATNA-Asymmetries and Aspiration
In Chapter two, I explored literature concerned with the importance of aspiration on the 
structure of negotiated outcomes. Recall that when the strength of a BATNA is defined 
in relative terms in BATNA-imbalanced negotiations, this strength was found not to 
affect negotiators’ aspiration levels (Pinkley et al., 1994). If negotiators assume their 
opponents have a similar BATNA (Hypothesis la), then this may explain why this is 
the case. It is possible that knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries is necessary for them to 
alter aspiration levels.
In other words, when negotiators have different BATNAs, the effect of this knowledge 
may differ depending on the quality of one’s BATNA in relation to another’s. 
Specifically, the direction of how this information influences aspirations depends on 
who is given access to this knowledge and whether it identifies negotiators as expecting 
too much or too little relative to established social norms (Brodt, 1994, Roth and 
Murnighan, 1982). This identification is required to determine whether negotiators’ 
initial aspiration levels are high or low. For instance, some may suggest that in 
fixed-sum negotiations, negotiators’ initial aspiration level is low when their expected 
profit is less than half o f the maximum joint profit, while their aspiration level is high if 
expected profit is more than half o f the maximum joint profit. However, it becomes 
more difficult to define whether one’s initial aspiration is (arguably unrealistically) high 
or low in variable-sum and BATNA-asymmetric negotiations. To accomplish this, I will 
next attempt to define strong and weak negotiators’ initial aspirations when no 
knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries is available. Also, I will consider impacts of
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information about BATNA-asymmetries on aspiration levels of strong and weak 
negotiators respectively.
3.2.1 Defining Negotiators ’ Initial Aspirations and Influence o f  BATNA-Knowledge
According to Hypothesis la, strong negotiators, who cannot compare their BATNAs 
with their opponents’, will tend to overestimate their counterparts’ BATNAs. 
Consequently, they may not set their aspiration as high as those who can learn 
BATNA-imbalances between parties. For example, when strong negotiators lack 
information about BATNA-asymmetries, they may be prepared to accept an offer that 
does not even give them a large surplus. However, providing strong negotiators with 
information o f others’ BATNAs could help them identify whether this offer is 
unreasonable. Hence, when this information is not made available to strong negotiators, 
their initial aspiration is expected to be low. Because knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries gives strong negotiators an acceptable justification for their 
demand of a higher share of the resources, it is suggested that this knowledge increases 
their aspiration level. To test this possibility, the hypothesis is proposed as follows:
Hypothesis 2a: The aspiration level of strong negotiators increases with knowledge of 
their weaker counterparts’ BATNAs.
On the other hand, it is plausible to predict that when weak negotiators have no 
information about opponents’ BATNAs, their aspiration is said to be unrealistically 
high. Again, this is because they tend to assume that their opponents are in a similar
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situation as they are, and this assumption deflates their estimations about counterparts’ 
BATNAs. So, it is speculated that when informed o f another’s BATNA weak 
negotiators expect less from the existing negotiation than when they lack information 
about another’s BATNA. This is due to the fact that this information shows that they 
are the weaker member of negotiation dyads. The influence o f knowledge about 
BATNA-imbalances is hypothesised in the following:
Hypothesis 2b: The aspiration level of weak negotiators decreases with the knowledge 
of her opponent’s BATNA.
In the next sections, this chapter considers the hypotheses set-up regarding the effect of 
knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries on distributive and integrative outcomes.
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3.3 Knowledge of BATNA-Asymmetries and Bargaining Strength
Recall that strong negotiators in general are considered to have greater bargaining 
strength than weak negotiators (Kim and Fragale, 2005, Komorita and Leung, 1985, 
Magee et al., 2007, Pinkley et al., 1994). However, Pinkley (1995) found that 
possessing a relatively attractive BATNA does not help negotiators to attain better 
outcomes (Pinkley, 1995). Under what circumstances strong negotiators show their 
BATNA advantage in their bargaining strength is still undetermined. To address this 
issue, a helpful starting point is to look at the difference across these studies.
One substantial difference across these studies is the level o f knowledge about 
BATNA-asymmetries that negotiators hold. Note that information about opponents’ 
BATNAs was never revealed to strong negotiators in Pinkley’s (1995) study. Given this 
lack of common knowledge, interpersonal BATNA comparisons were not easily made. 
In contrast, in other studies suggesting that strong negotiators have greater bargaining 
strength, either it is not clear from the descriptions of the experimental design to what 
extent subjects shared information about each other’s BATNA during negotiations, or 
complete information about BATNA-differences is assumed (Kim and Fragale, 2005, 
Komorita and Leung, 1985, Magee et al., 2007, Pinkley et al., 1994).
The roots o f the answer to the question above may exist in the level of strong 
negotiators’ knowledge about BATNA-asymmetries. Support for this reasoning can be 
found in real-life situations. For example, in a contract renewal negotiation between an 
employer and employee, suppose the employee has received an attractive job offer
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from another organisation prior to the negotiation. On the other hand, the employer has 
interviewed a number of applicants to replace the existing employee’s position, but 
none o f them has the qualification and experience required. The employee would 
demand more and feel increased bargaining strength relative to the employer when 
knowing the incompetence of other job applicants. The employee may become less 
willing to concede and receive better counter-offers from the employer than when s/he 
knows little about the opponent’s undesirable alternatives. As a result, s/he will gamer 
a larger share o f the bargaining surplus than when s/he lacks knowledge about the 
employer’s BATNA.
The speculation is that in order for strong negotiators’ better quality of BATNA to. 
convert into a higher proportion of the bargaining surplus, an opportunity for 
interpersonal BATNA comparisons is important. As Hypothesis la  and ‘projection 
hypothesis’ predict, negotiators tend to assume their opponents possess a similar 
BATNA. Providing strong negotiators with knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries will 
justify their demand of a larger share of the resources. In other words, knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries being made available to strong negotiators may mediate their 
bargaining strength in a predictable way. To consider the possibility that knowledge of 
BATNA-imbalances increases strong negotiators’ bargaining strength, the hypothesis 
tested is:
Hypothesis 3: Strong negotiators when informed of both BATNAs will receive a higher 
proportion o f the bargaining surplus than when they are not informed about others’ 
BATNAs.
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3.4 Knowledge of BATNA-Asymmetries and Agreement Efficiency
Chapter Two described past attempts to answer why BATNA-asymmetries improves 
dyads’ ability to reach efficient agreements. Recall that two plausible but competing 
explanations have been proposed in the existing literature. The first explanation is that 
in BATNA-imbalanced negotiations strong negotiators have freedom to share relevant 
information so that they are more likely to find creative ways to expand the resource 
pie (Kim, Pinkley and Fragale, 2005, Pinkley, 1995). But, we know that possessing an 
attractive BATNA alone is not sufficient to endow strong negotiators with freedom to 
find efficient agreements (Brett et al., 1996). As discussed in Chapter Two, Pinkley’s 
(1995) explanation will be refined and re-tested in Study 1. A major refinement is that 
knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries, rather than the existence o f an attractive BATNA 
alone, gives strong negotiators more freedom and incentive to find efficient solutions.
On the other hand, Roloff & Dailey (1987) hypothesised that weak negotiators are 
motivated and under pressure to develop creative solutions, so that the negotiated 
settlement will be more appealing than their opponents’ already attractive BATNA. 
Specifically, Pinkley (1995) suggested that weak negotiators’ pressure stems from their 
knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries. However, as argued in Chapter Two, an 
ineffective manipulation o f weak negotiators’ knowledge in Pinkley’s (1995) design 
means that Roloff & Dailey’s (1987) hypothesis could not be rejected.
Study 1 attempts to re-examine Roloff & Dailey’s (1987) explanation, removing two 
confounding variables in Pinkley’s (1995) design. First, in order for knowledge of
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BATNA-asymmetries to generate pressure on weak negotiators, they must be uncertain 
about whether strong negotiators are informed of both BATNAs. So, non-common 
knowledge of negotiators’ knowledge state (i.e. negotiators do not know what 
information the others hold) will be assumed. Also, to sustain the credibility of 
knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries, this knowledge will be provided directly by an 
impartial third party.
In addition to the existing explanations, both members’ recognitions of 
BATNA-asymmetries may be essential to the process by which efficient agreements 
develop. In order to reach efficient agreements, the co-existence of weak negotiators’ 
motivation and strong negotiators’ freedom may be required. Specifically, it is possible 
that complete knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries has an impact on negotiation 
efficiency as both parties have the opportunity of interpersonal BATNA comparisons.
In short, Study I will seek answers to the main question as to whose knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries (strong, weak negotiators’, or both negotiators’) impacts on 
dyads’ ability to find efficient agreements. The baseline model is that negotiators know 
only their own BATNAs. The rationale for this consideration is that studies have shown 
that simply the existence of BATNA-asymmetries is not sufficient to improve dyads’ 
ability to seek efficient outcomes (Brett et al., 1996, Pinkley, 1995). In the 
experimental designs presented in this thesis (details to follow), information regarding 
another’s BATNA will be made available in relevant conditions so as to provide full 
examinations o f the explanations described. To answer the main question, I propose 
three specific hypotheses.
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If Pinkley’s (1995) explanation is correct:
Hypothesis 4a: When strong negotiators are informed of both BATNAs, agreement 
with greater efficiency will be reached than when they have no information about 
another’s BATNA.
If Roloff & Dailey’s (1987) explanation is correct:
Hypothesis 4b: When weak negotiators are informed of both BATNAs, agreement with 
greater efficiency will be reached than when they have no information about another’s 
BATNA.
If knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries needs to be commonly held to increase 
agreement efficiency:
Hypothesis 4c: Settlement with greater efficiency will be obtained when both parties 
are informed of each other’s BATNA than when they know only their own BATNAs.
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3.5 Overview of Study 1
Study 1 considers BATNA-asymmetric negotiations and covers four different areas. 
Firstly, I will examine negotiators’ perceptions of their counterparts in terms of the 
others’ BATNAs. I will attempt to show that negotiators’ perceptions about opponents’ 
position is anchored to their own status (value o f the BATNA)6. Secondly, I will 
examine negotiators’ aspiration levels and the relationship between aspirations and 
knowledge of BATNA-imbalances. Thirdly, I will examine the effect of variability in 
the quality of the BATNAs on the negotiators’ bargaining strength. I will attempt to 
show that this is mediated in predictable ways by other factors. The experiment 
described below is designed to enable me to define the condition under which 
knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries increases strong negotiators’ bargaining strength.
Finally, Study 1 examines the effect o f knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries on 
negotiation efficiency. Specifically, one member of a dyad will be given different 
levels of information about another’s BATNA in different experimental conditions. The 
data from this experiment give insight into the question o f whose knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries improves dyads’ ability to find efficient agreements. I will also 
be able to address whether it is sufficient for one party to know the other’s BATNA in 
order to increase agreement efficiency.
6 Unlike in Pinkley, N eale, & Bennett’s (1994) studies, this w ill be measured prior to a negotiation in 
this study.
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3.6 Method
This section will detail and justify the methodology employed in Study 1. First, the 
procedure and structure of the negotiation simulation and manipulations of negotiators’ 
BATNAs that produce BATNA-imbalances between parties are described. Next, how 
knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries is manipulated to result in the four basic 
experimental conditions in this study is covered. Finally, I consider dependent 
measures that are required to provide critical tests o f hypotheses.
Subjects
Two hundred and twenty-four undergraduate and master students at London School of 
Economics and University College London participated in this study. They volunteered 
to take part in what was described as a “negotiation experiment”. The sample included 
122 men and 102 women, with ages ranging from 18 to 41 years and a mean of 24.54 
(SD = 3.50) years.
Procedure
Participants were randomly assigned to experimental conditions and received the 
following instructions on a paper handout before the exercise began:
“T he purpose o f  this study is to exam in e  n ego tia tion  b ehaviour. T here w ill be a 
n egotia tion  betw een  an em p loyer  and em p lo y ee  about a jo b  contract for the post o f
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A ssista n t M anager. Y o u  w ill be random ly a ss ign ed  as eith er an em p loyer  or 
e m p lo y ee . T here are s ix  issu es o f  concern  in  th e  n egotiation : salary, annual leave , 
bon u s, starting date, m ed ica l coverage and com p an y  car. Y o u  w ill negotia te  for 
p oin ts. B efo re  yo u  n egotiate, yo u  w ill  b e  g iv e n  a chart that d escrib es all the  
p o ss ib le  w a y s  y o u  can  settle th is n egotia tion  and h o w  m any p o in ts y o u  can  get for 
each  a lternative settlem ent. Y our goa l in  th is n ego tia tion  is  to  m a x im ise  the  
num ber o f  po in ts yo u  gain  for you rself. Y o u  w ill be g iv en  thirty m inutes to  
n ego tia te  and i f  yo u  are unable to  reach an agreem ent during that tim e, a 
d isagreem en t w ill be declared .”
As an incentive, subjects were informed that the money that they received at the end of 
the experiment was related to the number of points they earned: they received lOp for 
every 100 points they earned. The maximum possible payment to subjects was £12.80 
and the minimum was £0.007. The experimenter provided subjects with specific 
negotiation instructions, a “payoff’ chart, details about their role and own BATNAs, 
information about opponents’ BATNAs (if applicable), and a short quiz to ensure that 
subjects understood their BATNAs and payoff chart (see Appendix A (III)). All of 
these instructions, information, and quiz were given in writing on paper. Subjects were 
tested individually before being paired with another subject to negotiate. The quiz 
showed subjects some sample agreements and asked them to indicate which agreement 
was better and which agreement was worse than their BATNAs. The experimenter 
checked answers to every question; subjects in error were told to attempt the question
7 In fact, the minimum payment to participants was £5.00 for their time to take part in the exercise. 
However, in order to maintain the effectiveness o f  experimental manipulations, participants were not 
informed until the experimental session finished.
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again. Most subjects were correct on their first attempt; all were correct on their second 
attempts. Subjects negotiated for a maximum of 30 minutes; they negotiated 
face-to-face in private rooms, out o f earshot of other groups; their interaction was 
unrestricted except that materials informed participants that the payoff schedule was
Q
confidential and should not be shared with the other party .
Also, questionnaires were used for some o f the dependent measures. All participants 
were asked to complete a questionnaire at three different points in the experiment. The 
first questionnaire included a number of demographic questions and elicited the 
participants’ perceptions of other parties’ BATNAs, which was given after reading 
initial role materials and receiving details about their own BATNAs. The second 
questionnaire elicited participants’ aspiration levels, which was distributed after 
participants were given information about others’ BATNAs (only applies to some 
experimental conditions). And, the final questionnaire given after completing the 
exercise included a number of questions concerning the strategies that participants 
adopted and the outcomes obtained9 . After participants completed the final 
questionnaire, they were debriefed about the purpose o f the experiment.
Negotiation Task
The negotiation simulation used in this study was a variable-sum task. The negotiation 
situation involved an employer and an employee resolving six issues in a job contract.
8 Pilot study had found that 30 minutes were more than ample.
9 All questionnaires used are in Appendix A (IV). For more details about how experiments were run, the 
experimental protocol is available in Appendix B.
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As shown, all pairs negotiated a job contract that included different options on the 
following issues: salary, annual leave, bonus, starting date, medical coverage and 
company car. Table 3.1 describes all the possible ways participants could settle this 
negotiation. There were several alternatives for each issue (e.g., the bonus varies 
between 2% and 10%). Each party had different preferences for the different 
alternatives defined by the points he or she would receive if that alternative was agreed 
upon.
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Table 3.1 Pay-off Schedules for Job Negotiation Task
Salary
Annual
Leave
Bonus
Starting
Date
Medical
Coverage
Company
Car
Employer Pay-off Schedule
£ 2 4 ,0 0 0
(0 )
25 days  
(0 )
10% (0 )
1st July  
(1 2 0 0 )
P lan  A  
(3 2 0 0 )
B M W  3 3 0 i 
(0 )
£ 2 3 ,0 0 0
(5 0 0 )
2 0  days  
(1 0 0 0 )
8% (4 0 0 )
15th July  
(9 0 0 )
P lan B  
(2 4 0 0 )
V W  G o lf  
(2 0 0 )
£ 2 2 ,0 0 0
(1 0 0 0 )
15 days  
(2 0 0 0 )
6% (8 0 0 )
1st A u g  
(6 0 0 )
P la n C
(1 6 0 0 )
H ond a
(4 0 0 )
£ 2 1 ,0 0 0
(1 5 0 0 )
10 days  
(3 0 0 0 )
4%  (1 2 0 0 )
15 th A u g  
(3 0 0 )
P lan  D  (8 0 0 )
Ford F ocu s  
(6 0 0 )
£ 2 0 ,0 0 0
(2 0 0 0 )
5 days  
(4 0 0 0 )
2%  (1 6 0 0 )
1st Sept 
(0 )
Plan E (0 )
N o  
C om pany  
Car (8 0 0 )
Employee Pay-off Schedule
£ 2 4 ,0 0 0
(2 0 0 0 )
25  days  
(1 6 0 0 )
10% (4 0 0 0 )
1st July 
(1 2 0 0 )
Plan A  (0 )
B M W  3 30 i 
(3 2 0 0 )
£ 2 3 ,0 0 0
(1 5 0 0 )
20  days  
(1 2 0 0 )
8% (3 0 0 0 )
15th July  
(9 0 0 )
Plan B (2 0 0 )
V W  G o lf  
(2 4 0 0 )
£ 2 2 ,0 0 0
(1 0 0 0 )
15 days  
(8 0 0 )
6%  (2 0 0 0 )
1st A u g  
(6 0 0 )
Plan C (4 0 0 )
H onda
(1 6 0 0 )
£ 2 1 ,0 0 0
(5 0 0 )
10 days  
(4 0 0 )
4%  (1 0 0 0 )
15th A u g  
(3 0 0 )
P lan  D  (6 0 0 )
Ford F ocu s  
(8 0 0 )
£ 2 0 ,0 0 0
(0 )
5 days  
(0 )
2%  (0 )
1st Sept 
(0 )
P lan E (8 0 0 )
N o  
C om pany  
Car (0 )
Note. N eg o tia to rs are instructed that the num ber o f  points they  g e t is in parentheses.
The task contained six issues to be resolved and it included three types of issues: 
distributive, compatible and integrative (see Table 3.1). The salary was a purely
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distributive issue; when one party gains, the other party loses in a direct, fixed-sum 
fashion. The starting date was one in which both parties have perfectly compatible 
interests. In this negotiation task, there were two fully integrative trade-offs possible, in 
which preferences are inverse so that one party places a higher value on one issue and a 
lower value on another issue. Negotiators had different priorities for the annual leave 
and bonus issues and may logroll these to maximise joint gain (employer giving 
employee more bonus for less annual leave). In addition, they had different priorities 
for medical coverage and company car issues and could trade-off these issues in the 
most profit-maximising way (employer giving employee the best company car for the 
least medical coverage plan). Therefore, this negotiation simulation typically allowed 
for greater variation in integrative outcomes.
Negotiators could earn a maximum of 12,800 points or a minimum of 0 points. 
According to Table 3.1 an obvious compromise solution (settling at the mid-point for 
each issue) would be £22,000 salary, 15-day annual leave, 6% bonus, starting on the 1st 
August, Plan C medical coverage, and a Honda company car, yielding each negotiator 
6400 points for a joint total o f 12,800 points. A more mutually beneficial agreement 
was possible if negotiators made trade-offs between issues and realised the same 
preference for one o f the issues. Specifically, bonus was most important to the 
employee whereas annual leave was most important to the employer. Medical coverage 
was the second important issue to the employer and company car was the second 
important issue to the employee. An integrative solution required negotiators to logroll 
these 4 issues (e.g. 5-day annual leave and 10% bonus, and Plan A medical coverage 
and BMW as the company car). Negotiators were also required to comprehend the
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same preferences for the starting date (e.g. agreeing on 1st July maximise joint gain). In 
this example each party earned 9,400 points from these six issues and the joint outcome 
was increased to 18,800 points. O f course, there were several other possible solutions 
that negotiators could reach.
BATNAs and Magnitude o f  BATNA-Asymmetries
Strong negotiators were represented by the role o f employer; while weak negotiators 
were in the employee role. Participants were randomly assigned to the role of employer 
and employee. To create BATNA-imbalances between parties, each employer was 
randomly assigned to an employee so that each dyad was constituted of one employer 
and one employee. One might argue that employers (employees) always being strong 
(weak) negotiators may have created more than just BATNA differences. In other 
words, any observed significant differences between strong and weak negotiators may 
be attributable to their roles rather than their BATNAs. However, past research 
suggests that this is unlikely to be an issue: Pinkley (1995) considers the potential 
effect o f role in job contract negotiation but no significant impact of role was found on 
pre-negotiation parameters (i.e. reservation price, aspiration levels) and negotiated 
outcomes. In addition, the current study concerns the absolute difference across 
experimental condition. As a result, any difference in role (between employer and 
employee) should not interfere with the validity of hypotheses. Therefore, the role 
effect was not considered in this study.
Employers would receive 6,000 points if no agreement was reached, and employees
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would receive 1,200 points. Why did I set the value o f strong and weak negotiators’ 
BATNAs to be 6,000 and 1,200 points respectively? According to Table 3.1, a 
compromise on all six issues provides each negotiator with 6,400 points. The 6,000 
points make the BATNA an attractive one because it is just slightly less than what the 
compromise solution is worth.
There are two underlying reasons why this is necessary. First, it is artificial to exclude 
the compromise solution (sub-optimal agreement) as a viable solution, and as a result, 
the change in agreement efficiency that will be seen may be due to an experimental 
artefact. Second, Pinkley et al. (1994) suggest that dyads, consisting of one party with 
no specified BATNA and another with an attractive BATNA but less attractive than the 
compromise solution, generate a sufficient imbalance in BATNAs in order to improve 
negotiation efficiency. In most cases, negotiators at least have an alternative (which 
may not be attractive) prior to negotiations. To improve external validity of the current 
study, a weak BATNA was assigned to weak negotiators (employees). Considering that 
the maximum joint outcome was 18,800 points and employers’ BATNA was 6,000 
points, 1,200 points made employees’ BATNA relatively weak.
Information and Common Knowledge States
Strong and weak negotiators always knew:
• their own BATNAs (6,000 points for employer and 1,200 points for employee)
• that there were six issues to be resolved
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•  their own pay-off schedules.
Strong and weak negotiators were not told by the experimenter:
• whether information about their own BATNAs had been revealed to their 
opponents or not.
•  if their opponents were informed of their BATNAs even when they were informed 
of their opponents’ BATNAs (in the relevant conditions).
• their opponents’ payoff schedule
It is important to note that in this study non-common knowledge of others’ knowledge 
state (i.e. players do not know what information the others hold) is assumed. As argued 
before, this assumption removes the confounding variable in Pinkley’s (1995) study. 
This is because even if Roloff & Dailey’s (1987) hypothesis is correct, the incentive of 
weak negotiators (employees) to find efficient agreements may disappear when they are 
certain that their stronger counterparts (employers) do not know both BATNAs.
Independent Variables
Knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries was manipulated. First, employers were either 
informed o f employees’ BATNAs or not (strong negotiators’ knowledge). Second, 
employees were either informed of employers’ BATNAs or not (weak negotiators’ 
knowledge). All possible combinations of these two types o f information levels 
resulted in a fully crossed 2x2 factorial design (strong negotiators’ knowledge vs. no
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knowledge and weak negotiators’ knowledge vs. no knowledge).
To summarise the design, 1 would identify four basic conditions, to which negotiation 
pairs were randomly assigned. They were:
(1) Neither player knew the opponent’s BATNA;
(2) Strong negotiators knew weak negotiators’ BATNAs, but weak negotiators 
knew only their own BATNAs;
(3) Weak negotiators knew strong negotiators’ BATNAs, but strong negotiators 
knew only their own BATNAs; and
(4) Both strong and weak negotiators knew each other’s BATNA.
As mentioned, subjects were allowed to freely communicate with opponents. It is 
important to consider if negotiators revealed their own BATNAs to others. Weak 
negotiators were not expected to disclose their BATNAs often, particularly when they 
knew that they were in a weaker position than their opponents. However, strong 
negotiators in Condition 2 knew that their BATNAs were better than their counterparts’ 
and may have had an incentive to reveal their BATNA advantage to weak negotiators. 
As a result, this could contaminate (or at least weaken) the manipulation o f knowledge 
of BATNA-asymmetries.
To check this potential design-limitation, subjects were asked whether they revealed 
their BATNAs to their opponents during the negotiation. Only four (of 228) negotiators 
reported that they revealed their BATNAs to others. Two of the four were strong
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negotiators in Condition 3. Note that weak negotiators in Condition 3 were given 
information o f others’ BATNAs. So, strong negotiators’ revelation of their own 
BATNAs merely confirmed the information given to weak negotiators. There is 
evidence to suggest that the manipulation of knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries was 
robust as intended. Although the percentage of negotiators revealing their BATNAs is 
small, it is important to check that the data does not change by excluding them. To 
address this issue, all the major analyses were performed twice: once using the full data 
set and once using only those cases that no contamination o f the manipulation occurred. 
The two set of analyses yielded very similar results.
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Dependent Measures
Perceptions Negotiators’ perceptions of others’ BATNAs were assessed prior to 
negotiations. Their perceptions were surveyed after reading materials about their role, 
payoff schedules and BATNA manipulation but before receiving information about 
another’s BATNA (if applicable).
Two conditions were considered: (1) range o f possible BATNAs not given and (2) 
range given. When the range o f possible BATNAs was not given, negotiators were 
asked: “What is your estimate o f the opponent’s BATNA?” When the range was given, 
they were asked to indicate what they believed the probability o f the range(s) which 
their opponents’ BATNAs would fall within. A number o f questions were asked for 
each interval, for example: “What is the probability that the opponent’s BATNA is 
greater than 0?”; “What is the probability that the opponent’s BATNA is greater than 
1,000?” (see Appendix A (IV) for details). Given the probability distributions of 
participants’ perceptions, we would be able to compute an ‘expected estimate of 
another’s BATNA’ for each participant.
Aspiration Levels Negotiators’ aspiration levels were assessed by asking participants 
to indicate what constituted an ideal situation for them prior to negotiations. 
Specifically, following the provision o f role material, pay-off schedules, BATNA 
manipulation and information o f others’ BATNAs (if available), the experimenter 
provided participants with a questionnaire (see Appendix A (IV)) with the following 
instructions:
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“Below is a pay-off chart similar to the one that has been given to you. Now, we 
would like you to fill in the boxes in this to indicate what your ideal settlement 
would be on each issue. Please note that only one alternative can be ticked for each 
issue.”
A measure o f aspiration was computed by transforming negotiators’ predictions into 
number of points they would receive if that settlement was obtained.
Bargaining Strength Strong negotiators’ bargaining strength was measured by the 
proportion of bargaining surplus they received. The distribution of resources within 
negotiation pairs is examined to determine whether informed strong negotiators are 
able to claim a larger share of the resources than those without knowledge. There are 
two features for this measurement. First, this would reflect how well strong negotiators 
claim bargaining surplus in comparison with their opponents. With this measure, the 
higher the proportion strong negotiators received, the lower the proportion weak 
negotiators received. Second, this measurement would not lead to any misleading 
results that the absolute strong negotiators’ gain might do. For instance, the large 
surplus attained by strong negotiators could be due to an overall increase in the 
resource pie, rather than their increased bargaining strength. Therefore, distributive and 
integrative outcomes were not confounded.
Negotiation Efficiency There were three primary measures of negotiation efficiency 
for each negotiation dyad: (1) joint profit, (2) number o f superior agreements and (3) 
integrativeness score. Joint profit has been widely used to measure agreement
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efficiency in negotiation studies (Anderson and Thompson, 2004, Brett et a i, 1996, 
Pinkley, 1995, Pinkley et al., 1994, Thompson, 1990b, Thompson, 1991). It is simply 
the total number o f points that negotiation dyads earn. Higher joint profit indicates 
more efficient agreements.
However, Tripp and Sondak (1992) have suggested that joint gains do not necessarily 
reflect agreement efficiency. An agreement can be Pareto-efficient (i.e. neither 
negotiator can do better without hurting the other party) without maximising joint gains. 
Therefore, using joint outcomes as a tool to assess negotiation efficiency may 
underestimate the Pareto-efficiency of some negotiated agreements (Tripp and Sondak, 
1992). To address this concern, an additional analysis was undertaken, specifically 
focussing on the Pareto-efficiency of agreements. A new dependent measure of 
agreement efficiency was generated by comparing the agreement reached for each dyad 
against all possible agreements. This new dependent measure, known as ‘Number of 
Superior Agreements’, indicates the number of agreements for which at least one of the 
negotiators would have done better and neither would have done worse. So, fewer 
numbers of superior agreements indicate higher efficiency o f the agreement reached.
Finally, an integrativeness score was constructed to reflect the degree to which 
negotiation dyads traded-off the issues for which they had different priorities (e.g., 
annual leave and bonus, medical coverage and company car. see Table 3.1). Dyads 
who traded-off issues in the most profit-maximising way (one giving another party the 
most important issue in exchange for his most important issue), received higher 
integrativeness scores than those who compromised or traded-off to a lesser extent on
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these issues. As mentioned earlier, there were two possible integrative trade-offs in this 
negotiation (see Table 3.1). When dyads successfully found a fully integrative trade-off, 
they would receive one point. If both available trade-offs were found, they would be 
awarded an integrativeness score of two points. However, when dyads did not trade-off 
issues to the full extent or no trade-off was found, dyads would be assigned a score of 
zero.
In the following section, the empirical results will be presented and discussed.
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3.7 R esults
In this section, analyses of four areas will be covered: (1) negotiators’ perceptions about 
others’ BATNAs, (2) negotiation efficiency, (3) bargaining strength, and (4) aspiration 
levels. In each area, a brief summary of research questions and hypotheses will be 
given. Then, experimental results and critical tests of hypotheses will be included. 
Before detailing the findings in Study 1, it is important to examine the validity of 
manipulations.
3.7.1 Manipulation Checks
After receiving the experimental material containing BATNA manipulations, subjects 
were asked to specify the numbers of points they would receive in case of an impasse. 
In order to create BATNA-asymmetries between parties, it is necessary to check the 
number of points that subjects believed they would receive for different roles (6,000 
and 1,200 points for strong and weak negotiators respectively). Only a few numbers of 
participants (less than 2%) gave the wrong answers in the first trial. All of them were 
correct on their second attempts. In addition, manipulations o f knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries should be considered. All negotiators who were given knowledge 
of BATNA-asymmetries correctly reported their opponents’ BATNAs. Thus, the 
BATNA and knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries manipulations worked as intended.
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3.7.2 Negotiators ’Perceptions about Others’ BATNAs
It is unclear as to how negotiators’ expectations o f others’ BATNAs are formed, when 
no information about their opponents is given. Study 1 was designed to answer the first 
research question: how does the perceived quality o f negotiators’ BATNAs affect their 
perceptions o f the quality of opponents’ BATNAs? Specifically, Hypothesis la  
predicted that negotiators are likely to anchor to their own BATNAs, when estimating 
about others’ BATNAs. This was tested for both strong negotiators (employers) and 
weak negotiators (employees) respectively10. First, consider strong negotiators’ 
perceptions o f opponents’ BATNA and then weak negotiators’ perceptions.
Strong Negotiators’ Perceptions (Employers)
A  ‘one sample t-test’ was performed to examine whether strong negotiators tend to 
anchor their perceptions of the other’s BATNA to their own BATNAs. If Hypothesis la  
is correct, strong negotiators’ estimates o f others’ BATNAs will not differ from their 
own BATNAs. The finding supports this hypothesis. As can be seen in Table 3.2, strong 
negotiators’ estimate (Mstro„g = 5,690) was not significantly different from their own 
BATNAs (BATNA = 6,000), t = -1.40, p  > .05. Thus, the result suggests that strong 
negotiators tended to anchor to their own BATNAs and failed to make sufficient 
adjustments when making judgements about their opponents’ positions.
10 Strong negotiators are those with a relatively attractive BATNA in negotiation dyads, and weak 
negotiators are those with a relatively poor BATNA.
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Table 3.2 Means (Standard Deviations) for Negotiators’ Estimates of O thers’ 
BATNAs as a Function of BATNA
Strong N eg o tia to rs W eak  N eg o tia to rs
(BATNA =  6 ,0 0 0 ) (BATNA =  1,200)
E stim ate  o f  o p p o n e n ts ’ B A T N A  5 ,690  (1 ,8 1 6 ) 1,375 (83 4 )
Note. N = 68 (strong negotiators) and 67 (weak negotiators).
Figure 3.1 Distribution of Strong Negotiators’ Perceptions about O thers’ BATNAs
Strong Negotiators’ 
BATNA =  6 ,0 0 0
OXex.a
e
2V
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20%  “
10%
100000 2500 5000 7 500
S tron g  N e g o tia to r s’ E stim ate  o f  O th e r s ’ B A T N A s
Illustrated in Figure 3.1 is the distribution of strong negotiators’ perceptions of their 
counterparts’ BATNAs, which will allow for further analysis and support of the 
hypothesis. For instance, looking at the proportion above and below strong negotiators’ 
BATNAs (6,000 points): 27.9% of strong negotiators reported the perceptions about the 
other’s BATNA that were below their BATNAs; whereas 26.5% of them showed that 
their perceptions were above their BATNAs. More interestingly, a substantial number 
of strong negotiators (45.6%) estimated their opponents’ BATNAs to be exactly the
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same as their own BATNAs. Also, as illustrated in Figure 3.1, strong negotiators’ 
estimations were mainly clustered around their own BATNAs. This has clearly 
demonstrated that they projected their estimations about the others on their own 
situation when no information about opponents is available.
Weak Negotiators’ Perceptions (Employees)
A similar analysis was performed to investigate whether weak negotiators based their 
perceptions of the opponent’s BATNA on their own, as strong negotiators did. 
According to Hypothesis la, weak negotiators’ perceptions about their opponents’ 
BATNA should also anchor to their own BATNAs. The findings lend support to this 
hypothesis. As illustrated in Table 3.2, when no information about others’ BATNAs is 
given (i.e. range o f possible BATNAs), weak negotiators’ estimation of their 
counterparts’ BATNAs was not significantly different from their own BATNAs (Mwa* 
= 1,375 vs. BATNA = 1,200), 1.71,/? >.05.
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Figure 3.2 Distribution of Weak Negotiators’ Perceptions about O thers’ BATNAs
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Figure 3.2 displays the distribution o f weak negotiators* perceptions about o thers’ 
BATNAs. Again, it is worth considering how their perceptions are formed and the 
distribution above and below their own BATNAs, 1,200 points. About 27%  o f  weak 
negotiators reported that their estim ations were below their BATNAs and about 45%  o f 
their estim ates w ere above it. About 28% o f  weak negotiators believed that their 
opponents’ BATNAs were exactly the same as their own BATNAs. As can be seen in 
Figure 3.2, the distribution o f their perceptions was slightly positively skewed due to a 
few cases with estim ations that were much higher than o thers’. In general, most weak 
negotiators’ perceptions were clustered around their BATNAs, 1,200 points. The result 
provides further support that weak negotiators tended to use their own BATNAs as a 
tool when perceiving others' positions.
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Effect o f  Range o f  Possible BATNAs on Weak Negotiators’ Perceptions
Study 1 also considers the effect of the range of possible BATNAs on weak negotiators’ 
perceptions about others’ BATNAs. Providing this range may influence negotiators’ 
perceptions about their opponents’ BATNA if  their BATNAs are in the extremes (in this 
case weak negotiators)11. In particular, Hypothesis lb  suggested that the range of 
possible BATNAs would reduce the anchoring effect o f weak negotiators’ BATNAs (in 
the lower- or upper-end) on their perceptions about others’ BATNAs.
To test this hypothesis, I compared the difference in weak negotiators’ perceptions 
between two groups, one without being given the range and another with the range 
given. The finding supports Hypothesis lb. When weak negotiators were given the 
range of possible BATNAs, their perceptions about their counterparts’ BATNAs (M rang e  
= 3,323) were higher than those without knowledge of the range (Mnora,lge = 1,375), t = 
7.26, p  < .0005. Considering that the size of the range was 12,800 points, the 
2,000-difference in perceptions between these two groups is not trivial. This suggests 
that the range o f possible BATNAs lessens the anchoring effect o f BATNAs on weak 
negotiators’ perceptions. However, the impact of weak negotiators’ own BATNAs 
(1,200 points) remains strong enough to pull their perceptions away from the best 
guess -  the range median.
11 The effect o f  range on strong negotiators’ perceptions was not tested in this case, because their 
BATNAs (6,000 points) were very close to the range median (6,400 points).
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3.7.3 Knowledge o f  BATNA-Asymmetries and Aspiration Levels
Study 1 was designed to explore the possibility that knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries may affect negotiators’ aspirations in BATNA-imbalanced 
negotiations. Specifically, in BATNA-imbalanced negotiations knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries is expected to affect negotiators in different positions differently.
Table 3.3 Negotiators’ Knowledge Status in Different Conditions
Experimental Conditions Information Levels
C ontrol N either p layer k n ow s h is or her op p on en t’s B A T N A
C on d ition  2  O nly strong n egotia tors k n ow  both B A T N A s
C on d ition  3 O nly w eak  n egotiators k n o w  both  B A T N A s
C on d ition  4  B oth  k n o w  ea ch  o th er’s B A T N A s
Table 3.3 describes the four basic experimental conditions and negotiators’ knowledge 
status in each condition. Negotiators’ aspirations were assessed prior to negotiations, 
and their aspirations should be independent o f their counterparts’ knowledge status. 
Therefore, the effect o f strong negotiators’ knowledge on aspirations was examined by 
comparing their aspirations in control condition and condition 3 to those in condition 2 
and 4. Similarly, the effect of weak negotiators’ knowledge on aspirations was 
examined by comparing their aspirations in control group and condition 2 to those in 
condition 3 and 4.
- 99 -
Chapter Three -  Importance o f  Knowledge o f  BA TNA-Asymmetries (Study 1)
Effect o f  Knowledge o f  BATNA-Asymme tries on Strong Negotiators ’Aspirations
Does knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries affect negotiators’ aspiration levels? Yes. 
First consider the impact of negotiators’ knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries on their 
aspiration levels. An analysis of variance, ANOVA, with a priori contrasts requested 
was performed to examine the impact of experimental conditions (knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries) on strong negotiators’ aspiration levels. A significant main effect 
for Experimental Condition was found, F(3,l 11) = 6.80,p  < .0005.
Hypothesis 2a predicted that this knowledge would have a positive impact on their 
aspiration levels. The findings support this hypothesis. As can be seen in Table 3.4, a 
planned comparison was conducted to compare strong negotiators’ aspiration in the 
control group and condition 3 with the pooled mean of the other two groups, condition 
2 and 4. Informed strong negotiators reported higher aspirations (Mkn0Wiedge = 7,990) 
than those without information (Mn0 knowledge = 7,396), t = 2.86, p  < .01. The finding 
suggests that strong negotiators’ knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries results in higher 
goals that they set for themselves.
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Table 3.4 Means (Standard Deviations) for Negotiators’ Aspiration Levels as 
Function of Experimental Condition
Experimental Condition Strong Negotiators’ Aspiration Levels
N o  S trong N eg o tia to rs’ K n o w led g e 7 ,3 9 6
(C ontrol &  C ond ition  3 ) (1 ,0 7 8 )
Strong N eg o tia to rs’ K n o w led g e 7 ,9 9 0
(C o n d itio n  2  & C ond ition  4 ) (1 ,1 2 7 )
Weak Negotiators’ Aspiration Levels
N o  W eak N eg o tia to rs’ K n o w led g e 7 ,3 9 7
(C ontrol & C ondition  2 ) (1 ,7 2 7 )
W eak N eg o tia to r s’ K n o w led g e 6 ,2 5 6
(C on d ition  3 &  C ond ition  4 ) (1 ,8 6 6 )
Note. N o . o f  S trong N egotia tors = 1 1 2  and N o . o f  W eak N eg o tia to rs = 1 0 8
Effect o f  Knowledge o f  BATN A-Asymmetries on Weak Negotiators ’Aspirations
An ANOVA was used to consider the impact o f negotiators’ knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries (Experimental Condition) on weak negotiators’ aspiration levels. 
A significant main effect for Experimental Condition was found, F(3,107) = 6.50, p  
< .0005. Hypothesis 2b suggested that weak negotiators’ aspiration will decrease with 
their knowledge levels of others’ BATNAs. This hypothesis is supported. As can be 
seen in Table 3.4, a planned contrast o f weak negotiators’ aspiration (control and 
condition 2 vs. condition 3 and 4) revealed that when weak negotiators were informed, 
their aspiration levels were significantly lower than when they lacked this knowledge 
( H k n o w le d g e  = 6,256 compared to Mno kn ow led g e  = 7,397), t = -3.30, p  < .01. The result 
indicates that when weak negotiators knew both BATNAs, they tended to lower 
expectations about what constituted an ideal situation for themselves.
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3.7.4 Knowledge o f  BATN A-Asymmetries and Bargaining Strength
The third question addressed in Study 1 is under what circumstances would strong 
negotiators outperform their opponents? As argued earlier in this chapter, the key to 
increasing strong negotiators’ bargaining strength may be the opportunity of 
interpersonal BATNA comparison. So, here I examine whether knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries mediates the relationship between an attractive BATNA and 
strong negotiators’ bargaining strength in a predictable way.
Table 3.5 Strong Negotiators’ Knowledge Status in Different Conditions
Experimental Conditions Information Levels
C on d ition  1 (C ontro l) N eith er  p layer k n ew  h is or her op p on en t’s B A T N A
C ondition  2 O n ly  Strong n egotiators k n ew  both  B A T N A s
Note. T h is an a ly s is  on ly  con sid ered  tw o  experim ental co n d itio n s  and w eak  n ego tia tors’ 
k n o w led g e  w as h eld  constant, b ecau se  P in k ley  (1 9 9 5 ) su g g ests  that th is k n o w led g e  can have an 
im pact on strong n ego tia tors’ bargain ing strength.
To examine whether knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries influences strong negotiators’ 
bargaining strength, an independent-samples Mest was used. I compared their 
bargaining strength when only they were informed o f both BATNAs, to that when 
neither party was informed (control group vs. condition 2) (see Table 3.5). According 
to Hypothesis 3, strong negotiators’ knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries should 
increase with bargaining strength. The finding supports its prediction. When only 
strong negotiators were informed of both BATNAs, they obtained a larger share of the 
resource pie (M =  54.0%) than when they lacked this knowledge (M  = 47.5%), t = 6.34,
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p  < .0005. Therefore, this indicates that information of another’s BATNA available to 
strong negotiators had a significant impact on their bargaining strength.
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Figure 3.3 Distribution of Strong Negotiators’ Bargaining Strength (Control vs. 
Condition 2)
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It m ight be interesting to describe the distribution o f bargaining surplus that informed 
strong negotiators claimed below and above the mean proportion (M =  54.0% ). 52% o f 
informed strong negotiators showed bargaining strength above the mean while 48% 
received a share o f  the resource pie that was below the mean. As can be seen in Figure 
3.3, it is clear that informed strong negotiators were more capable o f  claiming 
bargaining surplus than control strong negotiators were: the percentage o f  informed 
strong negotiators claim ing more than half o f  the resource pie was always higher than 
that o f  control strong negotiators.
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3.7.5 Knowdedge o f  BATNA-Asymmetries and Agreement Efficiency
Study 1 was also designed to identify conditions under which BATNA-asymmetries
improves agreement efficiency. The research question addressed is whose knowledge of
BATNA-asymmetries (strong, weak or both negotiators’) can have an impact on
agreement efficiency. Three different hypotheses were examined in this study. Pinkley’s
(1995) refined hypothesis suggests that knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries gives
strong negotiators more freedom to signal information and to find creative ways to
1 ?expand the resource pie . In contrast, according to Rolofif & Dailey’s (1987) 
hypothesis, weak negotiators’ knowledge can put pressure on them to develop creative 
solutions. Alternatively, knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries may need to be commonly 
held by both parties, in order to improve dyads’ ability to find efficient agreements. To 
test these possibilities, Study 1 will explore:
I f  Pinkley’s (1995) explanation is correct:
Hypothesis 4a: When only strong negotiators are informed of both BATNAs, 
agreements with greater efficiency will be reached than when they have no information 
about another’s BATNA.
12 It is important to note that Pinkley’s (1995) original hypothesis is that the existence o f  an attractive 
BATNA alone provides strong negotiators with freedom to signal relevant information. However, as 
shown in chapter 1, this was not supported. The hypothesis tested in this study is a refined version o f  
Pinkley’s (1995) hypothesis.
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IfR o lo ff& D ailey’s (1987) explanation is correct
Hypothesis 4b: When only weak negotiators are informed o f both BATNAs, agreement 
with greater efficiency will be reached than she has no information about another’s 
BATNA.
I f  the Alternative explanation is correct
Hypothesis 4c: Settlement with greater efficiency will be obtained when both parties 
are informed of each other’s BATNA than when they lack information.
As mentioned, three different measurements used to examine agreement efficiency 
were:
(1) Joint outcomes -  The sum of bargaining surplus that strong negotiators and weak 
negotiators received
(2) Integrativeness score -  reflects whether negotiators fully trade-off issues for which 
they have different priorities. There were two possible integrative trade-offs; 
therefore, the maximum score was two.
(3) Number of Superior Agreements -  indicates the number o f agreements for which at 
least one of the parties would have done better and neither would have done worse. 
Higher numbers o f superior agreement indicate less efficient agreements. There 
were 15,625 possible agreements in this simulation and the value of agreements 
reached for each dyad was compared against them. Illustrated in Figure 3.4 are the
- 106 -
Chapter Three -  Importance o f  Knowledge o f BA TNA-Asymmetries (Study 1)
possible agreem ents.
Figure 3.4 Feasible Agreements
_3
”EL
•_
3cn
"in
O
.2
©WDSjc
O X )s
2
55
13000
12000
11000
10000
9000
8000
7000
6000
5000
3 “U q_ T
0 2000 4000 6000
Weak negotiators' surplus
8000 10000 12000
- 107 -
Chapter Three -  Importance o f  Knowledge o f  BATNA-Asymmetries (Study I)
Table 3.6 Means (Standard Deviations) for Joint Gains, Integrativeness Score, and 
Number of Superior Agreements by Experimental Conditions (Study 1)
E x p e r im e n ta l C o n d it io n
N either
Inform ed
(C ontrol)
O nly  Strong  
N egotia tors  
Inform ed  
(C on d ition  2 )
O n ly  W eak  
N eg o tia to rs  
Inform ed  
(C on d ition  3 )
B o th  Inform ed  
(C on d ition  4 )
1 6 ,9 2 9 , 16,086* 17,943,- 15,789*
J o in t  G a in
(1 ,4 0 1 ) (1 ,9 8 5 ) (9 8 6 ) (1 ,7 7 9 )
I n te g r a t iv e n e s s 0 .6 8 , 0 .5 4 , 1.29* 0 .3 9 ,
S co re (0 .8 2 ) (0 .7 4 ) (0 .7 1 ) (0 .6 3 )
N u m b e r  o f
1 3 3 , 560* 18c 411*
S u p e r io r
(2 5 8 (1 ,0 0 5 ) (4 7 ) 601
A g r e e m e n ts
Note. N  =  2 8  in each  cond ition . L ow er num bers o f  superior agreem en t ind icate m ore e ffic ien t
agreem ents. M axim u m  jo in t gain =  18 ,800; m axim um  in tegra tiven ess score  =  2 . Subscrip tin g  is 
based upon  com p arison s o f  m eans w ith in  each  row  u sin g  A N O V A s w ith  contrasts; d ifferent 
subscripts ind icate m ean s d iffer at p  < .05 or less. (e .g . the jo in t o u tco m e for C ontrol is g iven  
the subscript la ’ and it is sign ifican tly  d ifferent to  that for C on d ition  2 g iv en  subscript ‘6 ’ . 
H ow ever, the jo in t o u tco m es for C ondition  2 and 4  are not s ig n ifica n tly  d ifferen t.)
ANOVAs with contrasts were used to test the relationship between the manipulated 
levels o f knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries (Experimental Condition) and agreement 
efficiency. Significant main effects were found on joint outcomes, F (3 ,l l l )  = 10.27, p  
< .0005, integrativeness score, F (3 ,l l l )  = 4.81, p  < .05, and number o f superior 
agreements, F (3 ,l l l )  = 8.12, p  < .0005. A series o f planned comparisons was 
conducted to clarify these relationships.
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Pinkley’s Explanation (Strong Negotiators’ Knowledge)
Hypothesis 4a predicted that knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries by strong negotiators 
would have an impact on agreement efficiency. If this is correct, strong negotiators’ 
knowledge should increase with joint outcomes and integrativeness scores, but decrease 
with number o f superior agreements. The findings do not support Hypothesis 4a. 
Contrary to the prediction of this hypothesis, a priori contrasts (control vs. condition 2) 
revealed that strong negotiators’ knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries destroyed 
agreement efficiency. When only strong negotiators were informed o f both BATNAs, 
joint gains were significantly lower than when neither party was informed (M  = 
16,086ft compared to M -  16,929a), t = 1.98,p < .05 (see Table 3.6). For integrativeness 
scores, there was no significant difference between two groups. In addition, when only 
strong negotiators were informed, the number of superior agreement was significantly 
higher than when no party was informed (M =  560ft vs. M  = 133a), t = 2.66, p  < .01 
(higher numbers of superior agreements indicate less efficient agreements). These 
findings suggest that strong negotiators’ knowledge did not improve, but hinder, dyads’ 
ability to search for efficient solutions.
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Figure 3.5 Distribution of Joint Gains (Control vs. Condition 2)
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Examining distributions o f jo in t gains in different experim ental conditions, as shown in 
Figure 3.5, when only strong negotiators were informed, higher proportions o f  dyads 
reached agreem ents with low jo in t outcom es than when neither party was informed. 
Looking at the region o f  high jo in t outcom es, the pattern was reversed: control dyads 
were more likely to reach efficient agreem ents. Also, the data shows that when only 
strong negotiators w ere informed, only 11% o f  dyads reached the m ost efficient 
agreem ent but about 21%  o f dyads did so in the control group.
R olo ff & D a iley ’s Explanation (Weak N eg o tia to rs’ Knowledge)
Hypothesis 4b suggested that knowledge o f  BATNA-asym m etries being made available 
to weak negotiators improves dyads’ ability to find efficient outcom es. If  this is correct,
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jo in t gains and integrativeness scores will increase with weak negotiators' knowledge, 
but num ber o f  superior agreem ents will decrease. Planned com parisons o f  the measures 
o f  agreem ent efficiency between the control group and condition 3 provided evidence 
to support Hypothesis 4b. As can be seen in Table 3.6, both jo in t gains and 
integrativeness scores were significantly higher when only weak negotiators were 
informed (condition 3) than when no party was informed (control) (M  = 17,943c vs. M  
= 16,929^ and M =  1.29/, vs. M -  0.68a), t =  3 A 3 , p <  .01, t = 3.11 , p  < .01. In addition, 
when only weak negotiators were informed, num bers o f  superior agreem ents were 
significantly lower than when neither party was informed (M =  18c vs. M -  133a), I = 
-2.32, p  < .05. The results show that weak negotiators’ knowledge o f
BATNA-asym m etries alone facilitates the developm ent o f  efficient agreem ents.
Figure 3.6 Distribution of Joint Gains (Control vs. Condition 3)
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Figure 3.6 shows the impact of weak negotiators’ knowledge on joint gains. It is clear 
that weak negotiators’ knowledge improves agreement efficiency: when only weak 
negotiators were informed, almost 60% of dyads reached agreements with 18,000 
points or more but only 21% of control dyads did so. Also, it is important to note that 
when only weak negotiators were informed, about 45% of dyads found both integrative 
trade-offs, whereas just 21% in the control group did so.
Alternative Hypothesis (Complete Knowledge)
According to Hypothesis 4c, the prediction was that when both players were aware of 
BATNA-imbalances, agreement efficiency would be greater than when they were not. 
Planned contrasts (control vs. condition 4) o f efficiency were performed to test this 
relationship. However, the findings contradict this conjecture. As can be seen in Table 
3.6, when both negotiators were informed (condition 4), joint gains were significantly 
lower than when they lacked information (M =  15,789^ compared to M =  16,929fl), t = 
2.67, p  < .01. The integrativeness score in condition 4 (M =  0.39a) was just marginally 
lower than that in the control group (M = 0.68a), t = 1.47, p  = 0.07. Finally, consistent 
with joint gains, when both parties had knowledge, numbers o f superior agreements 
were significantly higher than when they lacked knowledge (M =  41U vs. M =  133a), t 
= 2.25, p  < .05. The results indicate that complete knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries 
hindered dyads from reaching efficient solutions.
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Figure 3.7 Distribution of joint gains (Control vs. Condition 4)
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As shown in Figure 3.7, higher percentages o f  dyads in com plete knowledge condition 
than control dyads reached agreem ents with low jo in t outcom es. For instance, 21%  o f 
dyads with com plete knowledge, com pared to less than 4%  o f  control dyads, reached 
agreem ents with 14,000 points or less. However, it is m ore likely that control dyads 
reached efficient agreem ents than those in com plete know ledge condition. It is also 
important to note that ju s t 7% o f  dyads in com plete know ledge condition found both 
integrative trade-offs, com pared to 21%  o f  control dyads.
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3.8 General Discussion
The following discussion focuses on how the results in Study 1 provide a piece of the 
puzzle in the existing literature. In particular, four different aspects will be discussed in 
turn: (1) negotiators’ perceptions about opponents’ BATNAs, (2) aspiration, (3) 
bargaining strength, and (4) agreement efficiency. Also, a general discussion will be 
given at the end o f this chapter to bring out the key ideas for analysing what this 
chapter shows. This will allow for tentative sideways links to other literatures relevant 
to the same theme. Finally, I will consider potential limitations in Study 1 and future 
directions.
3.8.1 Negotiators ’Perceptions o f  Opponents' BATNAs
The first research question addressed an apparent lack o f supportive empirical evidence 
for theoretical arguments predicting a relationship between the quality o f negotiators’ 
BATNAs and their perceptions about others’. According to Thompson and Hastie’s 
(1990) ‘projection hypothesis’, negotiators should tend to base their perceptions about 
opponents on their own position. Given that BATNA-imbalanced negotiations were 
considered in this study, I examined the impact of strong and weak negotiators’ 
BATNAs on their perceptions about others’ BATNAs, prior to negotiations. It was 
found that the quality of negotiators’ BATNAs influenced how expectations about 
others’ BATNAs were formed. A substantial number of strong negotiators (94%) and 
weak negotiators (90%) reported that they believed their opponents also had a BATNA. 
They tended to assume that their opponents possessed BATNAs that were very similar
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to their own. The results suggest that their estimations about opponents’ BATNAs are 
anchored to their own BATNAs to a great extent, which is consistent with Thompson 
and Hastie’s (1990) ‘projection hypothesis’.
Thompson and Anderson (2004) implicitly share a similar view in their study in which 
they attempted to create a power difference between the negotiation parties by 
providing one o f them with a BATNA. They found that giving a BATNA to negotiators 
did not have a significant impact on perceptions o f their own power status as the 
authors intended (i.e. negotiators possessing a BATNA did not significantly perceive 
themselves as more powerful than those without one). They hypothesised that 
negotiators might be uncertain as to whether their counterparts had a BATNA as well. 
However, they did not empirically test this hypothesis. The question o f why the 
negotiators with a BATNA do not perceive themselves as more powerful remains 
unanswered in their study. The current research addresses this question and extends 
their hypothesis that the negotiators might be uncertain as to whether their opponents 
also have a BATNA. The findings from the present study provide a fuller understanding 
of the process by which negotiators with a BATNA perceive their counterparts’ BATNA 
status.
In real-life situations, negotiators often do not know the precise value o f others’ 
BATNAs, but they may have some information about others’ position. Therefore, Study 
1 also considered the effect o f the range of possible BATNAs on negotiators’ 
perceptions about others’ BATNAs, when negotiators’ BATNAs were in the extreme of 
the range (weak negotiators in this case). Given the range, the best guess o f others’
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BATNAs should be the range median. It was found that when weak negotiators were 
given the range, their perceptions were farther from their own BATNAs than those who 
did not know the range. Being given the range lessened the anchoring effect of 
negotiators’ BATNAs but perceptions of weak negotiators were still below the range 
median.
In situations when no information about others’ BATNAs is available, knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries may play an important role in how negotiators approach 
negotiations and the structure of negotiated outcomes. Next, I will emphasise the 
importance o f an opportunity of interpersonal BATNA comparisons in different aspects 
o f negotiations, such as aspiration levels, bargaining strength, and agreement efficiency.
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3.8.2 Knowledge o f  BATNA-Asymmetries and Aspiration
Previous research has shown that the quality of BATNAs does not affect negotiators’ 
aspiration levels when their BATNAs are worth less than what a compromise 
agreement constitutes (Pinkley et al., 1994). This was replicated in Study 1: when 
knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries is not available, negotiators with different 
BATNAs (i.e. strong and weak negotiators) reported very similar aspiration levels13. 
The second issue addressed by Study 1 was that whether knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries influences negotiators’ aspirations when they have different 
BATNAs.
Knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries decreased with weak parties’ aspiration levels (see 
Figure 3.8). This is because an assumption o f equal-BATNA situations led to an 
underestimation o f the wideness of BATNA-differences between parties. As a result, 
when weak negotiators lacked information of BATNA-asymmetries, their initial 
aspiration levels were unrealistically high. Therefore, the role of this information was to 
help them reasonably identify their position in the negotiation, in comparison with their 
opponents’. Clearly, weak negotiators would expect less from the existing negotiation 
when they better understand how a bargaining situation was characterised, than when 
they lacked this knowledge.
13 Note that the values o f  both strong and weak negotiators’ BATNAs were less than compromise 
solution in this study.
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Figure 3.8 Negotiators’ Aspirations as a Function of BATNA Knowledge
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On the other hand, strong negotiators’ aspiration levels increased with their knowledge 
o f BATNA-im balances (see Figure 3.8). An explanation is that in the absence o f this 
knowledge, strong negotiators’ aspiration levels were unrealistically low, since they 
assum ed that their opponents would also have attractive BATNAs. Knowledge o f 
BATNA-asym m etries would help them identify that they were in the position o f higher 
power than their opponents. As a result, informed strong negotiators expected to obtain 
more from the existing negotiation than uninform ed strong negotiators who 
overestim ated their opponents’ BATNAs.
As discussed in Chapter Two, many scholars have argued out that negotiators with high 
aspirations would outperform  those with lower aspirations because high aspirations 
lead to higher dem ands and few er concessions (Brodt, 1994, Cum m ings and Harnett, 
1969, Hamner and Harnett, 1975, Thom pson, 1995). Coupling theorists’ suggestions
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with the effect of knowledge on strong negotiators’ aspirations, informed strong 
negotiators were therefore expected able to do better in claiming values than those 
without knowledge. The relationship between knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries and 
strong negotiators’ bargaining strength will be discussed next.
3.8.3 Knowledge o f  BATN A-Asymmetries and Bargaining Strength
One o f the purposes o f Study 1 was to examine whether strong negotiators’ knowledge 
of BATNA-asymmetries improves their bargaining strength. As predicted, the result 
showed that strong negotiators’ bargaining strength was mediated by this knowledge in 
a predictable way. Clearly, being given this information placed strong negotiators in a 
position of greater bargaining strength, resulting in a bigger slice of the resource pie 
than control strong negotiators who lacked this information. It explains why in some 
studies strong negotiators were able to reflect their BATNA advantage (Kim and 
Fragale, 2005, Komorita and Leung, 1985, Magee et al., 2007, Pinkley et al., 1994) but 
in another study, they failed to do so (Pinkley, 1995). The finding that strong 
negotiators’ knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries was a mediator has important 
implications. Magee et al. (2007) examine the relationship between BATNAs and the 
likelihood and pattern o f negotiators making the first offer. They show that strong 
negotiators, compared to weak negotiators, are more likely to make an advantageous 
first offer, but this finding was confined to situations where strong negotiators knew 
both BATNAs. It is possible that the observed effect o f BATNA on the first offer made 
is also mediated by knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries. More research is necessary to 
address this issue.
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Also, Study 1 indicated that those control strong negotiators were outperformed by 
their weaker counterparts, even though they had a more attractive BATNA than others. 
The question emerges as to why having an attractive BATNA is not sufficient to provide 
strong negotiators with a larger share of surplus?
One place to begin to address this question would be to speculate about strong parties’ 
mind-set when they did not have knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries. One possible 
explanation is that uninformed strong negotiators, as shown previously, assumed that 
their counterparts also had an attractive alternative to the negotiation. As a result, they 
would act as if they were in equal-BATNA situations. In contrast, knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries provided strong negotiators with a justification of a larger share 
of the resource pie. It signals to them that their counterparts rely on the existing 
negotiation to a greater extent than they do.
However, the results indicated that the impact of knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries 
on strong negotiators’ bargaining strength was not considerable. The increase in their 
bargaining strength was only about 6-7%. Why is this? Unlike other studies (Roth and 
Malouf, 1979, Roth and Mumighan, 1982), opponents’ payoff structures were never 
revealed to strong negotiators in this study. Therefore, they knew little about the exact 
amount o f surplus that their weaker counterparts would receive from any particular 
agreements. Although the increase in their bargaining strength was not large, effects of 
knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries on strong negotiators’ strategies and how they 
approach negotiations should not be underestimated. As will be discussed later, 
knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries, when given to strong negotiators, can have an
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impact on dyads’ ability to reach efficient agreements. This may be due to the fact that 
informed strong negotiators approached negotiations very differently from those 
without knowledge14.
A Bigger Slice o f  a Smaller Pie or a Smaller Slice o f  a Bigger Pie
Bargaining strength -  using proportions of surplus that strong negotiators received -  
might not reveal the entire story, and could be misleading. Although it allows us to 
make judgements as to whether information about another’s BATNA increases their 
bargaining strength, it fails to examine if strong negotiators are better off when only 
strong negotiators are informed than when they are not. To illustrate, imagine 
negotiators A and B bargain over how to divide £100 and negotiator A gets £40, 40% of 
the total available surplus. When negotiators C and D negotiate how £50 should be split, 
negotiator C receives £30, 60% of the total surplus. In terms o f bargaining strength, 
negotiator C performs better than negotiator A, but is it right to say that negotiator C, 
who has £30, is better o ff than negotiator A with £40?
Focussing only on the effect o f knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries on bargaining 
strength might distort the character of the data, since it assumes that the size o f the 
resource does not change. Perhaps it is unwise to draw the conclusion that informed 
strong negotiators were better off than control strong negotiators. In light of this 
potential problem, bargaining strength should be interpreted cautiously. To address this 
problem, an additional analysis of their absolute payoffs is needed. The results show
14 The process by which this occurs will be addressed in Study 2 and Study 3.
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that there was a significant main effect o f strong negotiators’ knowledge on their 
absolute payoffs. When only strong negotiators were informed of both BATNAs, they 
obtained higher payoffs than when they lacked information (M =  8,724 vs. M =  8,054). 
Therefore, it is evident that strong negotiators’ knowledge not only increased greater 
bargaining power, but also led to higher payoffs.
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3.8.4 Knowledge o f  BATNA-Asymm etries and  A greem ent Efficiency
The final question addressed in Study 1 was w hose know ledge o f  BATNA-asymmetries 
results in an im provem ent o f  agreem ent efficiency? This issue was examined by 
challenging negotiators with a task requiring logrolling skills to reach efficient 
agreem ents and by providing them with know ledge o f  BATNA-asymmetries. As 
illustrated in Figure 3.9, the effect o f  knowledge o f BATNA-asym m etries on agreement 
efficiency can differ, depending on the quality o f  one’s BATNA in relation to another’s. 
When only strong negotiators were informed o f  both BATNAs, dyads were less likely 
to reach efficient agreem ents than when they w ere not. Conversely, weak negotiators’ 
knowledge o f BATNA-im balances alone im proved dyads’ ability to reach efficient 
agreements. When both parties had com plete knowledge o f  BATNA-asymmetries, 
dyads tended to attain less efficient agreem ents tlhan they both lacked this knowledge.
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This pattern of result can shed some light on why dyads with unequal BATNAs reach 
more efficient outcomes than those with equal BATNAs (Pinkley, 1995, Pinkley et a l, 
1994, Roloff and Dailey, 1987). There are two existing but competing explanations, one 
by Pinkley (1995) and another by Roloff and Dailey (1985). Each o f these requires 
knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries being available to one o f the parties, either strong 
or weak negotiators. Therefore, the observed impact o f knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries on efficiency allows for preliminary examinations of these 
explanations. In addition, Study 1 examined whether complete knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries may be required to improve agreement efficiency.
First, the refined version of Pinkley’s (1995) hypothesis was that knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries provides strong negotiators with both the freedom and 
motivation to signal relevant information and find creative ways to expand the resource 
pie. Contrary to Pinkley’s (1995) hypothesis, the findings showed that knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries by strong negotiators did not improve dyads’ ability to find 
efficient agreements. Therefore, Pinkley’s (1995) explanation is not supported in this 
research. Not only did strong negotiators’ knowledge o f BATNA-imbalances fail to 
facilitate the development of efficient solutions, but it also seemed to hinder this 
process.
As discussed previously, negotiation efficiency was assessed with the use of three 
different measurements, (1) joint gains, (2) integrativeness scores, and (3) numbers of 
superior agreements. Both joint gains and numbers o f superior agreements indicated the 
detrimental effect o f strong negotiators’ knowledge on efficiency. However, there was
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no significant difference in integrativeness scores between control dyads and dyads 
with informed strong negotiators, although the trend was consistent with the other two 
measurements. This is because integrativeness scores were used to indicate if 
negotiators fu lly  traded off issues in the most profit-maximising way whereas the others 
directly examined agreement efficiency. The pattern of results suggests that both 
control dyads and those with informed strong negotiators were unlikely to fully trade 
off issues but the former tended to trade off to a greater extent.
Second, according to Roloff and Dailey (1987), weak negotiators’ knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries is the key to the development o f efficient agreements in 
BATNA-imbalanced negotiations. The relationship between weak negotiators’ 
knowledge and agreement efficiency was tested in Pinkley’s (1995) study, but it 
received weak support. This is because it was common knowledge that strong 
negotiators did not know both BATNAs in Pinkley’s (1995) design. As mentioned in 
Chapter Two, the argument was that if weak negotiators knew that their opponents were 
not informed, they would be free to behave in the same way as strong negotiators (or 
any other way), and consequently, the impact of weak negotiators’ knowledge on 
efficiency would be greatly reduced. Therefore, the current study explored the 
possibility o f this confounding variable, and non-common knowledge of whether strong 
negotiators knew both BATNAs was shown to be important. When this confounding 
variable was removed, weak negotiators’ knowledge alone was found to improve the 
development of efficient agreements. The pattern of results generally supports Roloff 
and Dailey’s (1987) explanation in this study.
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Apart from existing hypotheses proposed by Pinkley (1995) and Roloff & Dailey 
(1987), the study explored the possibility that commonly held knowledge of 
BATNA-imbalances may be necessary to increase agreement efficiency. As illustrated 
in Figure 3.9, when both parties had complete knowledge about BATNA-asymmetries, 
they tended to reach less efficient agreements than when they had no knowledge. The 
pattern of results contradicted the prediction of the alternative explanation. Instead, it 
suggests that complete knowledge hinders negotiators from reaching efficient 
outcomes.
O f all the results, this finding is probably most intriguing. While weak negotiators’ 
knowledge alone improved the quality of agreements, dyads’ ability to reach efficient 
agreements was hindered when strong negotiators’ knowledge was also introduced. The 
pattern of results suggests that the detrimental impact o f strong negotiators’ knowledge 
o f BATNA-asymmetries on agreement efficiency is powerful enough to ‘wash out’ the 
benefit of weak negotiators’ knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries. More research is 
necessary to identify how this occurs.
Thus far, we have discussed the four main research questions raised in this chapter. The 
following discussion focuses on how the results provide a piece o f the puzzle in the 
existing literature that has not yet been directly addressed in Study 1. First, an attempt 
will be made to untangle the inconsistencies of mixed results regarding the relationship 
between power and agreement efficiency in previous studies. Also, Study 1 has 
examined the effects o f negotiators’ knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries on both 
distributive and integrative outcomes separately. The second part combines and
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generalises these findings to evaluate whether negotiators’ knowledge introduces a 
trade-off between integrative and distributive outcomes. Finally, this chapter will 
consider the potential limitations and future directions of the current research.
Chapter Three -  Importance o f  Knowledge o f  BATINA-Asymmetries (Study 1)
3.8.5 Equal Power versus Unequal Power and Agreement Efficiency
Along with other theorists, the current research used the BATNA manipulation to 
create a power difference between parties (Brett et al., 1996, Pinkley, 1995, Pinkley et 
a l .y  1994, Roloff and Dailey, 1987). Strong negotiators had a better quality of BATNA 
than weak negotiators did. Power has also been operationalised in different ways in 
other negotiation studies. For instance, Mannix and Neale (1983) adopted a market 
setting and power difference was created by giving negotiators asymmetric numbers of 
alternative negotiation partners that existed in the market. Lawler and Yoon (1993) 
manipulated power by varying the probabilities o f various profits from the alternative 
negotiator. In case o f an impasse, power-advantaged negotiators had a higher expected 
value o f the alternative outcome than power-disadvantaged negotiators did.
Previous empirical research has provided mixed results on whether equal or unequal 
power (or BATNA) among dyad members results in agreements o f higher efficiency. 
Past research that employed BATNA manipulation suggests that dyads with 
asymmetric BATNAs reach agreements of higher efficiency than those with equal 
BATNAs (Pinkley et al., 1994, Roloff and Dailey, 1987). In contrast, the stream of 
research using different power manipulations has shown that dyads with an equal 
balance of power are more likely to reach solutions o f higher efficiency than those with 
an unequal balance o f power (Lawler and Yoon, 1993, Mannix and Neale, 1993).
Clearly, there are contradictions within this set of findings. Why do dyads with unequal 
BATNAs sometimes outperform dyads with equal BATNAs and sometimes vice versa?
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Perhaps the power manipulation used is relevant. Alternatively, the amount of 
knowledge about BATNA-asymmetries that negotiators hold may be important. 
Although the difference in efficiency between equal and unequal power was not 
directly addressed in the current study, the relationship between negotiators’ knowledge 
and agreement efficiency explored may help untangle the inconsistencies in the 
literature.
Before addressing this issue, it is necessary to first examine the difference in 
negotiators’ knowledge among these studies. An assumption o f complete knowledge 
was made in studies suggesting that dyads with equal power reached agreements of 
higher efficiency (Lawler and Yoon, 1993, Mannix and Neale, 1993). That is, 
negotiators knew their own and the others’ power status or BATNAs. However, 
Pinkley et al. (1994) and Roloff & Dailey (1987), who found that dyads with unequal 
BATNAs reached more efficient agreements, did not make such an assumption. In fact, 
it is unclear from the descriptions o f their experimental design to what extent 
negotiators shared information about their BATNAs.
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Figure 3.10 A Summary of Findings in Agreement Efficiency (Study 1)
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Note. ** This is the baseline model (control group) in the current study.
Brett el al. (1996) and Pinkley (1995) found that when negotiators only knew their own 
BATNAs and were told not to reveal their BATNAs to opponents, there was no 
difference in agreem ent efficiency between dyads with unequal BATNAs and those 
with equal BATNAs. N ote that in the control group in Study 1, dyads with asymmetric 
BATNAs had incom plete information about others' BATNAs. In other words, based on 
the past findings, the control group is equivalent to dyads with equal BATNAs in terms 
o f agreem ent efficiency. Also, the current study showed that com plete knowledge o f  
BATNA -asym m etries (i.e. both parties knew both BA TN A s) had an adverse effect on 
dyads' ability to reach efficient solutions (see Figure 3.10). This implies that when both 
strong and w eak negotiators had complete knowledge, they tended to reach less 
efficient agreem ents than dyads having equal BATNAs.
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Together, these results explain the contradiction in findings from those studies 
considering the difference in efficiency between dyads with equal power and those with 
unequal power. As shown earlier in this chapter, strong negotiators’ knowledge and 
weak negotiators’ knowledge have opposite impacts on agreement efficiency. However, 
the detrimental effect of strong negotiators’ knowledge is sufficiently powerful to 
override the benefit of weak negotiators’ knowledge on efficiency.
3.8.6 Trade-off between Integrative and Distributive Bargaining
The patterns of results from Study 1 suggest that information about another’s BATNA 
introduces a trade-off between distributive and integrative bargaining for both strong 
and weak negotiators. Both advantages and disadvantages o f possessing this 
information were observed. For example, knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries might 
lead negotiators to be more effective at distributive bargaining, but at the same time 
ineffective at integrative bargaining, or vice versa.
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Figure 3.11 A Trade-off Introduced by Strong Negotiators’ Knowledge
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As can be seen in Figure 3.11, when only strong negotiators were informed o f  both 
BATNAs, their bargaining strength was found to be greater than when they were not 
informed. That is, this inform ation seems to propel strong negotiators to taking a larger 
share o f  the resource pie. On the other hand, this know ledge was also found to 
influence agreem ent efficiency. When strong negotiators were aw are o f  
BATNA-asym m etries, negotiation dyads tended to be less likely to attain efficient 
outcom es than when they were not. In other words, strong negotiators’ knowledge o f 
BATNA-asym m etries seems to reduce the size o f the resource pie to be divided 
between negotiators. In light o f  opposing effects o f  strong negotiators’ knowledge on 
the distributive and integrative elem ents, a trade-off' was therefore introduced.
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Figure 3.12 A Trade-off Introduced by Weak Negotiators’ Knowledge
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Directions o f  the impact o f  weak negotiators’ knowledge on bargaining strength and 
agreem ent efficiency are the reverse. There was a significant effect for weak 
negotiators’ knowledge on their bargaining strength. W hen only weak negotiators knew 
both BATNAs, they tended to garner a small share o f  the bargaining surplus than when 
they did not know both BATNAs (see Figure 3.12). Why is this? Recall that weak 
negotiators’ aspiration levels decreased with knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries. 
Considering how aspirations affect the way negotiators approach negotiations (Brodt, 
1994, Cum mings and Harnett, 1969, Ham ner and Harnett, 1975, Thom pson, 1995), an 
explanation is that informed weak negotiators w ith lower aspirations make less 
aggressive opening offers and concede more quickly than control weak negotiators, 
resulting in a sm aller share o f the resource pie.
On the other hand, it was shown that w eak negotiators’ knowledge o f
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BATNA-asymmetries had a considerable impact on the quality o f negotiated 
agreements. When only weak negotiators were informed of both BATNAs, dyads were 
more capable of reaching efficient agreements than when they were not. Although 
knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries led them to be less effective at distributive 
elements, at the same time it increased the size of the resource pie to be divided. 
Similar to strong negotiators’ knowledge, it introduces a trade-off between distributive 
and integrative outcomes but in the opposing direction.
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3.8.7 Potential Limitations and Future Directions
The current study, like much o f the research on negotiations, adopted a job offer 
negotiation simulation (Anderson and Thompson, 2004, Brett et al., 1996, Pinkley, 
1995, Pinkley et a l 1994). One might argue that the job offer negotiation might have 
created more than just BATNA differences between parties. Being designated as 
recruiters might have placed individuals in a position of higher power, and it could also 
have activated social norms unrelated to BATNAs; for instance, employers are 
commonly considered to have ‘legitimate’ and ‘reward’ power over candidates, 
therefore outperform their counterparts. Thus, the ‘role’ effect could be a potential 
confounding factor.
Yet, the findings from Study 1 showed that when negotiators had no knowledge about 
others’ BATNAs, strong negotiators did not outperform than weak negotiators in terms 
of distributive outcome. In fact, they attained a slightly smaller share of the resource 
pie (MstWfjg = 47.5%) than did weak negotiators (Mweak = 52.5%). This implies that there 
is little effect of ‘role’ to start with. In support of this assertion, Pinkley (1995) tested 
the effect of ‘role’ and there was no difference in the results in terms o f distributive and 
integrative outcomes. Finally, it is important to note that the potential confounding 
factor of ‘role’ in the current research (if any) will be eliminated, because the absolute 
difference in negotiated outcomes across different experimental conditions was of 
interest. As a result, any observed changes in negotiated outcomes speak only to the 
effect of negotiators’ knowledge about BATNA-asymmetries.
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The second potential limitation concerns the setting of the negotiation simulation. The 
present research, like most of the research on negotiations, used university students and 
the stakes were lower than they would be in real-life situations. This may limit the 
generalisability o f the findings because individuals may behave differently if the stakes 
involved are higher, or they may use information about others’ BATNAs in a different 
way. Thus, it is important to conduct complementary research in real-world negotiation 
settings to verify the external validity of the findings.
At the beginning of this chapter, the impact of negotiators’ BATNAs on perceptions 
about others’ positions were considered. Only two values o f BATNAs (1,200 and 6,000 
points) were considered in this study. This could be problematic. One might argue that 
negotiators with different levels of BATNAs may be anchored to their own BATNAs to 
different degrees, when estimating their opponents’ positions. For example, negotiators 
with a BATNA of 1,200 points may perceive that their opponents’ BATNAs are similar 
to their own. However, negotiators with a BATNA of 3,000 points may not do so. An 
assumption -  that the impact of negotiators’ BATNA on their perceptions is 
independent o f the quality of BATNAs -  entails a significant loss of generality and 
comprehensiveness. Therefore, the findings have limited us to examining negotiators’ 
perceptions about others’ positions at two certain points. To test this hypothesis fully, 
different values o f BATNAs over the range of possible BATNAs should be included in 
the analysis.
Finally, I have explored the relationship between negotiators’ knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries and agreement efficiency. The impact of knowledge on
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efficiency can differ, depending on which party (strong or weak negotiators) have 
access to this information. However, the main limitation o f the current research is that it 
leaves relatively open the question of how knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries leads to 
agreements with different efficiency. Specifically, we do not yet know how strong 
negotiators’ knowledge hinders and weak negotiators’ knowledge facilitates dyads’ 
ability to search for efficient agreements. These open questions motivated the design of 
Study 2.
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Chapter Four -  How Knowledge of BATNA-Asymmetries Affects Agreement 
Efficiency (Study 2)
The main focus o f Study 1 was on whether negotiators’ knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries can have an impact on agreement efficiency. Yet, Study 1 leaves 
relatively open questions as to how negotiators’ knowledge results in agreements with 
different efficiency. Study 2 is designed to examine how this occurs. Considering that 
effects o f this knowledge on efficiency are various when given to different negotiators, 
the research questions that will be addressed in Study 2 are: (1) how does information 
about another’s BATNA, when given to strong negotiators, hinder dyads from reaching 
efficient outcomes?; (2) how does weak negotiators’ awareness improve dyads’ ability 
to reach integrative agreements?; (3) how do negotiators seem to be less capable of 
reaching efficient agreements, when information about others’ BATNAs is commonly 
held by both parties?; and (4) why does complete knowledge not improve dyads’ ability 
to find efficient outcomes, although solo weak negotiators’ knowledge does?
To address these research questions, it is important to discuss the mediating factor that 
can aid dyads’ ability to reach efficient agreements. The link between knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries and this mediator will be explored in this study to help shed light 
on the already-seen effects of knowledge on the quality o f negotiated agreements in 
Study 1. Therefore, the first half of this chapter will generate a number of testable 
hypotheses relating to the questions posed. The second half describes the methodology 
employed and reports the empirical findings. Finally, a discussion section describes 
theoretical implications o f the findings.
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4.1 Key to Successful Agreements
As mentioned before, the primary objective of Study 2 is to explain how negotiators’ 
knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries affects agreement efficiency. Before addressing 
this research question, it is important to understand dyads’ ability to reach efficient 
agreements (see Figure 4.1). Identifying underlying factors can help shed light on the 
research question by showing how negotiators’ knowledge affects efficiency. To 
anticipate, information-exchange between negotiators is the key. Study 2 explores 
whether negotiators’ knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries encourages or hinders the 
process by which negotiators share information about preferences.
Figure 4.1 A Possible Mediator of the Impact of Knowledge on Efficiency
Negotiators’
Knowledge of ----------- ►
BATNA-asymmetries
Agreement
Efficiency
Before exploring the relationship between knowledge and information-exchange, the 
following section aims to examine the relationship between information-exchange and 
agreement efficiency. Firstly, how negotiators generally approach negotiations is 
discussed. Secondly, a brief review of past research about information-exchange and a 
fuller understanding o f how it leads to efficient agreements are included. Finally, the 
discussion centres on how negotiators’ information-sharing behaviour affects their 
opponents’ behaviour.
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4.1.1 Commonness o f  Inefficient Agreements
A large body of research demonstrates that negotiators often settle for sub-optimal 
outcomes even when there are other agreements that can make at least one of them 
better off without hurting another (Neale and Northcraft, 1986, Pruitt and Rubin, 1986, 
Raiffa, 1982). According to the cognitive approach to negotiation, negotiators’ 
inaccurate perceptions of their opponents’ interests accounts for this inefficiency 
(Bazerman and Carroll, 1987, Thompson, 1990c). At the outset o f a negotiation, 
negotiators often perceive that their counterparts’ interests are completely opposed to 
their own and that they have the same preferences across to-be-negotiated issues. This 
perception is known as fixed-pie bias. This bias is considered a judgement error 
because in many negotiation situations negotiators’ interests are not completely 
opposed and potential for integrative agreements exists (Raiffa, 1982, Walton and 
McKersie, 1965).
Further, the fixed-pie bias is likely to persist throughout the course of negotiations 
(Thompson and Hastie, 1990, Thompson, 1991). Negotiators who suffer from this bias 
are unlikely to appreciate the opportunity for learning their opponents’ preferences 
across issues. After all, they might contend that there is no use telling their opponents 
something they already know; or it is pointless for them to learn something about their 
counterparts that merely confirms their expectations. As a result, negotiators commonly 
fail to make trade-offs across issues that differ in importance and instead settle for 
inefficient agreements.
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4.1.2 Relationship between Information-Exchange and Efficiency
Many researchers have suggested that information-exchange about preferences across 
issues between parties leads to greater judgement accuracy about the other’s interests in 
negotiations (Murnighan, Babcock, Thompson and Pillutla, 1999, Thompson and 
Hastie, 1990, Thompson, 1991, Walton and McKersie, 1965). With a better 
understanding o f opponents’ interests and priorities, negotiators are then more capable 
o f making trade-offs among issues that differ in importance, resulting in efficient 
agreements (Thompson, 1991).
Evidence o f this contention can be found in Thompson’s (1991) study. Thompson 
(1991) examined the importance of ‘actual’ information-exchange to the quality of 
negotiated agreements. Information-exchange was manipulated by explicitly instructing 
both members o f the dyad to either seek or provide information about interests to their 
opponents. It was found that negotiators who either sought or provided information 
made more accurate judgements about their opponents’ interests and reached more 
efficient agreements than did those who were not instructed to share information.
Thompson (1991) also examined whether benefits of information-exchange are limited 
to situations where both negotiators are instructed to seek or to provide information. 
Agreement efficiency was found to be greater when only one o f them was instructed to 
share information (either providing or seeking information about others’ interests), than 
when neither was. This finding suggests that only one member o f the dyad sharing 
information may reap the same benefits as both members doing so.
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Given that information-exchange is a major factor considered in this study, it is worth 
providing a fuller understanding of this process by explaining why the effort of one 
party is sufficient to improve agreement efficiency. It may be due to the fact that 
information-exchange is a reciprocal process. Thompson & Hastie (1990) provided 
evidence suggesting that the information-sharing behaviour o f negotiators influenced 
the behaviour of their opponents15. Specifically, seeking and providing information was 
found to be positively reciprocated, so that negotiators who sought information from 
their opponents were likely to be asked for information in return; negotiators who 
provided information to others were likely to receive information about others’ interests 
as well.
Study 1 showed that in BATNA-imbalanced negotiations knowledge of others’ 
BATNAs can affect agreement efficiency. In light o f the importance of 
information-sharing tactics, the relationship between knowledge and negotiators’ 
information-sharing behaviour can therefore help explain how changes in efficiency 
occurred in Study 1.
It is important to note that the present study is different from past research that 
considered information-exchange as an independent variable (Thompson, 1991, 
Thompson and Hastie, 1990). For example, Thompson (1991) manipulated the 
information-exchange process by instructing negotiators to share information, whereas 
the current study treats negotiators’ information-sharing behaviour as a dependent
15 Thompson (1991) found that seeking information followed reciprocity, but providing information 
received weak support. N evertheless, whether providing information is reciprocal is beyond the scope o f  
this study, and mixed empirical results should not interfere with the follow ing hypotheses in the present 
study. This is because what is important is that providing information improves negotiators’ judgements 
and agreement efficiency.
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variable. This is in order to explore whether knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries, when 
given to negotiators, would naturally encourage or hinder information-exchange.
The remainder o f this chapter focuses on the set-up o f hypotheses regarding the 
relationship between knowledge and information-exchange. I will consider whether 
knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries when given to strong and/or weak negotiators 
would hinder or encourage the parties’ information sharing behaviours.
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4.2 Effect of Negotiators’ Knowledge of BATNA-Asymmetries on Information- 
Sharing Behaviour
This section will briefly discuss how the pattern o f results from Study 1 will be used as 
a guide to predict the association between negotiators’ knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries and information-exchange about interests. It is divided into three 
subsections: (1) strong negotiators’ knowledge, (2) weak negotiators’ knowledge, and 
(3) complete knowledge. Before proceeding to the hypotheses, each subsection will 
give a quick review of relevant findings in Study 1.
4.2.1 Relationship between Strong Negotiators’ Knowledge o f  BATNA-Asymme tries and 
Information-Exchange
Study 1 produced evidence suggesting that knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries, when 
being made available to strong negotiators, does not improve dyads’ ability to search 
for efficient solutions. More importantly, to the extent that negotiations have integrative 
potentials, the finding suggests that this knowledge actually hinders dyads’ ability to 
find efficient solutions. In other words, strong negotiators’ knowledge is likely to 
undercut joint profits. It remains unclear as to how this knowledge hinders the 
development o f efficient solutions.
As discussed previously, it is clear that the degree to which negotiators communicate 
with others about their preferences helps determine the quality of negotiated outcomes. 
Implicit in the finding from Study 1 is that when strong negotiators are aware of 
BATNA-asymmetries, they are unlikely to appreciate the opportunity to freely
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communicate with their weaker counterparts about their interests. It is postulated that 
information about another’s BATNA will affect the likelihood o f strong negotiators 
sharing information with their counterparts. In essence, when strong negotiators are 
informed o f both BATNAs, they will be less likely to either seek or provide information 
about interests to their weaker counterparts. This lack o f information-exchange may 
explain how strong negotiators’ knowledge was a handicap to the development of 
efficient solutions. To explore this possibility, the following hypothesis is tested:
Hypothesis 1: When strong negotiators are aware of BATNA-asymmetries, they will be 
less likely to share information about interests with others, than when they are not.
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4.2.2 Relationship between Weak Negotiators’ Knowledge and Information-Exchange
Findings from Study 1 show that dyads are capable of reaching agreements with greater 
efficiency when only weak negotiators are informed o f both BATNAs than when they 
are not. Study 1 does not tell us how this happens. To address this issue, it is important 
to examine what mediates the relationship between weak negotiators’ knowledge and 
agreement efficiency. Again, research that emphasises the importance of 
information-exchange about preferences may be helpful.
It may be that solo weak negotiators’ knowledge plays an important role in fostering 
communications between parties about their interests. Specifically, this knowledge 
increases the likelihood o f weak negotiators sharing information, thus improving the 
quality o f agreements attained. To explore this possible explanation, the hypothesis 
tested is proposed as follows:
Hypothesis 2a: When weak negotiators are informed o f both BATNAs, they will be 
more likely to share information about interests with opponents, than when they are not 
informed.
Initiation o f  Information-Exchange
Apart from the likelihood of sharing information, weak negotiators’ knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries may also influence initiations o f the information-exchange 
process. Explicit in Roloff & Dailey’s (1987) hypothesis is the suggestion that 
knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries should lead to higher incentives of weak
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negotiators to create alternate settlements. It is worth considering whether informed 
weak negotiators are more likely to initiate information-exchange about interests than 
uninformed ones. It is important to note that this is not a test o f the impact of weak 
negotiators’ knowledge on motivation.
According to the speculation above and the prediction o f hypothesis 2a, knowledge of 
BATNA-imbalances not only facilitates weak negotiators’ information-sharing 
behaviours but also increases the chance o f them initiating this process. If correct, it 
will explain how this knowledge alone leads to an increase in agreement efficiency.
Hypothesis 2b: When only weak negotiators are informed o f BATNA-asymmetries, 
they will be more likely to initiate information-exchange than when they are not.
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4.2.3 Relationship between Complete Knowledge o f  BATNA-Asymmetries and 
Information-Exchange
Apart from strong negotiators’ and weak negotiators’ knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries, the impact of complete knowledge on agreement efficiency was 
examined in Study 1. Study 1 examined whether information about another’s BATNA 
needs to be commonly held to facilitate the development of efficient agreements. The 
results show that when negotiators have complete knowledge, they tend to reach less 
efficient agreements than when they lack this knowledge.
How does complete knowledge hinder dyads’ ability to reach efficient solutions? The 
focus of Study 2 is on whether complete knowledge affects information-sharing 
behaviours of negotiators. It is possible that when both parties have complete 
knowledge about BATNA-imbalances, they will be less likely to share information 
about interests than when they both lack this knowledge. This reduction in the overall 
information-exchange could explain the adverse impact of complete knowledge on 
agreement efficiency that was shown in Study 1.
It is important to note that in the examination of the impact o f complete knowledge, the 
measurement o f information-exchange is slightly different from that in examinations of 
main effects o f strong and weak negotiators’ knowledge, discussed previously. The 
former is measured at the dyadic level whereas the latter is measured at the individual 
level. The rationale is that there is no predicted, clear relationship between complete 
knowledge and negotiators’ individual information-sharing behaviour. Therefore, the 
negotiation dyad is considered as a unit. Which member of the dyad shares information
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is not yet o f interest here. To explore the possibility that complete knowledge hinders 
information-exchange between parties, the following hypothesis will be tested:
Hypothesis 3: When both parties have knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries, dyads will 
be less likely to share information, than when they lack this knowledge.
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4.3 Exploring How Complete Knowledge Reduces Agreement Efficiency
Since w eak negotiators* awareness o f  BATNA-asym m etries alone improves dyads’ 
ability to reach efficient agreements, it is curious that com plete knowledge o f 
BATNA-im balances does not reflect the same benefit (see Figure 4.2). The pattern o f  
results suggests that the benefit incurred from weak negotiators’ knowledge is 
elim inated, once strong negotiators’ knowledge is also introduced: strong negotiators’ 
know ledge alone hinders dyads from reaching efficient agreem ents. The detrimental 
effect o f  strong negotiators' knowledge is so powerful that it overrides the advantage o f 
weak negotiators’ know ledge on agreem ent efficiency.
Figure 4.2 Agreement Efficiency as a Function of Negotiators’ Knowledge
Efficiency (Joint Outcomes)
18,000 ~~
17.000
16.000 ~
Control Strong Informed Weak Informed Both Informed
Given this unexpected finding, some further questions need to be addressed. Why does 
com plete know ledge not improve agreem ent efficiency as w eak negotiators* knowledge
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alone does? How does strong negotiators’ knowledge wash away the advantage of weak 
negotiators’ knowledge? To address these questions, the following section focuses on 
the difference in negotiators’ behaviour between when only weak negotiators are 
informed o f BATNA-asymmetries and when both parties are informed. In other words, 
the baseline model is that weak negotiators know of both BATNAs and the only 
difference between these two groups is that strong negotiators are also informed in 
complete knowledge condition.
In the following, two plausible explanations will be tested o f how strong negotiators’ 
knowledge overrides the benefit of weak negotiators’ knowledge to agreement 
efficiency. It considers first whether strong negotiators’ knowledge affects their 
willingness to reveal their interests and second, whether strong negotiators’ knowledge 
affects informed weak negotiators’ information-sharing behaviour.
4.3.1 Strong Negotiators ’ Willingness to Reveal Their Preferences
As mentioned, Thompson (1991) suggests that seeking information about interests from 
others leads to agreements with greater efficiency. This contention is based on the 
assumption that negotiators are willing to take advantage of the opportunity to expand 
the resource pie. It is worth considering whether this is the case when strong 
negotiators are aware o f BATNA-asymmetries. It may be that when opponents 
(informed weak negotiators) ask for information about interests, informed strong 
negotiators are less willing to reveal this information than uninformed strong 
negotiators16. As a result, it will be difficult for their opponents to trade-off issues in
16 It is important to note that here I am not suggesting that strong negotiators’ knowledge reduces their
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which strong and weak negotiators have different priorities, and instead they settle for 
suboptimal agreements.
This is one o f the possible reasons that complete knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries 
does not improve agreement efficiency as solo weak negotiators’ knowledge does. To 
test this possible explanation, the following hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 4a: When both parties are informed o f both BATNAs, strong negotiators are 
less likely to provide that information, if asked, than when only weak negotiators are 
informed.
4.3.2 Effect o f  Strong Negotiators' Knowledge on Counterparts’ Information-Sharing 
Behaviour
Solo weak negotiators’ knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries is predicted to facilitate 
weak negotiators’ information-sharing behaviour in Study 2, thus improving agreement 
efficiency. However, given that the detrimental effect of strong negotiators’ knowledge 
is powerful, strong negotiators’ knowledge may alter weak negotiators’ behaviour: it 
may be powerful enough to constrain informed weak negotiators from sharing 
information about interests. In other words, it is possible that when strong negotiators 
are informed o f BATNA-asymmetries, informed weak negotiators are less likely to 
share information about interests than when strong negotiators lack this knowledge. If 
correct, it helps shed some light on how strong negotiators’ knowledge eliminates the
w illingness to reveal preference only when weak negotiators are informed o f  both BATNAs. It w ill also 
be likely that strong negotiators’ knowledge will work in a similar way even when weak negotiators are 
not informed. The baseline model chosen is when weak negotiators are informed, because I am interested 
in how strong negotiators’ knowledge washes away the advantage o f  weak negotiators’ knowledge.
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advantage of weak negotiators’ knowledge. To explore this possibility, the final 
hypothesis tested in Study 2 is as follows:
Hypothesis 4b: When both parties are aware of BATNA-differences, weak negotiators 
will be less likely to share information about interests, than when only weak negotiators 
know both BATNAs.
Study 2 does not examine why strong negotiators’ knowledge adversely affects weak 
negotiators’ information-sharing behaviour. If the above contention is proved to be 
correct, why this occurs will be addressed in Study 3. It is also important to note that 
Hypotheses 4a and 4b are not mutually exclusive. This is because both informed strong 
negotiators’ reluctance to reveal preferences and the impact o f strong negotiators’ 
knowledge on their weaker counterparts’ behaviour can, at the same time, remove the 
advantage of weak negotiators’ knowledge.
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4.4 Overview of Study 2
Study 1 produced evidence suggesting that knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries can 
have very different impacts on negotiation efficiency, depending on which party has 
access to this knowledge. Study 2 will seek to replicate these findings. However, it is 
still unclear as to how negotiators’ knowledge leads to agreements with different 
efficiency. Study 2 examines how this occurs. Specifically, it has been suggested that 
effects o f knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries on agreement efficiency may be 
mediated by information-exchange about preferences. Study 2 examines the beneficial 
and potentially deleterious effects of negotiators’ knowledge on information-exchange.
In summary, four research questions will be addressed in Study 2. The first question 
concerns whether strong negotiators’ knowledge alone hinders them from sharing 
information about interests. Secondly, since solo weak negotiators’ knowledge 
improves agreement efficiency, whether this knowledge encourages weak negotiators to 
share information and to initiate the information-exchange process will also be 
examined. Thirdly, it is to demonstrate how complete knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries destroys dyads’ ability to reach efficient solutions. In particular, 
this study will test whether the overall reduction in communications between parties 
accounts for this inefficiency. Finally, an attempt is made to explore why complete 
knowledge o f BATNA-imbalances does not improve agreement efficiency as weak 
negotiators’ knowledge alone can.
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4.5 Method
Participants
A total o f 228 master students at London School of Economics and University College 
London, 120 male and 108 female, aged from 18 to 38 years (M  = 24.03, SD = 3.19). 
Subjects participated in the experiment as volunteers.
Procedure
The instructions and procedures were the same as those used in Study 1 except that an 
additional post-negotiation questionnaire was used. It elicited the participants’ 
information-sharing behaviour (see Dependent Measures for details o f questions).
Negotiation Task and Independent Variables
The negotiation task, levels of negotiators’ BATNAs, and independent variables were 
the same as those adopted in Study 1 (see Chapter Three, section 3.6 for details). As in 
Study 1, four basic experimental conditions were formed, as shown in the following 
table:
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Table 4.1 Negotiators’ Knowledge Status in Different Conditions
Experimental Conditions Information Levels
Control Neither player knows his or her opponent’s BATNA
Condition 2 Only strong negotiators know both BATNAs
Condition 3 Only weak negotiators know both BATNAs
Condition 4 Both know each other’s BATNAs
Note. Unless otherwise stated, the baseline model (reference) is the control group.
Dependent Measures
There were three new dependent measures required in Study 2. Each of these is 
discussed below:
(I) Negotiators 'Information-Sharing Behaviour
Subjects were asked two questions regarding their information-sharing behaviour after 
completing the exercise: “Did you ask any questions in relation to the preferences o f 
the negotiated issues?”; “Did you provide your opponent with information about your 
preferences across issues without being prompted?” This measurement indicated 
whether or not negotiators exchanged information about interests (either by seeking or 
providing information) in negotiations17. This allowed for examinations of negotiators’ 
information-sharing behaviours in different experimental conditions. The higher 
proportion of the variable indicated that negotiators were more likely to share
17 Both information-seeking and information-providing have been found to be equally effective to 
improve dyads’ ability to reach efficient solutions (Thompson, 1991). The main concern in Study 2 is to 
examine whether negotiators’ knowledge o f  BATNA-asymmetries affects information-sharing 
behaviours. However, whether this knowledge results in different strategies o f  information-exchange is 
beyond the scope o f  this study. Therefore, they are not differentiated in the current research.
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information. Information-sharing behaviours of both strong and weak negotiators were 
examined so that comparisons of negotiators’ behaviours in the same role across 
different conditions were possible. As a result, two different variables were computed, 
and they were: (1) strong negotiators’ information-exchange (strong exchange), and (2) 
weak negotiators’ information-exchange (weak exchange).
(2) Weak Negotiators ’Initiation o f  Information-Exchange
Apart from information-exchange about preferences, it is also necessary to examine the 
likelihood of weak negotiators initiating this process. ‘Weak Negotiators’ Initiation
1 ftScore’ was computed for each weak negotiator . The coding was dichotomous, and the 
score was either ‘0’ or ‘1 ’. If  information-exchange occurred and it was initiated by the 
weak party, he or she would receive a score of 1. If there was no information-exchange 
or the opponent initiated this process, then he or she would receive ‘0’ points instead. 
This would therefore generate different proportions of weak negotiators initiating 
information-exchange (weak initiation) in different experimental conditions. The 
higher this proportion in one condition relative to another, the more likely weak 
negotiators in that condition initiated information-exchange.
(3) Strong Negotiators ’ Willingness to Reveal Their Preferences
The final measurement required in Study 2 was strong negotiators’ willingness to reveal 
information when asked, i.e. their responses to their weaker counterparts’ requests for
18 Initiation score for strong negotiators was not computed because strong negotiators’ knowledge was 
found not to improve efficiency and is not predicted to facilitate information-exchange.
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information about their preferences across issues. Again, these responses produced 
proportions of strong negotiators who were willing to reveal preferences for different 
conditions. This variable is denoted as strong willingness.
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4.6 Data Collection
The data required to test the hypotheses is the content of negotiators’ interactions in 
terms o f information-exchange about interests. This section describes different choices 
of data collection available and the advantages and disadvantages of the method 
chosen.
Negotiators’ information-exchange about interests can be measured in two different 
ways, concurrently or retrospectively. Concurrent methodology has been widely used in 
studies examining communications between negotiators (Murnighan et al., 1999, 
Thompson, 1991, Tinsley, O'Connor and Sullivan, 2002). Data are collected by 
recording the negotiations, and transcribing and coding the contents. Generally, the 
coding process is carried out by a number of independent raters in order to maintain the 
reliability o f the data set and avoid subjective biases. Retrospective methodology refers 
to data being collected after having completed all tasks. Information-exchange is 
measured by asking negotiators to ‘retrospectively’ recall if  any information about 
preferences has been shared.
Retrospective methodology has a number o f advantages over concurrent methodology. 
The collection o f data only at the end of experiments conserves valuable instruction 
time since it requires less complicated data management than recording the entire 
process o f experiments. Although concurrent data collection is the norm and probably 
the best method, it requires special equipments (e.g. video camera or voice recorder) 
and is expensive. Therefore, it is beyond the possible scope of the thesis given that over 
200 subjects participated in this study. But, the disadvantages of retrospective
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methodology, while potentially problematic, may be overstated and can be mitigated by 
careful data checks. Two potential disadvantages o f retrospective methodology are 
demand characteristics and memory-related problems (de Vaus, 1996, de Vaus, 2001, 
Pratt, Mcguigan and Katzev, 2000). Each of these problems is described below.
Demand characteristics, such as wanting to please experimenters, may affect subjects’ 
level o f recall accuracy. It may be specifically problematic when subjects have a 
subjective motivation to make the experiments look good (Conway and Ross, 1984). 
For instance, it may be that negotiators attempt to predict what sort of behaviour that 
experimenters look for and they think that information about preferences should  have 
been shared. In addition, knowledge of what constitutes a good agreement (i.e., 
information-exchange is the key to efficient agreements) may colour negotiators’ recall 
of earlier behaviour through hindsight bias (Fischhoff, 1982, Hawkins and Hastie, 
1990). For example, subjects might use a strategy to maintain their self-esteem, as they 
might not want the researcher to know that they have failed to realise that their 
opponents have different priorities across issues. As a result, these biases may inflate 
the reported level of information-exchange between parties.
The second potential shortcoming of retrospective methodology regards individuals’ 
memory. The most salient memory-related problems are the length and specificity of 
the time period that is being recalled (de Vaus, 1996, Pratt et al., 2000). It seems that 
the longer the time period that is being recalled and the gap between the task and the 
recall-prompt, the more likely subjects’ recollections may be distorted. For example, 
they may simply forget what has been discussed with others during experiments, thus 
lowering the reliability of retrospective data. Alternatively, it is open to the possibility
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that subjects’ recollections of past experiences are interpreted in the light of subsequent 
events and experiences.
4.6.1 Qualifying the Use o f  Retrospective Reporting
These potential caveats are not grounds to condemn retrospective reporting in this study. 
To avoid the potential biases resulting from demand characteristics, a screening process 
o f data has been established. In post-negotiation questionnaires, negotiators are asked 
to recall whether they and their opponents have shared information about interests in 
the course o f negotiations. To maintain the accuracy and generality o f data, data is 
considered valid only if both members of the dyad give an identical response. For 
example, a negotiator indicates that s/he has sought information about interests from 
the opponent, and the opponent also reports that s/he has been asked for information 
about interests. But, when one participant’s response is not in agreement with the 
opponent’s, the case will be considered invalid and therefore excluded from the 
analyses.
Memory recalls are particularly problematic when data is collected after a prolonged 
period o f time o f an intervention (de Vaus, 1996, de Vaus, 2001). Yet, past research 
provides empirical evidence suggesting that there are no differences in the majority of 
comments made concurrently and those made retrospectively, when valid data is 
collected up to twenty-four hours after an intervention (Bailey, 2003). To maintain the 
accuracy o f negotiators’ recollections, all data will be collected immediately following 
completions o f an experiment. Since the negotiation simulation in this study only lasted 
thirty minutes, it is unlikely that subjects’ recollections o f information-exchange
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process would be greatly distorted by time.
In addition, Pratt et a l  (2000) contend that clarifying a defined period, such as “during 
the experiment”, may facilitate subjects’ recollections. Also, specific behaviours are 
easier to recall and assess than those that are more global (de Vaus, 2001, Pratt et al., 
2000). Given this prescriptive advice, questionnaires are formulated in a manner that 
enhances the recall of information-exchange. For example, it is likely that negotiators 
will recall their information-sharing behaviour when prompted by the cues 
‘information-seeking’ or ‘information-providing’, than when asked ‘what has been said 
during negotiations’. Questions that negotiators are asked to answer are, for example, 
“Did you ask your opponent any questions in relation to preferences across issues 
during the negotiation?”, “Did you provide your opponent with information about your 
preferences across issues without being prompted during the negotiation?” etc.
Together, both the screening procedure and the design of questionnaires should be 
sufficient to reduce biases resulting from demand characteristics and memory recall. 
Still, it is important to consider whether negotiators’ responses are consistent with their 
opponents’ before discussing empirical findings in Study 2, and this will be covered 
next.
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4.6.2 Distributions o f  Valid Cases
Table 4.2 A Summary of the Case Validity
Excluded Cases
Number of 
cases
Percent
Did strong parties provide or seek information from f. 5%
another?
Did weak parties provide or seek information from another? 6 5%
Weak negotiators’ initiation of the information-exchange
12 10%
process
Did strong negotiators reveal their preferences requested? 0 0%
In spite o f potential problems with retrospective reporting, recall across dyads was 
consistent. As can be seen in Table 4.2, 95% of strong negotiators and weak negotiators 
provided reports about their own information-sharing behaviour which matched reports 
from the other member of the dyad. In terms o f initiations o f information-exchange 
process, 90% of weak negotiators’ responses were consistent with their stronger 
counterparts’. Also, strong negotiators’ willingness to reveal their preferences received 
perfect match with reports from their opponents19. In general, only about 5-10% of 
subjects were excluded in the analyses .
19 There was an uneven pattern o f  reasons for exclusion in each group (see Appendix C for details).
20 Although the amount o f  excluded data is not considerable, it is important to check that the data does 
not change by excluding them. To address this issue, all o f  the major analyses were performed twice: 
once using the full data set and once using only those dyads that provided consistent reports. The two  
sets o f  analyses yielded very similar results with the primary difference being that analyses based on the 
partial data set were statistically stronger. Results o f  analyses based on the full data set are not reported
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Finally, the effect o f knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries is considered in this study, 
and it is hypothesised that negotiators in the ‘knowledge’ condition should be more (or 
less) likely to share information relative to those in the ‘no knowledge’ condition. 
Hence, any difference in overall levels of information-exchange (between retrospective 
and concurrent methodologies) should not interfere with the validity of hypotheses. 
Next, the results o f the critical tests of hypotheses will be given.
in this thesis but may be obtained from the author.
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4.7 Results
Study 1 considered whether negotiators’ knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries influences 
the efficiency o f negotiated agreements. Study 2 re-examines the effect o f negotiators’ 
knowledge on agreement efficiency and will be reported in the next section. Study 2 
was also designed to seek an explanation for how negotiators’ knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries affects agreement efficiency. As suggested, 
information-exchange about interests is considered as a possible explanation for the 
pattern o f impacts of knowledge on efficiency. The second part o f the result sections 
includes critical tests of hypotheses regarding information-exchange about negotiators’ 
settlement preferences. The analyses of the experimental data will shed light on the four 
main concepts first introduced in this chapter. They are (1) the impact of strong 
negotiators’ BATNA knowledge on their information-sharing behaviour, (2) the effect 
o f weak negotiators’ BATNA knowledge on their information-sharing behaviour, (3) 
the impact o f weak negotiators’ knowledge on the initiation o f information-exchange, 
and (4) the influence of strong negotiators’ knowledge on their willingness to reveal 
their preferences.
4.7.1 Replication o f  Findings in Study 1
It has been shown in Study 1 that effects of negotiators’ knowledge on agreement 
efficiency can be very different for strong negotiators and weak negotiators, depending 
on the quality o f one’s BATNA in relation to another’s. Specifically, solo weak 
negotiators’ knowledge was found to improve agreement efficiency but both solo 
strong negotiators’ knowledge and complete knowledge were found to destroy dyads’
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ability to reach efficient outcomes.
The same dependent measure of agreement efficiency as adopted in Study 1, joint 
outcome, was used to examine if Study 2 replicated the same pattern. Higher joint 
outcomes indicate more efficient agreements (see Chapter 3 for details). Table 4.3 
describes experimental conditions and reports the findings.
Table 4.3 Means (Standard Deviations) for Joint Gains, Integrativeness Score, and 
Number of Superior Agreements by Experimental Conditions (Study 2)
Experimental Condition
Only Strong Only Weak
Neither
Negotiators Negotiators Both Informed
Informed
Informed Informed (Condition 4)
(Control)
(Condition 2) (Condition 3)
16,975a 16,131* 17,993, 15,790*
Joint Gain
(1,318) (1,886) (979) (1,754)
Note. N  = 26 in each condition. Maximum joint gain = 18,800. Subscripting is based upon
comparisons o f means using an ANOVA with contrasts; different subscripts indicate means
differ at p  < .05 or less. (e.g. the joint outcome for Control is given the subscript ‘a ’ and it is
significantly different to that for Condition 2 given subscript ‘b \  However, the joint outcomes
for Condition 2 and 4 are not significantly different.)
An ANOVA with contrasts was performed to investigate the effect of Experimental 
Condition (Control, Strong Negotiators Informed, Weak Negotiators Informed, and 
Both Informed) on agreement efficiency. There was a significant main effect for 
negotiators’ knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries on joint outcomes, ^(3,103) = 12.1,/?
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< .0005.
Do the data in Study 2 replicate the same patterns o f  results suggested in Study 1? Yes. 
First, consider the im pact o f  strong negotiators' knowledge on agreem ent efficiency. A 
contrast o f  jo in t outcom es between control and condition 2 was conducted. As can be 
seen in Table 4.3, when only strong negotiators were inform ed o f  both BATNAs, the 
mean o f  jo in t outcom es was 16,131 points, which was significantly lower than the 
control mean, 16,975 points, t = 2.16, p  < .05. A ccording to Figure 4.3, it is clear that 
when only strong negotiators were informed, dyads were less likely to reach 
agreem ents with great efficiency than when they were not.
Figure 4.3 Joint Outcomes as a Function of Strong Negotiators’ Knowledge
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Figure 4.4 Joint Outcomes as a Function of Weak Negotiators’ Knowledge
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Joint Outcomes
N ow consider the effect o f  weak negotiators’ know ledge on agreem ent efficiency. 
Based on the findings in Study 1, when only weak negotiators are aware o f 
BATNA-im balances, agreem ent efficiency should be improved. Again, the findings 
were in agreem ents with those in Study 1. As seen in Table 4.3, a planned comparison 
o f the control group vs. condition 3 revealed that jo in t gains were significantly higher 
when only weak negotiators were informed than when neither was informed (M  = 
17,993c vs. M  = 16,975a), t  -  2.61, p  < .01. Figure 4.4 shows the distribution o f jo in t 
outcom es in the control group and condition 3 (only w eak negotiators informed). When 
only weak negotiators were informed, 62% o f  dyads reached agreem ents with 18,000 
points or more (m axim um  jo in t outcome = 18,800), com pared to ju s t 20%  o f control 
dyads did so.
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Figure 4.5 Joint Outcomes as a Function of Complete Knowledge
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Joint Outcomes
Finally the influence o f  com plete knowledge on agreem ent efficiency is considered. 
The findings will replicate if com plete knowledge adversely affects agreem ent 
efficiency. As can be seen in Table 4.3, when both parties were informed o f 
BATNA-asym m etries jo in t gains were significantly lower than when they lacked 
inform ation (M  = 15,790* com pared to M  = 16,975a), t =  3.04, p  < .01. According to 
Figure 4.5, in the lower end o f jo in t outcom es proportions o f  dyads with complete 
knowledge were greater than those o f control dyads. About 7% o f  dyads with complete 
knowledge, com pared to none o f the control dyads, reached agreem ents with 12,999 
points or less.
- 170 -
Chapter Four -H ow  Knowledge o f  BATNA-Asymmetries Affects Agreement Efficiency (Study 2)
4.7.2 Knowledge o f  BATNA-Asymmetries vs. Information-Exchange
Here the relationship between knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries and 
information-exchange about interests is tested to explain how this knowledge, as 
illustrated previously, leads to agreements with different efficiency. The primary 
argument is that knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries impacts negotiators’ 
information-sharing behaviours. The following section is subdivided into three parts 
and examines the effect o f each negotiator’s knowledge in turn: (1) strong negotiators’ 
knowledge, (2) weak negotiators’ knowledge, and (3) complete knowledge.
Effect o f  Strong Negotiators 'BATNA Knowledge on Information-Exchange
Given that solo strong negotiators’ knowledge destroys agreement efficiency, it is 
expected that this relationship is mediated by information-exchange about interests in a 
predictable way. Specifically, Hypothesis 1 predicts that knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries hinders strong negotiators’ information-sharing behaviour 
(strong exchange).
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Table 4.4 Strong Negotiators’ Information-Sharing Behaviour by Experimental 
Conditions
Experimental Condition
Only Strong Only Weak
Neither
Negotiators Negotiators Both Informed
Informed
Informed Informed (Condition 4)
(Control)
(Condition 2) (Condition 3)
Strong
0.56o 0.266 0.77c 0.21*
Exchange
Note. Higher numbers in strong exchange indicate greater information-exchange. Subscripting 
is based upon comparisons o f proportions using a priori contrasts; proportions with different 
subscripts differ at p <  0.05 or less. N - 27 in each condition.
An ANOVA with contrasts was performed to examine the effect o f Experimental 
Condition on strong negotiators’ information-sharing behaviour. There was a significant 
effect of negotiators’ knowledge on strong exchange, 7r(3,107) = 9.29, p  < .0005. A 
planned comparison was conducted to test the hypothesised differences in strong 
negotiators’ information-sharing behaviour between the control group and condition 2.
Does knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries reduce the likelihood o f strong negotiators 
sharing information? Yes. Hypothesis 1 is supported by the data. As can be seen in 
Table 4.4, when only strong negotiators were informed o f both BATNAs, they were 
less likely to seek or to provide information about preferences to their opponents { M -  
0.26b) than when neither party was informed (M=  0.56a), t = 2.41, p  <  .01.
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Effect o f  Weak Negotiators ’BATNA Knowledge on Information-Exchange
Recall that weak negotiators’ knowledge alone improves dyads’ ability to search for 
efficient agreements. To test how this occurs, the following analyses consider impacts 
of weak negotiators’ knowledge on their information-sharing behaviour (weak 
exchange) and on the initiation of this process (weak initiation). In essence, it is to 
seek answers to two questions: 1) Does weak negotiators’ knowledge facilitate their 
information-sharing behaviour? 2) Does this knowledge also increase the likelihood 
that weak negotiators initiate the information-exchange process?
Table 4.5 Weak Negotiators’ Information-Sharing Behaviour by Experimental 
Conditions
Experimental Condition
Neither
Informed
(Control)
Only Strong 
Negotiators 
Informed 
(Condition 2)
Only Weak 
Negotiators 
Informed 
(Condition 3)
Both Informed 
(Condition 4)
Weak
Exchange
0.52a 0.30, 0.87c 0.29,
Weak
Initiation
0.25* 0.22* 0.75, 0.25*
Note. Higher numbers in weak exchange indicate a higher proportion o f weak negotiators
sharing information. Subscripting is based upon comparisons o f proportions within each row; 
proportions with different subscripts differ at p <  0.05 or less. (e.g. Weak Exchange for 
Control is given the subscript ia > and it is significantly different to that for Condition 2 given 
subscript ‘b \  However, Weak Exchange for Condition 2 and 4 are not significantly different.) N  
= 27 in each condition, except for Weak Initiation 77= 24 in the control and Condition 4.
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ANOVAs with planned contrasts were performed to examine effects of negotiators’ 
knowledge (Both, Only Strong, Only Weak, and Control) on weak exchange and weak 
initiation. There were main effects of negotiators’ knowledge on weak exchange, 
F(3,107) = 10.3,/? < .0005, and weak initiation, F(3,101) = 9 2 1 ,p  < .0005.
Regarding the first question, Hypothesis 2a predicted that solo weak negotiators’ 
knowledge should facilitate information-exchange. The findings lend support to this 
hypothesis. A planned contrast of weak exchange between control and condition 3 was 
used. As can be seen in Table 4.5, when only weak negotiators were informed of both 
BATNAs, they would be more likely to share information about preferences with their 
opponents (M =  0.87c) than when they were not (M = 0.52a), t = 2.94, p  <  .01.
Hypothesis 2b proposed that solo weak negotiators’ knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries would increase the likelihood of weak negotiators initiating the 
information-exchange process. This hypothesis is also supported. When only weak 
negotiators were aware of BATNA-asymmetries, they were more likely to initiate 
information-exchange ( M -  0.75b) than when neither party was (M = 0 2 5 a) , t = 4.11,/? 
<  .0005.
Effect o f  Complete Knowledge o f  BATNA-Asymmetries on Information-Exchange
Previous analyses have already addressed impacts o f strong negotiators’ and weak 
negotiators’ knowledge on their individual information-sharing behaviour. Information 
exchange was measured at the individual level. Instead, the next analysis focuses on 
information-exchange at dyadic level, reflecting whether dyads share information about
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preferences. Which member of the dyad exchanged information is not of interest here. 
Recall that complete knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries was found to hinder dyads’ 
ability to reach efficient solutions. To explain how complete knowledge affects 
agreement efficiency, an independent-samples Mest was used to explore the 
relationship between this knowledge and the overall information-exchange. Hypothesis 
3 suggested that complete knowledge reduced the overall information-exchange 
between parties. The findings support Hypothesis 3. When negotiators had complete 
knowledge, dyads were less likely to share information about preferences with each 
other (M  = 0.50) than when neither party had knowledge (M  = 0.67), t = -1.75, p  
<  .05.
As in Study 1, weak negotiators’ knowledge of BATNA-imbalances alone was effective 
to improve agreement efficiency but complete knowledge was detrimental. This 
unexpected finding begs explanations of why complete knowledge does not reflect the 
same benefit o f solo weak negotiators’ knowledge. To address this issue, the baseline 
model is when only weak negotiators are informed o f BATNA-asymmetries. In other 
words, the only difference between the baseline model and the ‘complete knowledge’ 
condition is that strong negotiators are informed in the latter group but they are not in 
the former.
Next, two explanations are tested of why complete knowledge does not improve 
agreement efficiency but solo weak negotiators’ knowledge does: these explanations 
concern how strong negotiators’ knowledge influences (1) strong negotiators’ 
willingness to reveal their preferences and (2) their weaker counterparts’ 
information-sharing behaviour.
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Now, consider the first explanation. Does strong negotiators’ knowledge reduce their 
willingness to reveal their preferences? According to Hypothesis 4a, when both parties 
had complete knowledge of BATNA-imbalances, strong negotiators should be less 
likely to reveal their preferences, if asked, than when only weak negotiators had 
knowledge. Hypothesis 4a receives support. When asked, only 40% o f informed strong 
negotiators revealed their preferences whereas all uninformed strong negotiators did, t 
= 2.45, p  < .05 (see Table 4.6).
Table 4.6 Weak Negotiators’ Information-Sharing Behaviour and Strong 
Negotiators’ Willingness to Reveal Preferences (Condition 3 and 4)
Experimental Condition
Only Weak Negotiators 
Informed 
(Condition 3)
Both Informed 
(Condition 4)
Strong
Willingness
1.00* 0.40,
Weak
0.87e 0.29,
Exchange
Note. Subscripting is based upon comparisons o f proportions within each row; proportions with 
different subscripts differ at p <  0.05 or less. N  = 23 for Strong Willingness and N  = 54 for 
Weak Exchange.
Next, consider the effect o f strong negotiators’ knowledge on (informed) weak 
negotiators’ information-sharing behaviour. Does strong negotiators’ knowledge affect 
the likelihood o f weak negotiators sharing information? Yes. Hypothesis 4b predicted 
that strong negotiators’ knowledge would hinder informed weak negotiators from 
sharing information. The findings lend support to this contention. As can be seen in
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Table 4.6, when both parties had knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries, informed weak 
negotiators were less likely to share information about interests (Af = 0.29^) than when 
only weak negotiators had knowledge ( M -  0.87c), t = -4.70, p  < .0005. The findings 
suggest that strong negotiators’ knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries has an adverse 
impact on weak negotiators’ information-sharing behaviour.
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4.8 Discussion
Study 1 underlined the importance of the relationship between negotiators’ knowledge 
of BATNA-asymmetries and agreement efficiency. It examined whether knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries can have an impact on agreement efficiency. The results indicate 
that the effect o f this knowledge varies and that it is mediated by which member of the 
dyad (strong, weak or both negotiators) has access to this information.
The primary objectives in Study 2 were to replicate these findings and to address 
unanswered questions concerning the process by which negotiators’ knowledge affects 
efficiency. The tested explanation is that knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries, when 
given to different members of the dyad, can have different impacts on 
information-exchange.
Table 4.7 A Summary of Results in Study 2
Negotiation Weak Strong
Experiment Condition
Efficiency Exchange Exchange
(Replication) (New Findings)
Control Baseline Baseline Baseline
Strong Negotiators Informed Low* Low Low
Weak Negotiators Informed High* High High
Both Informed Low* Low Low
Note. Asterisk (*) indicates that efficiency replicates the same pattern as reported in Study 1. 
Weak Exchange and Strong Exchange represent the likelihoods o f weak negotiators and 
strong negotiators sharing information respectively.
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I will first discuss the results of the effect o f strong negotiators’ knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries, then the impact of weak negotiators’ knowledge on agreement 
efficiency and information-exchange process. Finally, I will consider how negotiators’ 
information-sharing behaviours were influenced, when both parties were informed of 
BATNA-imbalances. Illustrated in Table 4.7 are the key findings in the present study, to 
which the following discussions will refer.
4.8.1 Effect o f  Strong Negotiators 'Knowledge on Efficiency and Information-Exchange
In Study 1, it was found that when only strong negotiators were informed of both 
BATNAs, negotiation dyads tended to reach less efficient outcomes than when strong 
negotiators were not informed. As illustrated in Table 4.7, the results in Study 2 
replicate this pattern. The first new question addressed by Study 2 concerned how 
strong negotiators’ knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries hindered dyads’ ability to reach 
efficient solutions. Given that information-exchange about interests is important to the 
development of efficient agreements (Murnighan et al., 1999, Raiffa, 1982, Thompson, 
1991), the relationship between strong negotiators’ knowledge and 
information-exchange process was of particular interest. Specifically, strong 
negotiators’ knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries could affect their information-sharing 
behaviour and that this would consequently influence dyads’ ability to develop efficient 
agreements.
In Study 2, a comparison of strong negotiators’ information-sharing behaviours, when 
they were informed o f both BATNAs versus when they were not, was carried out. It 
was found that strong negotiators’ knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries was detrimental
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to information-exchange process (see Table 4.7). In particular, when only strong 
negotiators had knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries, they were less likely to provide or 
to seek information about preferences from their opponents than when they lacked this 
knowledge. A substantial number of strong negotiators (74%) failed to exchange 
information about interests with their opponents when they realised that they were the 
stronger party within the dyad. As a result, this knowledge discourages parties from 
finding joint benefits. This analysis has provided us with an explanation o f how strong 
negotiators’ knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries led to inefficient agreements.
4.8.2 Effect o f  Weak Negotiators ’ Knowledge on Efficiency and Information-Exchange
Study 1 showed that weak negotiators’ awareness o f BATNA-asymmetries alone can 
have positive impacts on dyads’ ability to reach efficient outcomes. As shown in Table 
4.7, the same impact o f weak negotiators’ knowledge on efficiency was replicated in 
Study 2 from which the conclusion can be drawn that weak negotiators’ knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries is beneficial to the development of efficient outcomes. Yet, how 
weak negotiators’ knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries improves dyads’ ability to find 
efficient agreements was still unclear.
One o f the purposes o f Study 2 was to explore whether weak negotiators’ knowledge 
would encourage them to communicate about interests with others, and whether this 
knowledge would increase the likelihood of weak negotiators initiating this 
communication process. By addressing these issues, it can shed some light on how solo 
weak negotiators’ knowledge was conducive to efficient agreements.
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To examine the impact of solo weak negotiators’ knowledge on information-exchange, 
weak negotiators’ information-exchange behaviours when they were informed of both 
BATNAs were compared to those when they were not. Weak negotiators with 
knowledge tended to be more likely to share information about preferences with their 
opponents than those without knowledge. Moreover, the results showed that when only 
weak negotiators were informed o f BATNA-asymmetries, they tended to be more likely 
to initiate communications about preferences with their opponents.
Together, it is clear that weak negotiators’ knowledge o f BATNA-imbalances is an 
important ingredient for fostering communications between parties. We are still 
uncertain why this knowledge would do this, and this will be discussed in the final 
section o f this chapter.
4.8.3 Effect o f  Complete Knowledge on Efficiency and Information-Exchange
Study 1 addressed the question as to whether knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries needs 
to be commonly held by both parties to improve agreement efficiency. The effect o f 
complete knowledge on agreement efficiency was found to be significant and 
considerable but in the opposite direction as predicted. When both strong and weak 
negotiators had complete knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries, dyads tended to reach 
less efficient agreements than when they both lacked this knowledge. This finding was 
replicated in Study 2 (see Table 4.7).
The fourth issue addressed by Study 2 concerned how complete knowledge of 
BATNA-imbalances hindered dyads’ ability to search for efficient solutions. Again,
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considering that information-exchange about interests is the key to efficient solutions 
(Murnighan et al., 1999, Raiffa, 1982, Thompson, 1991), the relationship between 
complete knowledge and communications between negotiators was explored. It was 
found that when both parties had complete knowledge, negotiation dyads were less 
likely to share information about interests than when they did not have knowledge. 
Clearly, there is enough evidence to suggest that complete knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries is an obstacle to information-exchange between parties, and as a 
result, dyads with complete knowledge attain relatively inefficient agreements as Study 
1 has shown.
The final issue addressed by Study 2 concerned why complete knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries does not improve agreement efficiency as solo weak negotiators’ 
knowledge. Two explanations were proposed and tested. First, the results indicate that 
when both parties were provided with knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries, strong 
negotiators were less likely to reveal their priorities if asked, than when only weak 
negotiators were provided with knowledge. Overall, in complete knowledge condition, 
refusing to reveal preferences was more common than was revealing preferences when 
asked. In other words, it was more difficult for weak negotiators to elicit information 
about interests from their stronger counterparts when both parties had knowledge than 
when only weak negotiators did.
Secondly, it was found that when both parties had complete knowledge, weak 
negotiators were less likely to exchange information about interests than when only 
weak negotiators had knowledge. This finding suggests that strong negotiators’ 
knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries can unfavourably affect weak negotiators’
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information-sharing behaviour, even though weak negotiators’ knowledge alone has 
been shown to be conducive to information-exchange.
Given these explanations, it is clear how strong negotiators’ knowledge eliminates the 
benefit o f weak negotiators’ knowledge on agreement efficiency.
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4.9 Conclusion
Many theorists have pointed out that dyads with unequal BATNAs tend to reach more 
efficient outcomes than those with equal BATNAs. Unfortunately, we know very little 
about how this increased efficiency is achieved (Pinkley et al., 1994, Roloff and Dailey, 
1987). Although researchers have suggested processes by which this occurs, their 
suggestions are so different and sometimes contradicting that we are left wondering 
whether BATNA-asymmetries do in fact matter (Brett et al., 1996, Lawler and Yoon, 
1993, Pinkley, 1995, Roloff and Dailey, 1987).
The current studies shed some light on this domain in two ways. Firstly, negotiators’ 
knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries has a profound impact on the way negotiators 
approach negotiations and ultimately on the efficiency of outcomes reached. Secondly, 
impacts o f negotiators’ knowledge can be very different, depending on which member 
(strong or weak negotiators) has access to this information. Knowledge of 
BATNA-imbalances, when being made available to strong negotiators, deters dyads 
from searching for efficient outcomes. Conversely, weak negotiators’ knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries alone facilitates the development of efficient agreements. These 
results refine and generalise the theoretical relationship between information about 
another’s BATNA and efficiency of negotiated agreements when negotiators have very 
different BATNAs.
This research also addresses an apparent lack of relationship between negotiators’ 
knowledge and information-exchange. The current findings provide a fuller 
understanding o f how the variability in the information level about the other’s BATNA
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leads to agreements with different degrees of efficiency. This is because effects of 
negotiators’ knowledge on efficiency are mediated by their information-sharing 
behaviours in a predictable way.
Knowledge does not uniformly discourage or encourage negotiators to share 
information about preferences with the other party. At the heart o f this chapter is the 
message that knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries can have different impacts on 
negotiators’ information-sharing strategies. Similar to effects o f knowledge on 
efficiency, which member of the dyad has access to the knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries is key. Strong negotiators’ awareness o f BATNA-differences 
hinders them from sharing information. Weak negotiators’ knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries fosters communication between parties. It also increases the 
likelihood of weak negotiators initiating the information-exchange process. However, 
this advantage o f weak negotiators’ knowledge no longer holds when knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries is also introduced to their stronger counterparts. Informed strong 
negotiators’ unwillingness to reveal preferences and the reduction in weak negotiators’ 
information-sharing behaviour may account for this adverse impact of complete 
knowledge about BATNA-asymmetries.
4.9.1 Limitations and Motivation fo r  Study 3
The main limitation o f Study 2 is that it leaves relatively open the question of why 
negotiators’ knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries had a strong effect on 
information-exchange, thus resulting in agreements with different degrees of efficiency. 
First, it is necessary to examine why strong negotiators’ knowledge seemed to deter
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them from sharing information, thus leading to inefficient agreements. Research that 
considers power-asymmetric situations may be helpful. Lawler & Yoon (1992) and 
Mannix (1993) speculate that in power-imbalanced negotiations power-advantaged 
negotiators tend to push for agreements which reflect the difference between parties. 
Unfortunately, the authors do not provide supportive empirical evidence for this 
contention, or speculate under what circumstances this would occur.
It may be that knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries changes strong negotiators’ mind-set 
and the way they approach negotiations. Recall the finding in Study 1 that negotiators 
tend to assume an equal-BATNA situation when no information is available. 
Knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries therefore signals to strong negotiators that their 
opponents rely on the existing negotiation to a greater extent. This knowledge may 
induce more value-claiming behaviours and competitive tactics from strong negotiators, 
which allow them to reflect their BATNA advantage. In doing so, it is likely that 
informed strong negotiators will overlook the possibility that the resource pie can be 
expanded. We obtained some supportive evidence for this explanation in Study 1 that 
strong negotiators’ knowledge does increase their bargaining strength. Nevertheless, 
more work is required to confirm this conjecture and there may be other mechanisms 
responsible for the adverse effect of this knowledge on information-exchange and 
efficiency.
The second open question regards why solo weak negotiators’ knowledge facilitates 
information-exchange about interests and improves dyads’ ability to find efficient 
solutions. Relevant arguments in past research that bears upon this issue may help 
answer this question. Roloff and Dailey (1987) suggest that in BATNA-imbalanced
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negotiations weak negotiators are under pressure and motivated to be creative, and 
therefore come up with alternate settlements. No supportive empirical evidence for this 
suggestion is given.
Implicit in their hypothesis was the assumption that weak negotiators had complete 
information about another’s BATNA. Again, Study 1 showed that when negotiators are 
not aware of BATNA-imbalances, they assume an equal-BATNA situation. Therefore, 
information about another’s BATNA may make weak negotiators realise that they are 
more reliant on the existing negotiation than their counterparts. As a result, informed 
weak negotiators may be motivated to be creative and to search for integrative 
agreements that generate sufficient surplus, in order to keep strong negotiators at the 
negotiation table. At the same time, it is not necessarily to transfer the entire pool to 
their stronger counterparts, and negotiated agreements must provide sufficient benefit 
for weak negotiators. Hence, informed weak negotiators’ higher motivation to create 
alternate settlements may explain why their knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries is 
conducive to information-exchange.
Some supportive evidence for this contention has been obtained in Study 2: weak 
negotiators’ knowledge increases the likelihood that they initiate the 
information-exchange process. However, it still remains conjecture at this stage, and it 
is necessary to test whether weak negotiators’ knowledge is associated with their 
motivation in Study 3.
Finally, the present study has shown that solo weak negotiators’ knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries is conducive to information-exchange but this benefit disappears
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when both parties have complete knowledge. This is due to the fact that strong 
negotiators’ knowledge deters informed weak negotiators from exchanging information. 
However, it is still unclear as to why this occurs and this will also be addressed in 
Study 3.
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Chapter Five -  Why Knowledge of BATNA-Asymmetries Affects Agreement 
Efficiency (Study 3)
The primary focus of Study 1 was on whether information o f another’s BATNA has an 
impact on the quality of agreements when negotiators have very different BATNAs. It 
has been found that knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries can have a significant impact 
on agreement efficiency and that the effect on agreement efficiency can differ, 
depending on the quality of one’s BATNA in relation to another’s. Given the 
importance o f information-exchange about preferences across issues to the 
development o f efficient agreements (Thompson, 1991, Mumighan et al., 1999), Study 
2 was designed to examine negotiators’ information-exchange behaviour in order to 
explain how knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries affects agreement efficiency. Study 1 
and 2 produced evidence suggesting that weak negotiators’ knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries alone is conducive to information-exchange about interests, thus 
improving dyads’ ability to search for efficient agreements. In contrast, strong 
negotiators’ knowledge alone is detrimental to the development of efficient outcomes, 
by discouraging negotiators from sharing information. In addition, the disadvantage of 
strong negotiators’ knowledge is more powerful than the benefit o f weak negotiators’ 
knowledge. When both negotiators have complete knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries, 
negotiation dyads tend to be less likely to share information and result in less efficient 
outcomes than when they both lack this knowledge.
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Considering that weak negotiators’ knowledge alone is beneficial to agreement 
efficiency, Study 2 also examined why complete knowledge hinders dyads’ ability to 
search for efficient solutions, finding that strong negotiators’ knowledge reduced their 
willingness to reveal their preferences and deterred their weaker counterparts’ 
information-sharing behaviour. Both of these accounted for the observed decline in 
agreement efficiency in ‘complete knowledge’ condition.
Study 3 is designed to explore the causes of negotiators’ behaviours. Specifically, the 
mechanisms by which strong and weak negotiators’ knowledge affects 
information-exchange and results in agreements with different efficiency are 
considered. The study will attempt to provide critical tests o f possible mechanisms (that 
will be proposed later in this chapter). Since knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries, when 
given to strong and weak negotiators, can have opposing impacts on agreement 
efficiency and information-exchange, the mechanisms (that Study 3 will propose) will 
follow very different paths. The research questions that will be addressed are: (1) why 
does strong negotiators’ knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries deter 
information-exchange and lead to inefficient outcomes?; (2) why does weak 
negotiators’ knowledge encourage them to share information, resulting in efficient 
agreements?; (3) why does strong negotiators’ knowledge reduce their willingness to 
reveal priorities across issues?; and (4) why does strong negotiators’ knowledge hinder 
informed weak negotiators’ information-sharing behaviour, even though weak 
negotiators’ knowledge alone is shown to be beneficial?
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5.1 Relationship between Strong Negotiators’ Knowledge and Agreement 
Efficiency
In this chapter, an explanation will be sought for the findings that solo strong 
negotiators’ knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries destroys agreement efficiency and 
hinders information-exchange about interests. Two different hypotheses will be 
proposed in an attempt to help shed some light on this issue. The first hypothesis 
concerns the relationship between strong negotiators’ knowledge and their focus on the 
distributive side o f negotiations. The second considers the effect o f strong negotiators’ 
knowledge on the perceived usefulness of information-exchange.
Recall the finding in Study 1 that when negotiators have no information about others’ 
BATNAs, they tend to assume an equal-BATNA situation. Knowledge of 
BATNA-imbalances may signal to strong negotiators that their opponents rely on the 
negotiation to a relatively greater extent. Therefore, knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries may play an important role in strong negotiators’ negotiation 
style and mind-set, thus leading to different information-sharing behaviour and 
efficiency o f outcomes reached. Study 3 will determine whether strong negotiators’ 
style and mind-set can differ as a function of knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries, in 
order to explain the findings in Study 1 and 2. Specifically, the following mechanism 
involves two steps: first, knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries affects strong negotiators’ 
negotiation style and second, it affects their judgement accuracy about opponents’ 
interests across issues.
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Before discussing how this knowledge changes strong negotiators’ style, a brief review 
o f relevant research is useful. Studies concerning negotiators with unequal power have 
found that negotiators in positions of higher power are likely to expect a resource 
distribution based on equity rather than equality21 (Bacharach and Lawler, 1981, 
Komorita, 1984, Komorita and Hamilton, 1984, Lawler and Yoon, 1993, Mannix, 1993, 
Shaw, 1981). Their predictions were based on the assumption that powerful negotiators 
recognise differences in power.
Extending these predictions, knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries by strong negotiators 
may change their expectations of resource distribution. It may be that strong negotiators, 
when informed o f both BATNAs, express their superiority distributively and exert their 
dominance in order to push for agreements that reflect the difference in their BATNAs. 
In other words, informed strong negotiators are likely to focus on the distributive 
element o f the negotiation (see Figure 5.1). The impact o f strong negotiators’ 
knowledge on bargaining strength shown in Study 1 attests to this contention -  
Informed strong negotiators garnered a larger share o f the resource pie than those who 
lacked information.
21 N ote that these studies defined power differently from my studies. For example, power was 
represented by number o f  alternatives that negotiators have. Or, difference in power was manipulated by 
varying the probabilities o f  various profits o f  the alternatives.
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Figure 5.1 A Proposed Theoretical Model of Strong Negotiators’ Knowledge of 
BATNA-Asymmetries and Agreement Efficiency
Asymmetries
The second step o f the mechanism is that focusing on exerting dominance may affect 
how strong negotiators perceive the structure of the task, which in turn reduces 
information-exchange about interests. A large body o f research has shown that 
negotiators often suffer from the fixed-pie bias at the outset o f negotiations (Thompson 
and Hastie, 1990, Thompson, 1991, Bazerman and Neale, 1983). In light of the 
pervasiveness o f fixed-pie perception, strong negotiators’ knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries may make this powerful bias even harder to diffuse . This is 
because focusing on the distributive side of the negotiation may pull their available 
cognitive energy away from the creation of values (Lax and Sebenius, 1986) and 
towards on claiming values (Mannix and Neale, 1993). Informed strong negotiators 
may find it difficult to focus simultaneously on the integrative and distributive aspects 
o f the negotiation. As a result, informed strong negotiators will be more likely to make 
judgement errors about,their opponents’ interests.
22 It is important to note that I am not suggesting only informed strong negotiators suffer from the 
fixed-pie bias. Instead, it is speculated that informed strong negotiators are more likely to suffer from this 
bias than those who lacked information o f  BATNA-asymmetries.
Strong
Negotiators’ Focus on
Knowledge *  Exerting 
O f BATNA- Dominance
Information
Exchange
Bias
Decreases
Inefficient
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With greater judgement errors, strong negotiators with knowledge rarely conduct an 
active search for information which would go against their existing idea and attitudes, 
for instance, their opponents having different preferences across issues. After all, what 
is the use of learning something about weak negotiators that merely confirms their 
expectation? In short, strong negotiators’ knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries triggers a 
two-step communication-blocking mechanism: first, it puts them in a competitive mode 
and second, their expression of superiority makes the fixed-pie bias more salient. If true, 
this helps explain why strong negotiators’ knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries hinders 
dyads’ ability to reach efficient agreements.
To examine strong negotiators’ single-mindedness, I will consider the extent to which 
they focus on the distributive side of negotiations. To assess their fixed-pie perception, 
two aspects will be considered, (i) their judgement accuracy o f opponents’ preferences 
across issues; and (ii) whether they are able to identify the compatible issues in which 
both parties have identical interests. It is also important to examine if strong 
negotiators’ focus on exerting their dominance and fixed-pie perception mediate the 
relationship between strong negotiators’ knowledge on information-exchange (see 
Figure 5.1). This is because, for example, one might argue that the decline in 
information-exchange leads to judgement errors than vice versa. To test these 
possibilities, Study 3 will explore:
Hypothesis la: When strong negotiators are informed o f both BATNAs, they will focus 
on how to split the resources to a greater degree than those without the information.
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Hypothesis lb: When strong negotiators are informed o f both BATNAs, they will show 
lower judgement accuracy about their weaker counterparts’ preferences, than 
uninformed strong negotiators.
Hypothesis l c : Informed strong negotiators will be less likely to identify the compatible 
issue than those who lack information of others’ BATNAs.
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5.1.1 Alternative Explanation
Here an alternative, but equally plausible, explanation is presented of why strong 
negotiators’ knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries is a handicap to information-exchange 
and agreement efficiency. It may be that this knowledge impedes strong negotiators’ 
incentive to share information about interests and result in inefficient agreements. 
Informed strong negotiators may construe that they are in a relatively harder position to 
improve their profits through negotiation than their weaker counterparts by sharing 
information and making trade-offs. Given that uninformed strong negotiators assume 
their opponents possess a similar BATNA, it is unlikely that they share the same view 
as informed strong negotiators. Informed strong negotiators may perceive 
information-exchange about interests as a way to improve their weaker counterparts’ 
payoffs rather than their own individual outcomes. This may not be considered as 
appealing to informed strong negotiators as to uninformed ones, and as a result, they 
spend little effort on working out the possibility of integrative trade-offs.
Note that this explanation assumes that a ‘strong BATNA’ renders improvements 
through negotiations unlikely. In other words, it assumes that a strong BATNA is 
defined in absolute terms. ‘I have a great BATNA that you are unlikely to beat’. In the 
work presented in this thesis, the ‘strength’ of a BATNA is defined relative to the 
other’s BATNA. Unlike other studies on asymmetric BATNA situations (Lawler and 
Yoon, 1993, Pinkley et al., 1994, Roloff and Dailey, 1987, Pinkley, 1995), the quality 
of strong negotiators’ BATNA in my studies is worth less than the compromise solution 
(their BATNA is worth 6000 points whereas the compromise solution is 6,400 points).
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Also, it is far below the maximum possible individual profit (12,800 points). This 
indicates that there is room for strong negotiators, as well as weak negotiators, to 
improve their payoffs through negotiation by making trade-offs, although weak 
negotiators can improve their outcomes through negotiation to a greater extent. In other 
words, ‘I am strong because my BATNA is better than yours’. Because the relative 
strength o f a BATNA is considered, this alternative explanation is less compelling than 
the first explanation. Nevertheless, it is worth considering whether strong negotiators’ 
knowledge of BATNA-imbalances in fact leads to their belief that
information-exchange does not increase their payoffs.
Hypothesis Id: Informed strong negotiators are more likely to believe that 
information-sharing about interests will not improve their outcomes than those who are 
not informed.
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5.2 Relationship between Weak Negotiators’ Knowledge and Agreement Efficiency
Study 1 and 2 produced evidence suggesting that solo weak negotiators’ knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries induces more information-sharing behaviour and results in more 
efficient agreements. Unfortunately, we know very little why this happens. Researchers 
have speculated that weak negotiators’ motivation to create alternate settlements is of 
great importance in the search for efficient agreements (Pinkley, 1995, Roloff and 
Dailey, 1987, Pinkley et a l 1994, Mannix and Neale, 1993). Essentially, these scholars 
argue that the position o f lower power increases one type o f motivation in weak 
negotiators.
Figure 5.2 A Proposed Theoretical Model of Weak Negotiators’ Knowledge of 
BATNA-Asymmetries and Agreement Efficiency
Weak
Negotiators’ Motivation . Efficient
IncreasesKnowledge *" Increases * ExchanSe "  Agreements
of BATNA- lncreases
Asymmetries
However, the story may be more complex. The primary argument in Study 3 is that 
weak negotiators’ motivation to create alternate settlements is rooted in their 
knowledge o f BATNA-imbalances and that the increased motivation improves 
agreement efficiency (see Figure 5.2). Also, in other domains we know that
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motivational influence on agreement efficiency is complicated, involving more than 
one type o f motivation. Therefore, Study 3 will examine whether weak negotiators’ 
motivational states can differ as a function of knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries. 
Specifically, it will consider how weak negotiators’ knowledge may influence different 
forms o f motivation in order to explain the previous findings in Study 1 and 2. Before 
detailing the explanation, a brief review of the relationship between motivation and 
creativity o f solutions is needed.
5.2.1 Motivational Influence on Creative Performance
In variable-sum negotiations, discovering efficient agreements requires divergent and 
creative thinking because they are not immediately apparent (Anderson and Thompson, 
2004, Kurtzberg, 1998). In other words, efficient agreements can be referred as to 
creative solutions. Social psychological research has emphasised the importance of task 
motivation to the generation of creative solutions (Amabile, 1983b, Amabile, 1988, 
Conti, Coon and Amabile, 1996). In particular, Amabile (1988) suggested that task 
motivation makes the difference between what individuals can do and what they will do. 
The former depends on factors such as training, personalities, skills, etc. But it is task 
motivation that determines the extent to which these factors will be fully and 
appropriately engaged in the service of creative performance.
To better understand motivational influences on creative performance, an illustrative 
analogy can help. Note that the following analogy, originally Amabile’s (1988), is 
modified to apply to the negotiation context. A variable-sum negotiation is represented
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as a maze. The maze has several exits, any of which represents finding a solution that is 
at least satisfactory to both parties. The most straightforward and well-practiced path 
out o f the maze is the algorithmic exit -  compromise solution (Bazerman and Neale, 
1983, Thompson and Hastie, 1990, Thompson, 1991).
There are other exits available to those who are more inclined to investigate. This 
investigation is more likely in negotiators who have higher levels of task motivation 
(Amabile, 1988, Amabile, Hill, Hennessey and Tighe, 1994, Ryan and Deci, 2000, 
Ruscio, Whitney and Amabile, 1998). These negotiators are not simply interested in 
exiting the maze, because the very exploration o f the maze provides them with 
something extra (e.g., extra payoffs, pleasure, positive challenge in the task etc.). 
Exploring the maze is the only way to find the less obvious exits -  efficient outcomes -  
which are analogous to end products high in creativity.
In the next sections, a brief discussion of different types o f motivation is given and an 
attempt is made to explain how knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries may enhance weak 
negotiators’ motivational states, thereby improving the search for efficient agreements.
5.2.2 Different Types o f  Motivation
At the most basic level, to be motivated means to be moved to do something. Even brief 
reflection suggests that motivation is hardly a unitary phenomenon. People vary not 
only in level of motivation (i.e., how much motivation), but also in the orientation of 
that motivation (i.e., what type of motivation). Social psychologists distinguish
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between different types of motivation based on the different reasons that give rise to an 
action (Ryan and Deci, 2000, Deci and Ryan, 1985, Amabile et a l,  1994). A 
fundamental distinction is between intrinsic motivation and extrinsic motivation. 
Intrinsic motivation is the motivation to engage in a task primarily for its own sake, 
because the task itself is interesting, engaging, or in some way satisfying (Amabile et 
al., 1994, Deci and Ryan, 1985). Extrinsic motivation refers to doing something 
because it leads to a separable outcome, such as competition, restrictions and goals set 
by others, pressure, etc (Amabile, 1988, Amabile et a l,  1994, Ryan and Deci, 2000).
5.2.3 Effect o f  Knowledge o f  BATNA-Asymmetries on Motivational States
Negotiation research concerning BATNA-asymmetries primarily considers extrinsic 
motivation as the only factor to improve agreement efficiency (Mannix and Neale, 
1993, Pinkley et al., 1994, Roloff and Dailey, 1987). Intrinsic motivation has been most 
neglected. Study 3 will argue that weak negotiators’ knowledge may alter both intrinsic 
and extrinsic motivation, which results in improvements in dyads’ ability to reach 
efficient agreements. Two elements, specified in social contexts which produce 
variability in intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, are considered: (i) perceived challenge 
and (ii) pressure (Amabile, 1983b, Amabile et a l,  1994, Deci and Ryan, 1985, Roloff 
and Dailey, 1987, Ryan and Deci, 2000).
Perceived Challenge
Deci and Ryan (1985) argue that interpersonal events and structures conducive to
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feelings o f competence during action can enhance intrinsic motivation for that action, 
because they allow satisfaction of the basic psychological need for competence (Deci 
and Ryan, 1985, Amabile, 1988). The optimal challenge is important in itself and can 
facilitate intrinsic motivation. However, feelings of competence will not enhance 
intrinsic motivation unless they are accompanied by a sense o f autonomy (deCharms, 
1968). Thus, individuals must experience not only perceived competence, but also their 
behaviour has to be self-determined, if intrinsic motivation is to be enhanced.
Given the importance of autonomy, it is necessary to investigate the degree to which 
free choice is allowed in the task employed in this study before discussing the influence 
o f weak negotiators’ knowledge on feelings of competence. Negotiators are allowed to 
communicate freely with their opponents, and also there are no restrictions on strategies 
that they may adopt. The only restriction is that they are instructed not to share 
information about their payoff schedules. The negotiation task in the present study 
should provide sufficient amount of autonomy for intrinsic motivation to occur.
I argue that knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries may enhance weak negotiators’
intrinsic motivation by generating feelings of competence. Weak negotiators’
knowledge signals that they rely on the existing negotiation to a greater extent,
compared to their opponents with a more attractive BATNA. So, their job is more than
just reaching an agreement that generates reasonable payoffs to themselves. The
agreement also needs to satisfy their stronger counterparts. Informed weak negotiators
may consider the negotiation situation as challenging, complex, and difficult. Hence,
informed weak negotiators will be attracted by the challenge o f the problem and
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reaching an agreement that is mutually acceptable will provide them with feelings of 
competence23.
Feelings of competence may not emerge when weak negotiators are not aware of 
BATNA-differences. Study 1 suggests that weak negotiators, when uninformed of both 
BATNAs, consider their opponents’ BATNAs similar to their own. Without knowing 
the magnitude o f differences in their BATNAs, uninformed weak negotiators may 
perceive the negotiation task as less challenging than informed weak negotiators.
Pressure
As suggested before, negotiation research has generally focused on extrinsic motivation 
to explain why weak negotiators may be driving the efficiency of final outcomes 
(Mannix and Neale, 1993, Pinkley, 1995, Pinkley et al., 1994, Roloff and Dailey, 1987). 
In essence, Roloff and Dailey (1987) hypothesised that weak negotiators are motivated 
by pressure to be creative, and thus come up with alternate settlements. However, they 
did not test this hypothesis.
Although the authors defined power differently24, support for Roloff and Dailey’s (1987) 
hypothesis can be found in Mannix and Neale’s (1993) study. In their experiment, they
23 I do som etim es speak o f  intrinsically challenging negotiation, but when I do so I am talking about the 
particular negotiation task that, on average, many individuals find to be intrinsically challenging. There 
may, in fact, be differences between individuals’ motivational orientations.
24 Instead o f  the different quality o f  BATNAs, power difference was manipulated by different numbers 
o f  alternative negotiation partners existed. The powerful negotiator was given more alternative 
negotiators than was the less powerful negotiator. A lso, a market setting was adopted and negotiators 
were not allowed to speak to one another. Negotiations involved a back-and-forth sequence o f  proposals 
and counter-proposals.
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considered the efficiency of final offers that parties o f higher power and those o f lower 
power made. It was found that parties of lower power made final offers with greater 
efficiency: the power disadvantage of weak negotiators may force them to consider 
more carefully the options available. Nevertheless, it is still unclear as to under what 
condition weak negotiators are most likely to be extrinsically motivated to be creative. 
Where does the pressure arise from?
I argue that the answer may lie in weak negotiators’ knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries. Implicit in Roloff and Dailey’s (1987) hypothesis was the 
assumption that weak negotiators had complete information about BATNA-differences, 
and Mannix and Neale’s (1993) finding was based on a situation where negotiators 
knew o f each other’s power. Therefore, it may not be enough to argue that weak 
negotiators are motivated to be creative simply because o f BATNA-asymmetries. 
Recall the finding in Study 1 that when weak negotiators are not aware of 
BATNA-imbalances they tend to assume equal-BATNA situations. This suggests that 
weak negotiators’ motivation toward creating alternate settlements may differ as a 
function o f knowledge about BATNA-asymmetries. In essence, this knowledge may 
induce higher levels o f pressure (extrinsic motivation) to expand the resource pie from 
weak negotiators.
Considering possible impacts o f weak negotiators’ knowledge on intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation derived from the above discussion, Study 3 will attempt to test whether this 
knowledge enhances the overall level of motivation. No research, to my knowledge, 
has actually provided such a test of this relationship. Given the strong link between
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motivation and creative performance introduced earlier (Amabile, 1983b, Amabile, 
1996, Amabile et al., 1994, Conti et a l , 1996, Deci and Ryan, 1985, Roloff and Dailey, 
1987, Ryan and Deci, 2000), I explore whether informed weak negotiators with higher 
levels o f motivation will be more creative in the task than those without information. 
Returning to the illustrative analogy where negotiation is a maze, it is suggested that 
informed weak negotiators may be more likely to explore the maze (the structure of 
negotiation) by exchanging information about priorities with opponents, and thus find 
less obvious exits (making integrative trade-offs and reaching efficient agreements). 
This would explain why weak negotiators’ knowledge is conducive to 
information-exchange and efficient agreements as suggested in Study 1 and 2. To test 
this possibility, the following hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 2\ When weak negotiators are informed of both BATNAs, it is more likely 
that they will show higher levels of motivation than when they are not informed.
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5.3 Relationship between Complete Knowledge and Agreement Efficiency
I have already discussed the mechanisms by which solo strong (and weak) knowledge 
of BATNA-asymmetries alters information-sharing behaviours and agreement 
efficiency. Here the attention will be confined to the state of complete information 
about BATNA-imbalances. That is, both strong and weak negotiators know of the 
wideness o f BATNA differences between them.
Study 1 and 2 showed that complete knowledge destroys efficiency and that an overall 
decrease in information-exchange about interests accounted for the observed decline in 
efficiency. Solo weak negotiators’ knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries facilitates 
information-exchange and improves agreement efficiency. However, when strong 
negotiators’ knowledge is introduced, the advantages of weak negotiators’ knowledge 
disappear.
Study 2 attempted to explain how strong negotiators’ knowledge washed away and 
overrode the benefit o f weak negotiators’ knowledge by comparing the differences in 
negotiators’ behaviours between condition 3 (solo weak negotiators’ knowledge) and 
condition 4 (complete knowledge). Two explanations were identified. One is that strong 
negotiators’ knowledge reduces their willingness to reveal preferences when asked. 
Another one regards strong negotiators’ knowledge deterring informed weak 
negotiators from sharing information about interests. However, Study 2 leaves 
relatively open questions of why these occur, and these questions will be addressed 
here.
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5.3.1 Strong Negotiators ’ Willingness to Reveal Preferences
First, we need to answer why strong negotiators’ knowledge impedes their willingness 
to reveal preferences. Schema Theory, from studies in social cognition, suggests that 
information about counterparts invoke schemas that organise negotiators’ images of 
counterparts (Fiske and Taylor, 1991). These schemas help a negotiator in interpreting 
the opponent’s behaviour and endow a negotiator with a set o f expectations about the 
other party’s future actions (Fiske and Taylor, 1991, Ross and Nisbett, 1991, Tinsley et 
al., 2002). For example, Tinsley et al. (2002) show that when a negotiator knows that 
his counterpart has a distributive reputation (i.e. he is known for his ability to extract 
deep concessions), this information affects negotiators’ perceptions o f counterparts’ 
intentions as well as their own behavioural response. Perhaps strong negotiators’ 
knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries affects their interpretations o f their counterparts’ 
behaviour in a similar way.
As hypothesised before, informed strong negotiators are likely to focus on exerting 
their dominance, thus leading to greater judgement errors about others’ preferences. 
Their assumption that the task is fixed-sum may evoke schemas that organise images of 
their weaker counterparts. These schemas endow them with an expectation about 
certain levels o f distributive behaviour from their weaker counterparts. As a result, 
knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries might make strong negotiators suspect that weak 
negotiators’ attempts to elicit information about their preferences are ways to counter 
their strength. It explains why informed strong negotiators were more reluctant to give 
out their preferences when asked by their counterparts than uninformed strong
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negotiators.
These arguments stem from the effect of strong negotiators’ knowledge on their attitude 
toward the negotiation task and judgement errors about others’ preferences. It is 
important to note that I have proposed the hypotheses for this effect before (see section 
5.1), but here the attention is confined to situations where weak negotiators know both 
BATNAs.
Hypothesis 3a: When both parties are informed o f BATNA-asymmetries, strong 
negotiators will focus more on how to claim more surplus than when only weak 
negotiators are informed.
Hypothesis 3b: When both parties are informed of both BATNAs, strong negotiators 
will show greater judgement errors about their opponents’ priorities than when only 
weak negotiators are informed.
5.3.2 Effect o f  Strong Negotiators’ Knowledge on Informed Weak Negotiators’ 
Information-Sharing Behaviour
Study 3 will also examine why strong negotiators’ knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries 
discourages informed weak negotiators’ information-sharing behaviours. To address 
this issue, it is necessary to first consider in what the benefit o f solo weak negotiators’ 
knowledge is rooted. According to Hypothesis 2 introduced earlier, solo weak 
negotiators’ knowledge increases their motivation. So, will strong negotiators’
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knowledge reduce informed weak negotiators’ motivation levels?
The answer is no. This is because informed weak negotiators’ motivation (both intrinsic 
and extrinsic) arises from the nature of the negotiation situation itself. It should be 
independent o f their stronger counterparts’ knowledge status about the 
BATNA-differences. Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 3c: When strong negotiators are informed o f both BATNAs, informed weak 
negotiators’ motivation levels will be the same as when strong negotiators are not 
informed.
This hypothesis may, at first glance, seem to contradict the suggestion that higher levels 
of motivation are conducive to creative performance (i.e. searching for efficient 
outcomes by exchanging information) (Amabile, 1983b, Amabile, 1985, Amabile, 1988, 
Amabile et a l , 1994, Deci and Ryan, 1985). It begs a question: why do high levels of 
motivation not encourage informed weak negotiators’ to share information, when 
strong negotiators are also informed of both BATNAs?
Recall that research on motivational influence on creative performance suggests that 
increases in motivation must be accompanied by a sense of autonomy in order for the 
enhanced motivation to result in increased creative performance (Deci and Ryan, 1985, 
Ryan and Deci, 2000). Strong negotiators’ knowledge may affect the environment of 
negotiations, thus limiting the perceived autonomy o f weak negotiators’ strategies. It 
may be that informed strong negotiators control the scope o f their counterparts’
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behaviour by restricting the way they approach negotiations. In essence, they tend to be 
more likely to make procedural remarks to control the negotiation process. As strong 
negotiators dominate proceedings, weak negotiators’ autonomy diminishes. Therefore, 
weak negotiators may face a more complex situation and need to focus on protecting 
their own interests. This pulls their available cognitive energy away from increasing or 
caring about the joint outcome (Mannix and Neale, 1993). In other words, the 
procedural remarks made by strong negotiators will preclude weak negotiators from 
using tactics aimed at creating values. This explains why increased motivation does not 
encourage weak negotiators to exchange information about interests when both parties 
are informed of BATNA-asymmetries.
To test this possibility, the following hypothesis will be tested:
Hypothesis 3d: When both parties are informed o f both BATNAs, it is more likely that 
strong negotiators will try to control the negotiation process using procedural remarks, 
than when only weak negotiators are informed.
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5.4 Overview of Study 3
Study 1 and 2 produced evidence suggesting that knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries, 
when given to strong and/or weak negotiators, can have different impacts on agreement 
efficiency and information-exchange. Study 3 will seek to replicate these findings. 
Unfortunately, we know very little of why knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries affects 
negotiators’ information-sharing behaviour and efficiency of outcomes. Study 3 
examines why this happens. Specifically, it considers effects o f this knowledge on how 
negotiators approach negotiations and their mind-set.
In summary, four research questions will be addressed in Study 3. The first issue 
concerns whether strong negotiators’ knowledge affects negotiation style, judgement 
errors about others’ interests and the perceived usefulness o f information-exchange. 
Secondly, to explain improvement in efficiency by weak negotiators’ knowledge, 
whether this knowledge increases motivation will be examined. Thirdly, an explanation 
is provided for why strong negotiators’ knowledge reduces their willingness to reveal 
their preferences across issues. Finally, an attempt is made to examine why strong 
negotiators’ knowledge hinders weak negotiators’ information-sharing behaviour.
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5.5 Method
Participants
A total of 192 master students at London School of Economics and University College 
London participated in this study. The sample included 80 men and 112 women, with 
ages ranging from 19 to 43 years and a mean of 25.07 (SD = 3.58) years. Subjects 
participated in the experiment as volunteers.
Procedure
The instructions and procedures were the same as those used in Study 1 and 2 except 
that additional post-negotiation questionnaires were used (see Dependent Measures for 
details).
Negotiation Task & Independent Variables
The negotiation task, levels o f negotiators’ BATNAs, and independent variables were 
identical to those in Study 1 and 2 (see Chapter Three, section 3.6 for details). Again, 
four basic experimental conditions were formed, as shown in the following table:
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Table 5.1 Four Basic Experimental Conditions in this Study
Experimental Conditions Information Levels
Condition 1 Neither player knows his or her opponent’s BATNA
(Control)
Condition 2 Only strong negotiators know both BATNAs
Condition 3 Only weak negotiators know both BATNAs
Condition 4 Both players know each other’s BATNA
Dependent Measures
Dependent variables will be presented in the sequence as they appear in the hypotheses 
previously.
Strong Negotiators ’Focus on Distributive Element
To assess whether strong negotiators focussed on exerting dominance, I asked them to 
state the extent o f their agreement with the statements illustrated in Table 5.2. Strong 
negotiators responded on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly 
agree). To avoid response sets, one statement (4) was worded in the reverse direction. 
Responses to these six items were summed to obtain a strong-negotiators’ focus score.
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Table 5.2 Items for Strong Negotiators’ Focus on Distributive Element
1. I was very concerned if  I could outperform the employee.
2. My primary concern in the negotiation task was whether I could claim more surplus on the table than the 
opponent did.
3. I tried so hard to split the resources between us in the task.
4. As long as I enjoyed the negotiation, 1 was not very concerned if the other party earned more than I did.
5. I think a fair agreement would be the one that reflected the quality o f my BATNA (outside option).
6. The main goal I pursued was to do better than the opponent.
Judgements o f  Others ’ Preferences
Judgement accuracy scores were computed for each strong negotiator, following each 
negotiation, by examining their perceptions of others’ interests for negotiation issues. 
Specifically, following each negotiation, the experimenter provided each strong 
negotiator with a blank payoff schedule and the following instructions:
“Below is a blank payoff schedule similar to the one that has been given to you in 
this negotiation situation. At the time, we would like you to “fill in the numbers” to 
indicate what you think the other negotiator’s payoff schedule looks like. Your 
only hint is that the lowest number on their chart is zero and the highest is 4,000.”
From this fill-in-the-blank questionnaire, measures o f judgement accuracy were 
computed by examining deviations between strong negotiators’ estimates and the true
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values (Thompson, 1990b, Thompson, 1990a).
Two measures o f judgement accuracy were used: logrolling accuracy and compatibility 
accuracy25. Logrolling accuracy measured whether strong negotiators accurately 
perceived that four of the issues (e.g. annual leave, bonus, medical coverage, and 
company car, see Appendix A (III)) differed in importance to the other party. Strong 
negotiators who believe that the other party’s evaluation of the importance of the 
negotiation issues is the same as their own (e.g., they assume weak negotiators value 
annual leave the most and bonus the least) have a larger error score. Specifically, the 
accuracy score was computed by summing the absolute deviations o f strong 
negotiators’ estimates from weak negotiators’ actual values for the four logrolling 
issues26.
Compatibility accuracy measured whether strong negotiators realised that they had 
interests on one issue perfectly compatible with those o f weak negotiators (e.g., 1st July 
starting date). For this measure, strong negotiators were assigned a score of 0 if they 
failed to realise that the other party’s interests were the same as their own and a score of 
1 if they accurately identified that the other’s interests were compatible with their own.
25 A complete analysis o f  accuracy in negotiation would also entail assessing strong negotiators’ 
perceptions o f  the distributive issue (e.g., salary, see Appendix A (III)). This is not done because previous 
analyses indicate little or no variance on this measure (Thompson, 1990a, Thompson, 1990b).
26 Specifically, the formula is [abs (1600 -  x) + abs (1200 -  x) + abs (800 -  x) + abs (400 -x )  + abs (0 -  
x) + abs (4000 -  x) + abs (3000 -  x) + abs (2000 -  x) + abs (1000 - x )  + abs (0 -  x) + abs (0 -  x) + abs 
(200 -  x) + abs (400 -  x) + abs (600 -x )  + abs (800 -  x) + abs (3200 -  x) + abs (2400 -  x) + abs (1600 -  
x) + abs (800 -x) + abs (0 -  x)], in which abs = absolute value and x = strong negotiators’ estimate.
- 216 -
Chapter Five -W h y Knowledge o f  BATNA-Asymmetries Affects Agreem ent Efficiency (Study 3)
Strong Negotiators ’Perceptions o f Usefulness o f  Information-Exchange
To examine if strong negotiators considered information-exchange about interests 
useless in improving their individual outcomes, they were asked to indicate the extent 
to which each statement in Table 5.3 described their perceptions on a 7-point Likert 
scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Strong negotiators’ responses to the 
three items were summed to produce an overall perception o f information-exchange 
score.
Table 5.3 Items for Strong Negotiators’ Perception o f Information-Exchange
1. I did not believe that sharing information about preferences with the employee would yield a desired 
outcome.
2. 1 do not think that exchanging information about preferences could improve my payoff.
3. I felt that there was not much room in the negotiation for me to reach a deal that provided much more 
surplus than the BATNA I already had.
Motivation (Intrinsic and Extrinsic)
The Negotiators’ Motivation Inventory (NMI) was designed as a direct, explicit 
assessment of weak negotiators’ differences in the degree to which they perceived 
themselves to be intrinsically and extrinsically motivated toward the negotiation task. I 
adapted Work Preference Inventory (WPI) that assessed individuals’ motivation in 
organisations (Amabile et al., 1994) to fit with negotiators’ motivation and current 
hypotheses. Since motivation is a latent variable and cannot be directly measured, 
manifest variables of negotiators’ motivation were examined. Items for the NMI were
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written to capture the major elements o f both intrinsic and extrinsic motivation as 
described earlier (Bartholomew, Steele, Moustaki and Galbraith, 2002). For intrinsic 
motivation, the element includes perceived challenge. For extrinsic motivation, it 
includes pressure to reach a deal that satisfies strong negotiators.
Items were written in the first person, and I asked respondents to indicate the extent to 
which each item described them on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = 
strongly agree). An attempt was made to include approximately equal numbers of items 
for each element and to include statements that oppose each motivation, as well as 
statements that endorse it. This was in an effort to avoid response sets.
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Table 5.4 Negotiators’ Motivation Inventory Items and Scale Placement
Intrinsic Extrinsic
Item -------------------------------
Challenge Pressure
1. I felt that the task was a com plex problem to solve. X
2. I think the task was difficult for me. X
3. The task was relatively simple and straightforward. R
4. I found the task was something I could do easily, rather than
R
something that stretched my abilities.
5. I found that the negotiation problems tackled were completely new to
X
me.
6. I was concerned about whether the offers I made would satisfy the
X
opponent.
7. I seldom thought about whether the opponent was satisfied with the
offerfs).
8. I was very worried about whether the opponent would claim most o f
the surplus available on the table.
9. I was concerned about how the opponent was going to react to the
X
agreements suggested.
10. I was keenly aware o f  whether I earned something for what I did,
X
w hile keeping the other party at the negotiation table.
11. I felt that I was responsible for coming up with agreements that keep
X
the opponent at the negotiation table.
Note. An X indicates that the item falls on that particular scale. An R indicates that it is reverse scored.
The original version o f the NMI was written for the pilot study and discussions o f items 
with subjects were carried out, aiming for simplicity and clarity o f the questionnaire. 
On the basis o f initial item analyses with trial data not reported here, items were 
discarded, rewritten, and added in an effort to clearly and adequately capture both
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dimensions o f weak negotiators’ motivation. The NMI used in this study is in its fifth 
version (see Table 5.4).
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Procedural Remarks
The contents o f negotiators’ interactions were transcribed and coded in terms of 
procedural remarks that strong negotiators used, to assess whether they exerted control 
over the negotiation process. “Procedural remark” is defined as a meta-statement about 
how negotiation should proceed, for instance, which issue should be discussed, in what 
order, negotiating issue by issue. One rater coded all the transcriptions; a second rater 
who was blind to conditions and hypotheses coded half o f the transcriptions27.
The next sections will provide results of all the critical tests o f hypotheses, and a 
discussion of the results.
27 In case where disagreements occur, the code assigned by the first rater is retained to be consistent with 
the larger data set. The inter-rater reliability will be reported in the empirical section.
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5.6 Results
Study 1 and 2 considered whether and how negotiators’ knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries influences the efficiency o f negotiated agreements. Replicating 
these studies, Study 3 re-examines the effect o f negotiators’ knowledge on efficiency 
and information-exchange. Study 3 was also designed to seek an explanation for why 
negotiators’ knowledge affects agreement efficiency. I speculated about how 
negotiators’ knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries may affect their mind-set and attitudes 
toward the negotiation task. Specifically, I considered the possibility that mechanisms 
by which strong and weak negotiators’ knowledge affects agreement efficiency involve 
very different elements. The analyses of the experimental data will shed light on the 
four main concepts first introduced in this chapter: (1) the impact o f strong negotiators’ 
BATNA knowledge on their negotiation style and judgement errors, (2) the influence of 
strong negotiators’ knowledge on the perceived usefulness o f information-exchange; (3) 
the impact of weak negotiators’ knowledge on their motivational state; and (4) the 
effect o f complete knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries on the likelihood of strong 
negotiators dominating the negotiation process.
Next, a brief summary of findings for the effect of negotiators’ knowledge on efficiency 
and information-exchange is presented. This remainder o f this section is subdivided 
into three parts and examines the effect o f each negotiator’s knowledge in turn: (1) 
strong negotiators’ knowledge, (2) weak negotiators’ knowledge, and (3) complete 
knowledge.
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5.6.1 Replication o f  Findings in Study 1 and Study 2
As in Study 1, the dependent measures o f agreement efficiency and 
information-exchange were joint outcomes, strong negotiators’ information-sharing 
behaviour (strong exchange), and weak negotiators’ information-sharing behaviour 
(weak exchange). Higher joint outcomes indicate more efficient agreements (see 
Chapter 3 for details). Weak exchange and strong exchange represent the likelihoods of 
weak negotiators and strong negotiators sharing information respectively. Table 5.5 
describes experimental conditions and reports the findings.
Table 5.5 Means for Joint Gains, Strong Exchange, and Weak Exchange by 
Experimental Conditions
Experimental Condition
Joint Strong Weak
Outcomes Exchange Exchange
Control 16,908* 0.58, 0.50*
Strong Negotiators Informed 15,867* 0.25/ 0.21/
Weak Negotiators Informed 18,050c 0.82g 0.82,
Both Informed 15,763* 0.20 f 0.27,
Note. Subscripting is based upon comparisons o f means (or proportions) within each column; 
means with different subscripts differ at p <  0.05 or less. (e.g. Joint outcomes for Control is 
given the subscript ‘a ’ and it is significantly different to that for Condition 2 given subscript ‘6 ’. 
However, joint outcomes for Condition 2 and 4 are not significantly different.) N  -  24 in each 
condition, except for Strong Exchange and Weak Exchange N =  22 in the control and Condition 
2 .
ANOVAs with contrasts were performed to examine the impact of negotiators’
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knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries on joint outcomes, strong exchange and weak 
exchange. There were significant main effects for Experimental Condition on joint 
outcomes, F(3,95) = 24.50,/? < .0005, strong exchange, F(3,91) = 11.54,/? < .0005, and 
weak exchange F(3,91) = 7.36,/? < .0005.
Do the findings from Study 3 replicate the same patterns of results in Study 1 and 2? 
Yes. First, consider the effect of solo strong negotiators’ knowledge on efficiency and 
strong exchange. Planned contrasts (control vs. condition 2) revealed that both joint 
outcomes and strong exchange decreased with solo strong negotiators’ knowledge (see 
Table 5.5). When only strong negotiators were informed, dyads reached less efficient 
agreements (M =  15,867*,) than when they were not (M  = 16,908a), t = 2.39, /? < .01. 
When only strong negotiators were informed, they were less likely to share information 
(M = 0.25/) than when they were not (M = 0.58e), t = 2.68,/? < .01.
Now consider the impact of solo weak negotiators’ knowledge on efficiency and weak 
exchange. Again, the findings were in agreements with those in Study 1 and 2. When 
only weak negotiators were informed of BATNA-asymmetries, joint outcomes were 
significantly higher (M =  18,050c) than when they were not (M =  16,908o), t = 2.62, /? 
< .01. In addition, there was a significant difference in weak exchange between these 
groups, (M =  0.82, vs. M =  0.50*,), t = 2 2 S , p <  .05.
Finally the effect of complete knowledge on efficiency and information-exchange is 
considered. The findings are replicated if complete knowledge adversely affects 
efficiency and information-sharing behaviour. As can be seen in Table 5.5, joint
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outcomes decreased with complete knowledge (M = 16,908a compared to M =  15,763*), 
t = 2.62, p  < .01. When both parties had complete knowledge, strong negotiators were 
less likely to share information (M = 0.20/) than when they lacked knowledge (M  = 
0.58*), t = 3.16, p  < .01. This was also true for weak negotiators’ information-sharing 
behaviour ( M — 0.27, vs. M -  0.50*), t=  1.72, p  < .05.
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5.6.2 Examination o f  Why Strong Negotiators ’Knowledge Affects Agreement Efficiency
Solo strong negotiators’ knowledge impedes dyads’ ability to reach efficient solutions. 
To examine why this occurs, two explanations were proposed in Study 3. The first 
explanation considered impacts of strong negotiators’ knowledge on exerting 
dominance (focus score); their judgements about others’ preferences (logrolling 
accuracy); and whether they are able to identify the compatible issue (compatibility 
accuracy). These were to answer three questions: 1) Does strong negotiators’ 
knowledge affect their negotiation style? 2) Does this knowledge also lead to higher 
judgement errors o f strong negotiators about their counterparts’ interests? 3) Do focus 
score and judgement errors mediate the relationship between strong negotiators’ 
knowledge and information-exchange?
Focus on Distributive Element
First, consider the first question. As described in section 5.5, a 7-point Likert scale was 
employed (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree); six items were used to assess the 
degree to which strong negotiators focused on exerting their dominance. To assess the 
dimensionality o f the scale, I carried out an exploratory factor analysis. An examination 
o f the overall fit measures indicated that the one-factor model fitted the data (^ (9) = 
14.5, p  = 0.107). Also, eigenvalues indicated a single dominant factor with loadings 
ranged between 0.33 and 0.89. This scale showed an acceptable level of internal 
reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.81). Therefore, strong negotiators’ responses to the 6 
items were summed to produce an overall focus score.
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To examine the influence of the different experimental conditions on focus score, an 
ANOVA was performed. There was a significant main effect for Experimental 
Condition on focus score, F(3,95) = 56.34,/? < .0005. See Table 5.6 for means of focus 
score in different experimental condition.
Table 5.6 Strong Negotiators’ Focus Score in Different Conditions
Experimental Condition
Strong Weak
Neither
Negotiators Negotiators Both Informed
Informed
Informed Informed (Condition 4)
(Control)
(Condition 2) (Condition 3)
Mean Focus
17.8* 27.5 b 18.1a 28.0*
Score
Note. N  = 24 in each condition. Maximum focus score = 42. Higher focus scores indicate a 
greater degree to which strong negotiators focus on the distributive element. Subscripting is 
based upon comparisons o f means using an ANOVA with contrasts; different subscripts 
indicate means differ at p < .05 or less. (e.g. the focus score for Control is given the subscript 
4a ’ and it is significantly different to that for Condition 2 given subscript ib \  but the scores for 
Control and Condition 3 are not significantly different).
Does strong negotiators’ knowledge affect their negotiation style? Yes. Specifically, 
Hypothesis la  proposed that informed strong negotiators focused on exerting their 
dominance to a greater degree, than those without knowledge. A planned contrast o f 
focus score (control vs. condition 2) was conducted to test this relationship. As can be 
seen in Table 5.6, when strong negotiators were informed o f both BATNAs, they 
focused more on the distributive element o f the negotiation (M =  27.5*), than when they
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were not (M =  17.8„), t = 9.1 \ , p  < .0005.
Figure 5.3 Strong Negotiators’ Responses to Item 1 -  “I was very concerned if I 
could outperform  the employee” (Control vs. Condition 2)
60
■  control
■  condition 2
strongly disagree slightly neutral slightly agree strongly 
disagree disagree agree agree
Strong Negotiators' Response
Since the Likert Scale is ordinal, I consider the median o f  the item. For example, the 
median o f  item 1 was five (“slightly agree”) for informed strong negotiators, while it 
was three (“slightly disagree”) for control strong negotiators. About 68%  o f  informed 
strong negotiators reported that they slightly agree or agree the statem ent (“/  was very 
concerned i f  I  co idd  outperform  the em ployee”), whereas about 11 %  control strong 
negotiators shared the same view 28.
28 The patterns o f  strong negotiators’ responses to other items are very similar to those to item 1. If 
interested, see Appendix D (I).
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Judgement Errors about Others ’Interests
Here the second question concerning the relationship between strong negotiators’ 
knowledge and judgement errors is considered. To examine strong negotiators’ 
judgement errors about the other party’s preferences, I adopted two measures: (1) 
logrolling accuracy score and (2) compatibility accuracy score. Two ANOVAs with a 
priori contrasts were performed to examine the impact o f negotiators’ knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries (Control, Strong Negotiators Informed, Weak Negotiators 
Informed, and Both Informed) on both measures. There were significant main effects 
on both logrolling accuracy score, F(3,95) = 3.61 ,P <  .05, and compatibility accuracy 
score, F(3,95) = 2.94,/? < .05.
Does strong negotiators’ knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries lead to higher judgement 
errors about their counterparts’ interests? Yes.
First, consider the impact of strong negotiators’ knowledge on logrolling accuracy 
scores. Hypothesis lb  suggested that it is likely that informed strong negotiators failed 
to realise they have different priorities across issues. If  this is correct, informed strong 
negotiators should report higher logrolling accuracy scores than those without 
information (higher values indicate greater judgements errors). The findings support 
Hypothesis lb . As can be seen in the first row o f Table 5.7, when strong negotiators 
were informed o f both BATNAs, they made less accurate judgements about others’ 
preferences (M =  15,229b) than when they were uninformed (M =  ll,900a), t = -1.87,/? 
< .05.
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Table 5.7 Strong Negotiators’ Logrolling Accuracy and Compatibility Accuracy in 
Different Conditions
Experim ental C ondition
Neither
Informed
(Control)
Strong 
Negotiators 
Informed 
(Condition 2)
Weak 
Negotiators 
Informed 
(Condition 3)
Both Informed 
(Condition 4)
Logrolling
Accuracy
11,900* 15,229* 10,856* 15,763*
C om patibility
A ccuracy
0.67a 0.42* 0.71, 0.38*
Note. N  = 24 in each condition. Lower logrolling accuracy scores indicate more accurate
judgements. Compatibility accuracy score is the proportion o f strong negotiators that correctly 
identify the compatible issue (starting date). Subscripting is based upon comparisons o f means 
within each row using ANOVAs with contrasts; different subscripts indicate means differ at p  
< .05 or less.
Now, consider the effect of strong negotiators’ knowledge on compatibility accuracy. 
According to Hypothesis lc, strong negotiators’ knowledge should influence the 
likelihood that they identify the compatible issue. The findings lend support to this 
hypothesis. As can be seen in the second row o f Table 5.7, a planned comparison of 
compatibility accuracy between control and condition 2 revealed that informed strong 
negotiators tended to be less likely to identify the compatible issue (M = 0.42*) than 
those in the control group (M =  0.67a), t = -1.78, p  < .05.
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Mediating Role o f  Focus Score and Judgement Accuracy
Figure 5.4 A Proposed Theoretical Model of Strong Negotiators’ Knowledge of 
BATNA-Asymmetries and Information-Exchange
Strong Negotiators’ Focus on Exerting Less
Knowledge of _________ ^  Their Dominance & _________ ^  Information-
BATN A-Asymmetries Judgement Errors Exchange
Implicit in the hypotheses is that both strong negotiators’ focus on the distributive 
element and judgement accuracy mediate the relationship between strong negotiators’ 
knowledge and information-sharing behaviour (see Figure 5.4). To test whether they 
were mediators, logistic regressions were performed with four conditions to be 
satisfied29 (Baron and Kenny, 1986).
The first condition is that strong negotiators’ knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries 
needed to be related to their information-sharing behaviour, which I have already 
shown in Study 2. Second, strong negotiators’ knowledge needed to be related to focus 
score and judgement errors (logrolling accuracy score), which I have also shown in this 
study. Third, both focus score and judgement errors needed to be related to 
information-sharing behaviour while controlling for strong negotiators’ knowledge. 
Fourth, the relationship between strong negotiators’ knowledge and 
information-exchange needs to be reduced when taking into account the indirect effect 
o f focus score and judgement accuracy.
29 Logistic regressions were used because information-exchange is a dichotomous variable.
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Is the relationship between strong negotiators* knowledge and inform ation-exchange 
m ediated by focus score and judgem ent errors? Yes. A s illustrated in Figure 5.5, 
regressing inform ation-exchange on strong negotiators’ know ledge and focus score, I 
found that the regression coefficient for focus score was -0.282 (p = 0.017), whereas 
the regression coefficient for strong negotiators' know ledge was insignificant (p = ns). 
Also, regressing inform ation-exchange on both strong negotiators’ knowledge and 
judgem ent accuracy, I found that the regression coefficient for judgem ent error was 
-0.001 (p = 0.012) whereas the coefficient for strong negotiators’ knowledge was 
insignificant (p = ns)30.
Figure 5.5 Structural Equation of Model of the Relationships among Strong 
Negotiators’ Knowledge, Focus Score, Judgem ent Errors, and 
Information-Exchange. * p < .05
Judgement
Errors
Focus Score
Strong
Negotiators’
Knowledge
ns
Information-
ns
Exchange
Note. The dotted lines show the relationships between variables when controlling for the 
mediating variable(s).
Thus, when controlling for focus score and judgem ent errors, the effect for strong
30 For every 100 point increase in logrolling accuracy score (less accurate judgements), odds o f strong 
negotiators’ exchanging information decreased by 9.52%.
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negotiators’ knowledge on information-sharing disappeared. However, controlling for 
strong negotiators’ knowledge, effects of both focus score and judgement errors were 
significant. I can conclude that both strong negotiators’ focus on exerting their 
dominance and judgement errors mediated the effect o f knowledge on 
information-exchange.
Further, I tested whether strong negotiators’ focus on the distributive element mediated 
the relationship between knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries and judgement errors. 
The same four conditions, suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986), needed to be 
satisfied. The previous findings showed that the first and second conditions -  effects of 
knowledge on focus score and judgement errors -  are satisfied. Third, while controlling 
for strong negotiators’ knowledge, the regression coefficient for focus score was 634.9 
(p < .01). Also, while controlling for focus score, the regression coefficient for strong 
negotiators’ knowledge became insignificant (p = ns). These findings suggested that 
strong negotiators’ focus on exerting their dominance mediated the relationship 
between knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries and judgement errors (logrolling accuracy 
score).
Finally, I tested whether judgement errors mediated the association between focus on 
the distributive element and information-exchange (see Figure 5.5). When controlling 
for focus score, the regression coefficient for judgement errors was -0.001 (p = 0.018). 
However, controlling for judgement errors, the effect o f focus score on 
information-exchange became insignificant (p = ns).
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Perceived Usefulness o f  Information-Exchange
An alternative explanation o f why strong negotiators’ knowledge led to inefficient 
outcomes was also introduced in Study 3. This regards the impact of this knowledge on 
the perceived usefulness of information-exchange (perception score). Three items 
were used to assess whether strong negotiators perceived information-exchange as 
useful to improve their individual outcomes (see Table 5.3 for details). A principle
-l I
component analyses was performed to examine the dimensionality o f the scale . The 
analysis yielded a single dominant component with eigenvalue o f 1.99 that explained 
66% of the total variance of the score. For this component, the loadings for three items 
were all large and positive, ranged from 0.63 to 0.91. Also, the scale measuring strong 
negotiators’ perception about information-exchange gave an acceptable level of internal 
validity (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.75). Therefore, strong negotiators’ responses to the three 
items were summed to produce an overall perception score.
Hypothesis Id suggested that strong negotiators’ knowledge would render 
improvements in payoffs through information-exchange unlikely. An 
independent-samples Mest was used to test this relationship. If  this is correct, informed 
strong negotiators should show higher perception scores than those without knowledge. 
However, this hypothesis is not supported. When strong negotiators were informed of 
both BATNAs, their perceptions of information-exchange did not significantly differ 
from those without information (M =  8.50 vs. M =  9.07), t = 0.64, p  = ns. Specifically, 
both informed and control strong negotiators tended to agree that information-exchange
31 Here instead o f  factor analysis, principle component analysis was em ployed, because the number o f  
item (p = 3) were too small to produce the degree o f  freedom to be greater than zero.
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was useful to yield a desired outcome.
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5.6.3 Examination o f  Why Weak Negotiators’ Knowledge Affects Agreement Efficiency
Recall that solo weak negotiators’ knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries was found to 
facilitate information-exchange and therefore improved agreement efficiency in Study 
1 and 2. Study 3 was designed to explain these findings. I speculated that the benefits 
o f weak negotiators’ knowledge may lie in its impact on their motivational states. 
Specifically, it was argued that this knowledge may enhance the elements of both 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.
Note that I am not concerned about whether and how these elements are related to one 
another. Instead, I examined whether weak negotiators’ knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries influenced their overall motivational states (motivation score). 
This section is to seek answers to two questions: 1) Does weak negotiators’ knowledge 
increase overall motivation levels? 2) Does weak negotiators’ motivation mediate the 
effect o f weak negotiators’ knowledge and information-exchange?
Influence o f  Weak Negotiators ’ Knowledge on Motivation
As described in section 5.5, the Negotiators’ Motivation Inventory contained 11 items 
to capture two elements of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation -  (i) perceived challenge 
and (ii) pressure -  that may be associated with weak negotiators’ knowledge. Since the 
relationship between these elements is not o f interest, two separate factor analyses with 
a single factor were carried out to assess the dimensionality for each element, instead of 
a two-factor solution.
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Eigenvalues indicated a single dominant factor with all loadings greater than 0.48 and 
0.452 for perceived challenge and pressure items respectively. The fit measures showed 
that two one-factor models provided a good fit to the data for perceived challenge items, 
f 2(5) = 8.07, p  = 0.152, and for pressure items, ^(9) = 15.56, p  = 0.08. Also, both of 
these scales showed an acceptable level of internal reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.78 
and 0.77 respectively). Since the mixture o f motivation of interest, weak negotiators’ 
responses to the eleven items were thus summed to produce an overall motivation 
score.
An ANOVA was performed to examine the effect o f experimental condition (Control, 
Strong Negotiators Informed, Weak Negotiators Informed, and Both Informed) on 
motivation score. There was a significant main effect for negotiators’ knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries on motivational states of weak negotiators, F(3,79) = 20.42, p  
< .0005.
Table 5.8 Motivation Scores in Different Conditions
Experimental Condition
Strong Weak
Neither
Negotiators Negotiators Both Informed
Informed
Informed Informed (Condition 4)
(Control)
(Condition 2) (Condition 3)
Mean
Motivation 42.0o 39. \a 52.7* 54.0*
Score
Note. N  = 20 in each condition. Maximum motivation score = 77. Subscripting is based upon 
comparisons of means; different subscripts indicate means differ at p  < .05 or less.
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Regarding the first question, Hypothesis 2 suggested that when only w eak negotiators 
were aware o f  BATNA-asym m etries their overall m otivation would be higher than 
when they w ere not. The findings from a planned contrast o f  m otivation score lend 
support to this hypothesis. As can be seen in Table 5.8, inform ed weak negotiators 
reported a higher motivation score (M  = 52.7*) than control w eak negotiators (M  = 
42.0a), t =  4.57, p  < .0005.
Figure 5.6 Weak Negotiators’ Responses to ‘Perceived Challenge’ Item (Item 1) 
(Control vs. Condition 3)
40
S  Control
■  condition 3
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Weak Negotiators' Response
The m edians for item 1 (**I  f e l t  that the task was a com plex problem  to solve”) were 
three (“slightly disagree”) and five (“slightly agree”) for control weak negotiators and 
informed weak negotiators respectively. 60% o f informed w eak negotiators reported 
that they at least slightly agree this statement, w hereas ju s t 20%  o f those without
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inform ation stated the same extents o f  their agreem ent with this statem ent32.
Figure 5.7 Weak Negotiators’ Response to ‘Pressure’ Item (Item 6) (Control vs. 
Condition 3)
50
E3 control
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Weak N egotiators’ Response
The m edian responses o f  weak negotiators to item 6 (“/  was concerned whether the 
offers I  made w ould  satisfy the opponent”) were six (“agree”) for informed weak 
negotiators and five (“slightly agree”) for control weak negotiators. As shown in Figure 
5.7, 80% inform ed w eak negotiators reported that they at least slightly agree with this 
statem ent w hereas ju st 55%  o f those in the control group shared the same view33.
32 The patterns o f  weak negotiators’ responses to other ‘perceived challenge’ items are very similar. The 
full data set is available in Appendix D (I).
33 The patterns o f  weak negotiators’ responses to other ‘pressure’ items are very similar. The full data set 
is available in Appendix D (1).
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M ediating Role o f  Weak N ego tia tors’ M otivation
Figure 5.8 A Proposed Theoretical Model of Weak Negotiators’ Knowledge of 
BATNA-Asymmetries and Information-Exchange * p  < .05
Weak
Increased Increased
Negotiators’
Knowledge
n formation- ExchangeMotivation
ns
N o te .  T he dotted line sh ow s the relationship betw een variables w hen  controlling for m otivation.
Implicit in Hypothesis 2 is that weak negotiators’ m otivation to create alternate 
solutions mediated the effect o f  their knowledge about BATNA-imbalances on 
inform ation-exchange about interests. If  m otivation is the mediator, it will again have 
to satisfy four conditions that Baron and Kenny (1986) defined (see section 5.6.2 for 
details). The sam e analyses were carried out.
Does m otivation mediate the effect o f  weak negotiators' knowledge on 
inform ation-exchange? Yes. Regressing inform ation-sharing behaviour on both 
m otivation and weak negotiators' knowledge, I found the regression coefficient for 
m otivation was 0.152 (p  < .05), w hereas the coefficient for weak negotiators’ 
know ledge was 1.227 (p = ns) but insignificant. This suggests that when controlling for
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weak negotiators’ motivation, the effect for weak negotiators’ knowledge disappeared, 
and the effect o f motivation on information-exchange was significant while controlling 
for knowledge.
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5.6.4 Complete Knowledge o f  BATNA-Asymmetries
First, I considered why strong negotiators’ knowledge impedes their willingness to 
reveal preferences when asked. As argued, I speculated that the underlying reason may 
lie in impacts o f strong negotiators’ knowledge on the focus on exerting their 
dominance (focus score) and inaccurate judgements about others’ preferences 
(logrolling accuracy). All the following critical tests o f hypotheses are based on 
comparisons between condition 3 (only weak negotiators informed) and condition 4 
(complete information). The central question is why strong negotiators’ knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries overrides the benefit o f weak negotiators’ knowledge on 
information-exchange about interests. So, the baseline is that only weak negotiators are 
aware o f BATNA-asymmetries.
Focus on Distributive Element
Table 5.9 Strong N egotiators’ Focus Score in Condition 3 and 4
Experimental Condition
Only Weak Negotiators Informed Both Informed
(Condition 3) (Condition 4)
Mean Focus
18.1a 28.0,
Score
Note. N  = 24 in each condition. Maximum focus score = 42. Higher focus scores indicate a 
greater degree to which strong negotiators focus on the distributive element. Subscripting is 
based upon comparisons o f means within each row; different subscripts indicate means differ at 
p  < .05 or less.
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Hypothesis 3a suggested that when both parties were informed o f both BATNAs, strong 
negotiators would focus on exerting their dominance to a greater extent, than when 
only weak negotiators were informed. A planned comparison (complete knowledge vs. 
weak negotiators’ knowledge) was conducted for strong negotiators’ focus score. The 
findings lend support to Hypothesis 3a. As can been seen in Table 5.9, when both 
parties had complete knowledge, it was more likely that strong negotiators focused on 
expressing their superiority distributively (M=  28.0&), than when only weak negotiators 
had knowledge (M =  18.1a), t = 9.26, p  < .0005.
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Judgement Errors (Logrolling Accuracy)
Table 5.10 Strong Negotiators’ Logrolling Accuracy in Condition 3 and 4
Experimental Condition
Only Weak Negotiators Informed Both Informed
(Condition 3) (Condition 4)
Logrolling
10,856„ 15,763*
Accuracy
Note. N  = 24 in each condition. Higher logrolling accuracy scores indicate greater judgement 
errors about others’ preferences across issues. Subscripting is based upon comparisons o f 
means within each row; different subscripts indicate means differ at p <  .05 or less.
Hypothesis 3b proposed that when both parties were aware o f both BATNAs, it is more 
likely that informed strong negotiators tended to assume that their opponents had the 
same priorities across issues than when only weak negotiators were. The findings 
support Hypothesis 3b. As can be seen in Table 5.10, when both parties had complete 
information, strong negotiators made less accurate judgements about others’ 
preferences (M  = 15,763*) than when only weak negotiators were informed (M  = 
10,856a), t = 2.73, p  < .01.
Next, consider the second explanation of why complete knowledge did not reflect the 
benefit on agreement efficiency as solo weak negotiators’ knowledge did. Study 2 
showed that strong negotiators’ knowledge deterred weak negotiators from sharing 
information about interests. Study 3 considered why this was the case.
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As suggested previously, strong negotiators’ knowledge does not affect weak 
negotiators’ motivation to create alternate solutions (motivation scores). Instead, it 
makes strong negotiators dominate the negotiation process by using procedural remark 
(procedural remark). This section will seek answers to two questions: 1) Does strong 
negotiators’ knowledge affect informed weak negotiators’ motivation? 2) Does strong 
negotiators’ knowledge increase the likelihood that they dominate the negotiation 
process?
Motivation
Table 5.11 Motivation Scores in Condition 3 and 4
Experimental Condition
Only Weak Negotiators
Both Informed
Informed
(Condition 4)
(Condition 3)
Mean Motivation
52 .7* 54 .0a
Score
Note. N  = 20 in each condition. Maximum motivation score = 77 . Subscripting is based upon 
comparisons o f means within each row; different subscripts indicate means differ at p  < .05 or 
less.
Regarding the first question, Hypothesis 3c predicted that strong negotiators’ 
knowledge should have no impacts on informed weak negotiators’ motivation levels. If  
this is correct, there will be no difference in motivation scores between Condition 3 and 
Condition 4. The findings support this hypothesis. Effects o f strong negotiators’ 
knowledge were found to be insignificant for motivation scores. The findings suggested
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that when both parties had complete information about BATNA-asymmetries, weak 
negotiators’ motivation (Af = 54.0&) was as high as when only weak negotiators did (M  
= 52.7b), t < \ .
Procedural Remarks
To examine whether strong negotiators made procedural remarks, the contents of 
negotiators’ interactions were transcribed and coded (see Table 5.12 for definition of 
‘procedural remark’). The first rater coded all the transcriptions; a second rater coded 
half o f the transcriptions. To assess the reliability o f coding, Cohen Kappa was 
performed. The reliability coefficient was 0.924.
Table 5.12 Coding Schemes
Code Definition
Procedural Remark
Meta-statement about how the negotiation should proceed, 
e.g. which issue should be discussed; in what order; we should
negotiate issue by issue
Does strong negotiators’ knowledge increase the likelihood that they make procedural 
remarks? Yes. Hypothesis 3d suggested that when both parties were aware of 
BATNA-asymmetries, it is more likely that strong negotiators would make procedural 
remarks than when only weak negotiators were informed. This hypothesis receives 
support. An independent-samples Mest revealed a significant difference in likelihoods 
o f strong negotiators making procedural remarks. As predicted, when both parties had 
complete information, strong negotiators were more likely to suggest how the
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negotiation should proceed (M =  0.50) than when only weak negotiators had (M =  0.17), 
t = 2.56, p  < .01.
Figure 5.9 Proportions of Strong Negotiators Making Procedural Remarks
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Figure 5.9 illustrates proportions o f strong negotiators that made different 
m eta-statem ents in Condition 3 (only weak negotiators inform ed) and Condition 4 
(complete inform ation). As can be seen in Figure 5.9, 46%  o f  strong negotiators in 
Condition 4 suggested that they should negotiate one issue at a time, com pared to just 
17% o f those did in Condition 3. Sim ilar patterns were observed for m eta-statem ents 
such as “which issue to be d iscu ssed ’ and ‘7 /7  what order”.
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Figure 5.10 Proportions of Weak Negotiators Making Procedural Remarks
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Exam ining whether weak negotiators made procedural remarks in the same 
experim ental conditions ensures that strong negotiators’ knowledge o f 
BATNA-asymmetries accounted for the likelihood o f  strong negotiators making 
procedural remarks, rather than weak negotiators. Figure 5.10 reports proportions o f 
weak negotiators that made different m eta-statem ents in Condition 3 (only weak 
negotiators informed) and Condition 4 (complete inform ation). Looking at Figure 5.9 
and 5.10, it is clear that weak negotiators in both experim ental conditions were less 
likely to suggest how the negotiation should proceed than strong negotiators. Also, the 
pattern o f  results indicates that strong negotiators’ know ledge had no im pact on 
w hether weak negotiators made procedural remarks. For example, 8% o f  weak 
negotiators in Condition 4 suggested in what order issues to be discussed, compared to 
ju st 4%  o f those did in Condition 3. However, the pattern was reversed for 
m eta-statem ent such as “which issue to be discussed  ”.
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5.7 Discussion
The findings from the previous section provide answers to the four research questions 
raised at the beginning of the chapter. These questions regard different levels of 
negotiators’ knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries and each will be discussed in turn.
5 .7.1 Strong Negotiators ' Knowledge o f  BATNA-Asymmetries
The first question addressed by Study 3 was to explain why solo strong negotiators’ 
knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries was a handicap to the development o f efficient 
agreements and information-exchange about interests in Study 1 and 2. Two 
explanations have been proposed and examined in this study.
The first explanation considered the impact of strong negotiators’ knowledge on their 
negotiation style and mind-set. This explanation involved a two-step mechanism. The 
first step was that strong negotiators who learn the difference in their BATNAs would 
express their superiority distributively in order to push for agreements that reflect their 
BATNA advantage. Also, we know that negotiators commonly have the fixed-pie bias 
at the outset o f negotiation (Thompson and Hastie, 1990, Thompson, 1991). The second 
step was that strong negotiators’ focus on exerting their dominance would render this 
tenacious bias more difficult to dislodge, resulting in greater judgements errors about 
their opponents’ preferences. Theorists suggest that negotiators tend to overestimate 
information that is consistent with their expectations (i.e. fixed-pie perception) and 
underestimate information that goes against them (Pinkley et al,, 1995, Pruitt and
-249-
Chapter Five -W h y Knowledge o f  BATNA-Asymmetries Affects Agreem ent Efficiency (Study 3)
Camevale, 1993, Thompson and DeHarpport, 1994, Thompson and Hastie, 1990, 
Thompson, 1991). So, strong negotiators with knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries 
would rarely conduct an active search for information which would go against their 
existing ideas and suppositions.
There is support for this explanation. Strong negotiators, when informed of both 
BATNAs, were more likely to focus on claiming a larger share o f bargaining surplus 
and outperforming their weaker counterparts, and they suffered greater judgement 
errors. Further, mediation analyses suggested that the relationship between strong 
negotiators’ knowledge and information-exchange was partly due to their focus on 
distributive element and inaccurate judgements it fostered. Strong negotiators’ focus on 
exerting their dominance also mediated the impact of strong negotiators’ knowledge on 
judgement accuracy.
Recall that strong negotiators’ knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries was found to hinder 
dyads’ ability to reach efficient agreements and to discourage negotiators from sharing 
information about preferences. Coupling these findings with the relationship between 
this knowledge and strong negotiators’ mind-set, Pinkley’s (1995) hypothesis -  that 
knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries provides strong negotiators with freedom to share 
information and find creative ways to expand the resource pie -  is not supported. 
Rather, the ineffectiveness of strong negotiators’ BATNA knowledge, in terms of the 
search for efficient agreements, is consistent with prior work that suggests that when 
negotiators have different power, power-advantaged negotiators tend to push for
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agreements that distribute payoffs proportional to their power advantage34 (Bacharach 
and Lawler, 1981, Komorita, 1984, Lawler and Yoon, 1993, Mannix and Neale, 1993). 
In other words, knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries can help strong negotiators 
establish their hierarchy and provide them with an acceptable justification for demand 
o f the majority share of the resources. They will then turn their attention to expressing 
their superiority distributively.
Study 3 also tested the second explanation about why strong negotiators’ knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries suppresses information-exchange and leads to inefficient 
agreements. It considered the possibility that the relative strength o f strong negotiators’ 
BATNA renders improvements in individual payoffs through negotiations unlikely. In 
particular, when strong negotiators were informed of both BATNAs, they might 
construe that information-exchange is a way to improve their weaker counterparts’ 
payoffs rather than their own outcomes. However, uninformed strong negotiators may 
have discordant view because they assume their opponents possess a similar BATNA. 
As a result, informed strong negotiators may consider information-exchange less 
appealing than uninformed strong negotiators.
However, knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries did not seem to influence strong 
negotiators’ perceptions about the usefulness o f information-exchange; this lack of 
evidence rules out the second explanation. In fact, the finding showed that both 
informed and uninformed strong negotiators tended to agree that information-exchange 
would improve their individual payoffs. This suggests that the first explanation is more
34 These studies concerning unequal power defined power differently from my studies. For example, 
power was represented by number o f  alternative partners that negotiators have. Or, difference in power 
was manipulated by varying the probabilities o f  various profits o f  the alternatives.
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compelling than the alternative explanation.
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5.7.2 Weak Negotiators ’Knowledge o f  BATNA-Asymmetries
The second issue addressed was to examine why solo weak negotiators’ knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries facilitated information-exchange about interests, thus improving 
dyads’ ability to reach efficient agreements in Study 1 and 2. As argued, this may stem 
from its impact on weak negotiators’ motivational states, because we know that there is 
a strong link between motivation and creative performance (Amabile, 1982, Amabile, 
1983b, Amabile, 1988, Amabile et al., 1994, Deci and Ryan, 1985, Ryan and Deci, 
2000, Ruscio et a l , 1998). Given that discovering efficient agreements requires 
divergent and creative thinking (Kurtzberg, 1998), it is possible that weak negotiators’ 
knowledge increases their motivation and that they are more likely to explore the 
possibility o f resource pie expansion by exchanging information about preferences with 
opponents. To explore this possibility, Study 3 examined the impact of weak 
negotiators’ knowledge on the level o f motivation that they brought to negotiations.
The results provided evidence suggesting that weak negotiators’ knowledge increases 
their overall motivation. Further, the findings unravelled the relationships among weak 
negotiators’ knowledge, motivation states and information-sharing behaviours. 
Mediation analyses suggested that the relationship between weak negotiators’ 
knowledge and information-exchange was due to the motivation it fostered. Therefore, 
the findings imply that weak negotiators’ knowledge had a trickle-down effect in 
negotiations; knowledge of BATNA-imbalances, when being made available to weak 
negotiators alone, influenced their motivation, which encouraged information-exchange 
and ultimately shaped the quality of agreements reached.
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In my view, the major result of import is ascertaining why weak negotiators’ knowledge 
o f BATNA-asymmetries facilitates information-exchange about interests and dyads’ 
ability to reach efficient outcomes as seen in Study 1 and Study 2. There is enough 
evidence to suggest that weak negotiators’ knowledge o f BATNA-imbalances 
accounted for this by influencing their motivation. No research, to the author’s 
knowledge, has actually examined these relationships.
Study 3 also examined the impact of weak negotiators’ knowledge on the elements of 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, (i) perceived challenge and (ii) pressure, which 
would provide a fuller understanding of how this knowledge leads to efficient 
agreements.
The findings indicated that knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries fosters weak 
negotiators’ feeling o f competence by changing their perception o f the negotiation task. 
That is, informed weak negotiators perceived the task differently to uninformed weak 
negotiators who tended to assume their opponents have a similar BATNA. Informed 
weak negotiators perceived the negotiation as more challenging and complex than those 
without knowledge, because they not only need to come up with an agreement that 
provides them with sufficient payoffs, but also to satisfy their stronger counterparts. So, 
informed weak negotiators were attracted by the challenge of the problem, and the 
result was an increase o f intrinsic motivation.
In addition, I found support for the effect of weak negotiators’ knowledge on the 
extrinsic motivation component: pressure. Specifically, informed weak negotiators,
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compared to uninformed ones, tended to be under greater pressure about whether strong 
negotiators would claim most of the surplus; whether they could keep their stronger 
opponents at the negotiation table while earning sufficient payoffs for themselves. 
Conversely, uninformed weak negotiators were not urged to expand the resource pie as 
vigorously as informed weak negotiators, since uninformed negotiators tended to 
assume their opponents possess a similar BATNA. The results support Rolofif & 
Dailey’s (1987) prediction that in BATNA-imbalanced negotiations weak negotiators 
are under pressure to create alternate settlements. Unless the size o f the resource pie is 
increased, they will be unable to receive a high quality payoff (Mannix and Neale, 1993, 
Roloff and Dailey, 1987).
Also, this research result refines and generalises the theoretical relationship between 
the position o f low-BATNA and extrinsic motivation. It clarifies theorists’ speculation 
that when negotiators have different BATNAs, weak negotiators may be driving the 
integrativeness of the final outcome (Mannix and Neale, 1993, Pinkley, 1995, Roloff 
and Dailey, 1987). A major refinement is that this study specifies the condition in which 
weak negotiators are most likely to be extrinsically motivated. In this study, I have 
shown that it is not enough to argue that weak negotiators are under pressure to be 
creative simply because of BATNA-asymmetries. Rather, extrinsic motivation has been 
demonstrated as a function of weak negotiators’ knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries.
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5.7.3 Explanations o f  Asymmetric Data Collection
Asymmetric data were collected in Study 3: only weak negotiators’ motivation and 
strong negotiators’ focus on distributive elements were considered. However, for 
example, strong negotiators’ motivation was not discussed. Before proceeding to the 
discussion of complete knowledge, explanations o f asymmetric data collection are 
given here. The rationale is that since strong and weak negotiators’ knowledge has 
different impacts on efficiency the mechanisms by which these occur should involve 
very different elements. Nevertheless, it is necessary to consider whether strong 
negotiators’ motivation (weak negotiators’ focus on distributive elements) varies across 
different experimental conditions. If so, does it affect the conclusions made in section
5.7.1 and 5.7.2?
First, the level o f motivation that strong negotiators bring to negotiations is considered. 
As mentioned previously, solo weak negotiators’ knowledge increases their motivation, 
thus improving agreement efficiency. One might argue that weak negotiators’ 
knowledge indirectly increases strong negotiators’ motivation and that strong 
negotiators are likely to drive the search for efficient outcomes. However, this 
conjecture does not hold. This is because Study 2 shows that when only weak 
negotiators were aware o f BATNA-asymmetries, the probability that informed weak 
negotiators initiated information-exchange about interests was .81. It is clear that weak 
negotiators, rather than strong negotiators, initiate the search for efficient solutions. 
Also, based on the elements of motivation defined in Study 3, negotiators’ motivation 
arises from the nature of task and should be independent of others’ behaviour.
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On the other hand, one might also suggest that strong negotiators’ knowledge adversely 
affects their motivation, explaining why solo strong negotiators’ knowledge destroys 
the development of efficient agreements. To rule out this alternative explanation, a pilot 
study was carried out to examine this contention35. The pattern o f results found in this 
pilot study indicates that strong negotiators’ knowledge has no impact on their 
motivational states. Therefore, it does not affect the conclusion about why this 
knowledge deteriorates efficiency made previously in section 5.7.1.
Secondly, weak negotiators’ focus on distributive elements is examined. The results of 
the pilot study show that weak negotiators’ knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries has 
slight impact on focus on distributive elements. Specifically, when only weak 
negotiators are informed of both BATNAs, they tend to focus on distributive elements 
to a slightly lesser extent than when neither is informed. Although it appears that the 
relationship between weak negotiators’ knowledge and focus on distributive elements 
exists, it is not an alternative explanation of why this knowledge improves dyads’ 
ability to find efficient agreements. Rather, it sheds some light on why this knowledge 
reduces weak negotiators’ bargaining strength, resulting in a relatively smaller slice of 
the resource pie (see Chapter Three, section 3.8.6 for details).
Next, the discussion will centre on the findings in the complete knowledge condition 
and the remaining two research questions addressed in Study 3.
35 It was a sm all-scale study: forty-two subjects participated in the experiment. The whole set o f  results 
o f  the pilot study can be found in Appendix D  (II).
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5.7.4 Complete Knowledge o f  BATNA-Asymmetries
Study 1 suggested that although solo weak negotiators’ knowledge facilitated the 
development of efficient agreements, complete knowledge impeded it. Study 2 
considered how strong negotiators’ knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries overrode the 
benefit o f weak negotiators’ knowledge on agreement efficiency. Two explanations 
were found. The first explanation was that when both parties were aware of 
BATNA-imbalances, strong negotiators, if asked, were less willing to reveal their 
priorities than when only weak negotiators were. The third question addressed by Study 
3 concerned why this occurred. It was found that when both parties were informed, 
strong negotiators were more likely to focus on exerting their dominance and to make 
inaccurate judgements about opponents’ preferences, than when only weak negotiators 
were. Since informed strong negotiators tended to assume that the task is fixed-sum, 
they would expect certain levels of distributive behaviour from weak negotiators. Weak 
negotiators’ attempt to elicit their preferences may be considered as a way to counter 
their strength. This explains why strong negotiators’ knowledge reduced their 
willingness to reveal their preferences across issues.
Another explanation o f why complete knowledge did not show the same benefit of solo 
weak negotiators’ knowledge on agreement efficiency was also given in Study 2. It 
suggested that strong negotiators’ knowledge deterred informed weak negotiators from 
sharing information. The final issue addressed by Study 3 was to explain why this was 
the case. We know that weak negotiators’ knowledge alone encouraged them to share 
information about interests, because this knowledge induced high levels of motivation
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to  create alternate solutions. Therefore, Study 3 first considered the possibility that 
strong negotiators’ knowledge adversely affects weak negotiators’ motivational state.
To examine this issue, when both parties were aware o f BATNA-asymmetries, weak 
negotiators’ motivational state was compared with that when only weak negotiators 
were. There was no significant difference between the two groups in terms of 
motivation. This suggests that strong negotiators’ knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries 
does not hinder informed weak negotiators’ motivation to expand the resource pie. The 
findings are consistent with the argument that weak negotiators’ motivation stems from 
the nature o f the negotiation situation and is independent o f their stronger counterparts’ 
knowledge.
Considering that a sense of autonomy in the environment is important for motivation to 
lead to creative performance (Deci and Ryan, 1985, Ryan and Deci, 2000), whether 
strong negotiators’ knowledge affected the negotiation environment was also examined. 
It was found that when both parties had complete knowledge, strong negotiators were 
more likely to dominate the negotiation process than when only weak negotiators 
were . In particular, a substantial number of informed strong negotiators (50%) made 
procedural remarks during negotiations. For example, ‘we should negotiate one issue at 
a time’, ‘we should negotiate issue A now’, etc. These procedural remarks that 
informed strong negotiators made will reduce the degree o f autonomy in the 
negotiation by restricting the scope of informed weak negotiators’ strategies.
36 Note that it was found that strong negotiators’ knowledge did not affect the likelihood o f  informed 
weak negotiators’ making procedural remarks.
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This may have placed informed weak negotiators in a more complex situation and may 
pull their available cognitive energy away from expanding the resource pie. In other 
words, when strong negotiators were aware of BATNA-asymmetries, informed weak 
negotiators would be more difficult to find other avenues to settlement. It explains why 
knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries, when being made available to strong negotiators, 
hindered informed weak negotiators’ information-sharing behaviour, even though their 
motivation remained high.
This chapter has extended the findings from Study 1 and Study 2 in important ways. It 
has provided explanations of why knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries leads to 
agreements with different efficiency. Now we know how this knowledge, when given 
to strong negotiators, affects the way they approach negotiations and impacts 
judgement errors about opponents’ preferences. Consequently, it impedes 
communications between parties and dyads’ ability to reach efficient solutions. In 
contrast, solo weak negotiators’ knowledge can increase their motivation to create 
alternate settlements. However, this increased motivation does not improve agreement 
efficiency when strong negotiators are also aware of BATNA-asymmetries.
The next concluding chapter will discuss the general implications o f the findings from 
all three studies in this thesis.
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C hapter Six -  Conclusions and Suggestions for F u tu re  Research
In this final chapter, I I) provide a summary of the thesis and theoretical implications of 
findings; 2) consider the shortcomings o f the empirical research, where they seem 
incomplete and how they could be extended, and; 3) conclude with a speculative 
section listing possible practical implications.
6.1 Sum m ary of the Thesis
Most o f the theoretical literature employed in this thesis comes from research on 
BATNA-imbalanced negotiations and information about others. The thesis brings these 
different extant theoretical accounts together by focusing on negotiators’ knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries. To examine the importance of this knowledge, I have first 
considered how differential BATNAs among negotiators influence their perceptions of 
opponents’ BATNAs and how knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries affects parameters 
such as negotiators’ aspiration levels. This thesis also contributes to the literature 
concerned with the relationship between negotiators’ bargaining strength and their 
BATNAs by demonstrating that knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries mediates this 
relationship (Chapter 3).
The other key theoretical contribution of the thesis is the primary focus on the 
association between knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries and dyads’ ability to reach 
efficient solutions. As discussed, three consecutive experimental studies were
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conducted to provide an understanding of this relationship -  whether, how, and why 
knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries impacts agreement efficiency (Chapter 3, 4, and 5, 
respectively). The empirical results are summarised below.
6.1.1 Perceptions o f  Opponents ’ BATNAs
This thesis has provided conditions through which I can explore the effect of 
knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries on negotiated outcomes. Study 1 shows that 
negotiators’ perceptions of others’ BATNAs tend to anchor to their own BATNAs prior 
to negotiations. This finding is consistent with Thompson and Hastie’s (1990) 
‘projection hypothesis’ that predicts that negotiators tend to base their perceptions of 
others on their own situations. The hypothesis concerning the effect of a range of 
opponents’ possible BATNAs on weak negotiators’ perceptions (whose BATNAs were 
in the extreme o f the range given) was also tested out in Study 1. It was found that 
weak negotiators’ perceptions, when being given the range, were still below the best 
guess -  the range median. Interpretation o f the findings suggests that merely providing 
weak negotiators with the range may have been too subtle to diffuse the powerful 
anchoring effect o f their own BATNAs. Taken together, the findings give a strength to 
the current thesis because they allow for examination of cases where different amounts 
of knowledge about others’ BATNAs are present.
However, the findings that negotiators perceive the situation as BATNA-symmetric 
when walking into negotiations should be interpreted with caution. This may be an 
artefact o f experimental studies. In real-life situations, negotiators seldom believe that
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their BATNAs are of equal quality. For example, car buyers have access to information 
about dealers’ cost available on thousands of websites and/or car magazines. Or, when 
buying houses, information about the nature of the property market, and the history and 
current market value o f a house that is for sale can be obtained from real estate agents. 
All of this information can be valuable when trying to find out others’ BATNAs. Also, 
in the real world, whether negotiators assume BATNA-symmetric situation depends on 
the context. In a job-contract negotiation, employers are often considered as more 
powerful by negotiators than employees. This is because they occupy a position of 
authority and have more and better alternatives than employees. However, the current 
findings suggest that such social norms are not activated in the laboratory set-up.
Together, the anchoring effect of negotiators’ BATNAs on perceptions about others’ 
BATNAs may be less profound in real-life situation than in experimental set-up. It also 
points out a weakness in the current experimental literature on BATNA-asymmetries. 
With the presence of the anchoring effect, the manipulation o f BATNA-asymmetries 
may be less effective than intended. An example can be found in Anderson & 
Thompson’s (2004) study in which the BATNA manipulation did not have its usual 
effect o f creating a power difference. In other words, knowledge o f others’ BATNAs is 
an important focus for research on BATNA-imbalanced negotiations. Next, the focus is 
on how knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries shapes parameters such as negotiators’ 
aspiration levels and negotiated outcomes.
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6.1.2 Aspiration Levels
Study 1 also examines aspiration levels of strong and weak negotiators in 
BATNA-asymmetric negotiations. Aspiration levels were shown to be more or less the 
same, across strong and weak negotiators even when their BATNAs were very different. 
The findings are consistent with the general finding that the value o f one’s BATNA 
does not influence aspiration levels when the BATNA is worth less than what a 
compromise solution promises (Pinkley eta l., 1994).
Study 1 also points to the existence o f the effect o f knowledge about 
BATNA-asymmetries on aspiration levels and why this influence is not as theoretically 
expected. Knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries increases with strong parties’ aspiration 
levels because it helps them identify that they are in a position o f higher power than 
weak negotiators. In contrast, this knowledge signals to weak negotiators that they rely 
on the current negotiation to a greater extent than do their stronger counterparts and 
reduces their aspiration levels. These findings extend our understanding of the 
relationship between BATNA-asymmetries and aspiration in that knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries is not only an important factor affecting negotiators’ aspiration 
but also shows that the identity of the party with access to this knowledge determines 
the direction o f its impact.
6.1.3 Strong Negotiators ’Bargaining Strength
Results from Study 1 indicate that knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries improves strong
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negotiators’ bargaining strength, thus attaining a larger share o f the resource pie. 
However, when strong negotiators are not aware o f differences in BATNAs they are not 
able to outperform their weaker counterparts. This is because uninformed strong 
negotiators act as if they are in symmetric-BATNA situations and knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries provides them with a justification for a larger share of the 
bargaining surplus.
These research findings have important theoretical implication. Conflicting research 
reveals that in some cases strong negotiators are able to attain better outcomes than 
their weaker counterparts, but others fail to replicate the finding (Komorita and Leung, 
1985, Pinkley, 1995, Pinkley et al., 1994, Komorita, 1984). The findings reported here 
begin to untangle these inconsistencies by showing that knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries mediates the relationship between negotiators’ attractive 
BATNAs and bargaining strength.
Previous work on BATNA-asymmetric negotiations has examined how the possession 
of an attractive BATNA leads to greater bargaining strength in distributive negotiations. 
Magee et al. (2007), assuming complete knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries, show that 
strong negotiators tend to be more likely than weak negotiators to make the first offer 
and making the first offer produced a bargaining advantage. Coupling this finding with 
the relationship between strong negotiators’ knowledge and bargaining strength 
explored in Study 1, it is possible that uninformed strong negotiators, compared to 
those with information, are less likely to make the first offer that provided them with a 
bargaining advantage. In other words, knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries may also
-266-
Chapter Six -Conclusions and Suggestions fo r  Future Research
mediate the relationship between negotiators’ attractive BATNAs and the likelihood of 
negotiators making an advantageous first move.
6,1,4 Knowledge o f  BATNA-Asymmetries and Agreement Efficiency
Study 1 investigates whether knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries, when given to strong 
and/or weak negotiators, affects agreement efficiency. Study 2 considers how this 
occurs. Extending these studies, Study 3 provides a fuller understanding as to the 
motivational drives which lead to the differentiated outcomes.
Knowledge o f  Being the Stronger Party
It was found that solo strong negotiators’ knowledge affects their negotiation style and 
mind-set and leads to their expression of their superiority which renders the already 
tenacious fixed-pie perception more difficult to diffuse (Chapter 5). With greater 
judgement errors about others’ interests, informed strong negotiators therefore rarely 
conduct an active search for information which goes against their existing perceptions 
thereby diminishing the likelihood o f efficient outcomes (Chapter 3 and 4).
These results have theoretical implications for at least two domains. First, in the study 
of power-imbalanced negotiations, many theorists have pointed out that 
power-advantaged negotiators tend to push for agreements with distributive payoffs 
proportional to their power advantage, focus less on the integrative potential and 
ultimately, reach inefficient outcomes (Bacharach and Lawler, 1981, Komorita, 1984,
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Lawler and Yoon, 1993, Mannix and Neale, 1993). However, it is unclear as to under 
which circumstances these types of outcomes occur. The findings reported here show 
that being in a position of higher power alone does not necessarily prompt strong 
negotiators’ focus on the distributive side of the negotiation. Instead, strong negotiators 
must know they are strong. Without this knowledge, the pattern disappears. Second, 
neither being designated in a position of higher power nor knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries appears to provide strong negotiators with a motivation to share 
information and find creative ways to expand the resource pie as claimed by previous 
research (Pinkley, 1995).
Knowledge o f  Being the Weaker Party
The empirical investigation of the current thesis suggests that solo weak negotiators’ 
knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries improves the development of efficient agreements 
(Chapter 3)37. A large body o f research shows that task motivation is conducive to 
creative performance and thinking. These are essential for the discovery of the less 
obvious, but more efficient solution (Amabile, 1982, Amabile, 1983a, Amabile et a l , 
1994, Deci and Ryan, 1985, Kurtzberg, 1998). In Chapter 5, it is shown that knowledge 
increases the level o f (intrinsic and extrinsic) motivation that weak negotiators bring to 
negotiations. Therefore, informed weak negotiators are more inclined to both explore 
the structure o f negotiations and exchange information about interests (Chapter 4). This 
leads to an increased probability of finding ways to expand the resource pie and keep 
their stronger counterparts at the negotiation table (as shown in Studies 1 -  3).
37 The findings are also replicated in Study 2 and 3.
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By showing that knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries is an important factor provoking 
motivation, these results extend Roloff & Dailey’s (1987) conjecture that weak 
negotiators are extrinsically motivated (i.e. under pressure) to create alternate 
settlements. Also, the importance of non-common knowledge to the generation o f weak 
negotiators’ motivation is clearly demonstrated: weak negotiators were not told whether 
their stronger opponents had knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries. Other work 
assuming common knowledge suggests that weak negotiators’ knowledge does not lead 
to efficient outcomes (Pinkley, 1995). As mentioned in Chapter 2, this is because when 
weak negotiators are certain that their opponents are not informed they can freely 
behave in precisely the same way as strong negotiators, which could greatly reduce the 
effect o f knowledge on extrinsic motivation. The findings reported here provide the 
first attempt to link two research areas together: motivation and BATNA-imbalanced 
negotiations by exploring the previously neglected relationship between knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries and intrinsic motivation.
Powerful Detrimental Impact o f  Strong Negotiators ’ Knowledge
Study 1 examines whether knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries needs to be commonly 
held to improve efficiency. The results reveal that dyads’ outcomes tend to be less 
efficient when both parties have complete knowledge. Study 2 and 3 replicate the same 
pattern o f results. In other words, it appears that the detriment of strong negotiators’ 
knowledge is powerful enough to override the advantage o f weak negotiators’ 
knowledge. Study 2 and Study 3 have addressed how and why it occurs, and two 
reasons were found.
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First, strong negotiators’ knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries reduces their willingness 
to reveal information about their preferences across issues because it works to solidify 
judgement errors about others’ interests which subsequently affects their interpretations 
of others’ action. Specifically, informed strong negotiators consider weak negotiators’ 
attempts to elicit information about preferences as strategies to counter their own 
strength. Second, strong negotiators’ knowledge largely hinders their weaker 
counterparts’ information-sharing behaviour because informed strong negotiators often 
dominate the negotiation process by making procedural remarks. These procedural 
remarks limit the perceived autonomy of weak negotiators’ strategies. Given the 
importance o f autonomy to creative performance, informed weak negotiators’ high 
motivation becomes useless to facilitate information-exchange. As a result, negotiation 
dyads in the complete knowledge condition are unlikely to discover efficient outcomes.
Taken together, these findings reveal that strong negotiators’ knowledge seems to create 
a ‘Pygmalion effect’ -  defined as a persistently held belief in another person so that the 
belief becomes a reality (Goddard, 1985, Putnam and Jones, 1982, Rosenthal, 1987). 
Informed strong negotiators channel and affect their counterparts’ behaviour by 
interpreting ambiguous behaviour in a schema-conforming way (Darley and Fazio, 
1980), by reciprocating with their own distributive behaviours, and thus inducing 
reciprocal distributive behaviour on the part of weak negotiators. Their pre-judgements 
of the nature o f negotiation, reluctance to reveal their preferences and use of procedural 
remarks preclude their counterparts from using tactics aimed at creating values. Finding 
no other avenues to settlement, informed weak negotiators in the complete knowledge 
condition come to act more distributively and less integratively than those negotiating
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with uninformed strong parties.
The findings reported here relating to the relationship between knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries and agreement efficiency have important theoretical implications 
as well. One school o f thought holds that asymmetric BATNAs among negotiators lead 
to agreements o f higher efficiency (Pinkley, 1995, Pinkley et al., 1994, Roloff and 
Dailey, 1987), and another, using different power manipulations, finds the opposite to 
be the case (Lawler and Yoon, 1993, Mannix and Neale, 1993). Given these 
contradicting results, we are left wondering whether BATNA-asymmetries do in fact 
matter.
I have shown that these different findings can be reconciled by incorporating the state 
of knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries into the analysis. Studies which assume 
complete knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries tend to show that dyads with equal 
power reach agreements of higher efficiency. However, studies that show the opposite 
result do not have the same common knowledge assumptions. Given that the 
detrimental effect o f strong negotiators’ knowledge is sufficiently powerful to wash 
away the benefit o f weak negotiators’ knowledge, the seeming contradiction is resolved 
(see Chapter 3 section 3.8.5 for details).
The effect o f variability in negotiators’ knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries on 
agreement efficiency also suggests that the existing research should take negotiators’ 
knowledge status into account, because the majority o f the existing research, as 
discussed in Chapter Two, assumed complete knowledge of power-asymmetries
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(Binmore et al., 1989, Giebels et al., 2000, Kim and Fragale, 2005, Magee et al., 2007, 
Osbome and Rubinstein, 1990, Van Kleef et al., 2006). It remains questionable whether 
the pattern o f results stays the same if they did not make such an assumption. Anderson 
and Thompson (2004), assuming incomplete knowledge condition, show that strong 
negotiators’ positive affect facilitates the development o f efficient agreements. Given 
the detrimental impact o f strong negotiators’ knowledge on information-exchange and 
agreement efficiency, it leaves us wondering if strong negotiators’ positive affect still 
matters when strong negotiators are aware of BATNA-asymmetries. Since we know 
that informed strong negotiators tend to exert their dominance, the benefit of their 
positive affect on efficiency may be at least weakened.
Finally, a methodological point is made in that the studies reported here show that 
concurrent reporting o f negotiators’ experience is not necessary to create robust and 
unbiased results. Previous research on information-exchange adopts concurrent 
methodology which requires special equipments (e.g. video camera or audio recorder) 
and more complicated data management, and is more expensive (Kemp and Smith, 
1994, Thompson and Hastie, 1990, Thompson, 1991). In the current study, various 
shortcomings of retrospective study were identified and subsequently mitigated or 
shown not be as detrimental as feared (Chapter 4). The experiment also meets one of 
the main difficulties in studying information-exchange: it generates consistent recall 
across dyads and high enough rates of valid cases for examination.
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6.1.5 The Whole Picture
At the heart o f this thesis is the message that knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries has a 
profound impact on many o f the parameters which effect negotiation outcomes. 
Aspiration levels, the way negotiators approach negotiations, and ultimately 
distributive and integrative outcomes are all affected. Also, the direction of its impact 
substantially depends on which member of the dyad (strong or weak negotiators) has 
access to this information.
Whether knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries creates potential benefits or weaknesses 
to negotiators tends to depends on whether the negotiation is distributive or integrative. 
Past research shows that negotiators with higher aspiration make more aggressive 
offers and are less likely to concede and thereby helps them claim greater value in 
distributive negotiations (Brodt, 1994, Cummings and Harnett, 1969, Hamner and 
Harnett, 1975). Consistent with these studies, strong negotiators’ knowledge increases 
their aspiration levels and focus on domination, thus leading to greater bargaining 
strength in distributive negotiations. On the other hand, it proves to be a weakness from 
the perspective o f value-creation, since it tends to destroy dyads’ ability to search for 
and reach efficient solutions.
However, the story is completely reversed for weak negotiators. Knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries, when being made available to weak negotiators, facilitates the 
development o f efficient outcomes at the same time as it reduces weak negotiators’ 
aspiration levels and leads them to be less effective at distributive bargaining (see
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Chapter 3 section 3.8.6 for details). In other words, knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries 
introduces a trade-off between distributive and integrative bargaining for both strong 
and weak negotiators.
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6.2 Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
The current studies suggest that knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries is an important 
focus for future research while providing a fuller understanding of the relationship 
between this knowledge and agreement efficiency. That said, limitations of findings are 
inevitable. These limitations will be highlighted here and new research questions 
stimulated by the current findings will be discussed.
6.2.1 Methodological Limitations and Their Possible Solution
Retrospective methodology was adopted in the current studies to collect data about 
negotiators’ information-sharing behaviour. We know that truthfulness of information 
shared is important to the development of efficient outcomes because it allows 
negotiators to make more accurate judgements about others’ preferences (Thompson, 
1991). A limitation of retrospective methodology is that it cannot be examined to reveal 
whether subjects were truthful in the information shared. Thus, while we know whether 
knowledge affects information-exchange, it is unclear whether negotiators with 
knowledge tend to deceive more often than others. For instance, it is now clear that 
strong negotiators’ knowledge hinders information-exchange and willingness to reveal 
preferences when asked. It would be interesting to know whether strong negotiators’ 
knowledge leads to more deceitful responses to questions asked by opponents. Perhaps 
strong negotiators construe that giving out truthful information would counter their 
bargaining strength. Future work could take this into account by audio-taping the 
content of negotiators’ interaction. Alternatively, the retrospective report could include
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negotiators’ responses to questions asked and information that they provide, to allow 
for examination of their truthfulness. However, such extensive post-act questioning, 
essentially asking people to reveal if they had misled, seems particularly prone to the 
known problems associated with retrospective methodologies.
The second limitation is that although knowledge has been shown to affect the quality 
o f outcomes, it is unclear how much knowledge is required to achieve this effect. 
Specifically, it remains questionable whether strong or weak negotiators’ knowledge 
still affects agreement efficiency if the exact value of opponents’ BATNAs is not 
provided. Future research can use manipulations of knowledge that do not contain ‘full’ 
details o f others’ BATNAs. Wolfe and Mcginn (2005), to my knowledge, first focuses 
on complete knowledge condition without giving out the exact value of counterparts’ 
BATNAs -parties were told that the other’s BATNA was more (or less) attractive. A 
hypothesis to be tested is that merely alerting negotiators to BATNA-asymmetries 
might impose sufficient impact on negotiators’ behaviour and outcomes.
Another limitation o f the current experimental design is that the current findings do not 
allow us to determine whether knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries in general is 
advantageous to negotiators. Since this knowledge introduces a trade-off between 
distributive and integrative outcomes, it is possible that the variability of the resource 
pie (i.e. the intensity of difference in preferences across issues) determines whether this 
knowledge is a source o f benefit or not. For example, we know that knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries leads weak negotiators to be more effective at integrative 
bargaining but at the same time less effective at distributive bargaining. Thus, if the
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expansion of the resource pie is sufficiently large to cover the loss in bargaining 
strength, this knowledge tends to be advantageous to weak negotiators. It would 
become a source of weakness if the efficiency gains were not sufficiently large.
For future research in this vein, further studies could test for the effect o f the difference 
in importance across issues on negotiated outcomes. For example, in the current 
experimental design, the company car is four times more important to weak negotiators 
than medical coverage is (see Chapter 3 Table 3.1). It would be important to examine if 
altering the intensity o f difference across preferences leads to the same pattern of 
results as reported in this thesis.
Finally, the current work, like much of the research on negotiation, used university 
students. Obviously, this limits the generalisability o f the findings because the stakes 
involved were lower than they would typically be in real-life situations. Also, the 
intensity o f weak negotiators’ motivation and strong negotiators’ focus on domination 
may be more extreme. Thus, a possible direction for future research could be the effect 
of knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries in real-world disputes. This could be 
accomplished by qualitative research into actual negotiated settlement.
6.2.2 New Areas o f  Theoretical Interest
The impact o f magnitude of BATNA-asymmetries on outcomes may be important for 
future research. Further studies focussing on this difference would open up other 
interesting areas of research. For example, what are the minimum differences in
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BATNAs needed to instigate the same pattern of results suggested in this thesis? I 
would expect an inverse relationship: when the magnitude o f BATNA-asymmetries 
reduces -  negotiators’ BATNAs approach similarity -  the effect o f knowledge should 
diminish. This is because negotiators tend to assume equal-BATNA situations and this 
knowledge merely confirms their expectations. For now, this is merely conjecture.
Another possible avenue for future research could be what would happen if negotiators 
are provided with ‘false knowledge’ about the other’s BATNA. One speculation is that 
the effect of false knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries is very different from that of true 
knowledge. For instance, when weak negotiators are told that their opponents are in a 
weaker position than they are, it is possible that this knowledge no longer increases 
their motivation to discover efficient outcomes. Instead, more value-claiming and 
competitive strategies are expected from their side. This is because informed weak 
negotiators are virtually (at least they think they are) strong negotiators in this case.
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6.3 Practical Implications
When negotiators are in a position of higher power and have knowledge of 
BATNA-asymmetries, we know that they are likely to focus on the distributive element, 
suffer from more persistent judgement errors about others’ interests, and that they are 
likely to overlook possible agreements that make both parties better off. In other words, 
although research about others’ BATNAs improves bargaining strength, it also poses 
potential costs that may destroy integrative potential. In this case, strong negotiators 
should bear in mind they should still look for ways to expand the resource pie and 
therefore create more values on the table for both parties without hurting themselves. 
Negotiators’ strength can undermine the quality o f negotiated agreements.
The current thesis focuses on a one-shot negotiation, but this suggestion becomes 
particularly important when there are future ramifications for the parties (e.g. unions 
and their management). This is because “taking large slices out o f a resource pie” (i.e. 
diminishing opponents’ resources) can easily create a negative atmosphere and destroy 
trust in future relationships. Given the importance of trust to communication of 
interests and priorities (Anderson and Thompson, 2004, Camevale and Isen, 1986), it 
renders the discovery o f efficient agreements even harder in future negotiations and the 
accumulative loss of surplus that strong negotiators suffer may be considerable.
On a related point, when strong negotiators have knowledge o f BATNA-asymmetries, I 
suggest that they may reveal their BATNA advantage to their weaker opponents for two 
reasons. First, this knowledge is shown to increase weak negotiators’ motivation and
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efficient solutions are more likely to be discovered. Second, it reduces their aspiration 
levels and as a result informed weak negotiators are likely to demand less and make 
larger concessions to their stronger counterparts. Since knowledge was provided by an 
impartial party (i.e. the experimenter) in these studies, the credibility of this 
information may be an important factor provoking the changes in weak negotiators’ 
behaviours, which should be taken into consideration.
From the perspective o f weak negotiators, expecting competitive and controlling 
behaviour from informed strong negotiators, I do not suggest that weak negotiators 
reveal their BATNAs to their stronger counterparts. On the other hand, strategies such 
as eliciting information about interests from opponents may be perceived by informed 
strong negotiators as a way to counter their strength, and as a result, they are reluctant 
to reveal this information. Encountering this, weak negotiators may share information 
in a different way to break this deadlock: they can initiate information-exchange by 
disclosing their preferences to others as prior work suggests that it can improve 
agreement efficiency with no apparent cost to the party who initiates it (Thompson, 
1 9 9 0 ) .
Knowledge of BATNA-asymmetries -  depending on the context, which party has 
access to it, and how negotiators use it -  may be the heart o f a successful negotiation. 
What I have shown here is that this knowledge is a double edged sword, where one’s 
weakness leads to efficiency and where strength can lead to ‘winning’ an impoverished 
prize.
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Appendix A (I)
Informed Consent Form
Title of Study: Negotiation Analysis
People in charge:
Ricky Wong 
Interdisciplinary Institute of Management 
London School of Economics
This study is part o f the research programme intended to investigate how people behave 
in negotiations. If  you agree to take part in this research, you will be asked to negotiate 
with another person here. Your participation in this study will take about 60-75 minutes. 
The amount of money that you earn in this study will depend on the performance and 
decisions that you and the other person make.
You may ask questions about the research procedures, and these questions will be 
answered. Your participation in this research is confidential. Only the person in charge 
will have access to your identity and to information that can be associated with your 
identity. In the event of publication of this research, no personally identifying 
information will be disclosed. To make sure your participation is confidential, only a 
code number will be used to identify you; furthermore, your name will not be used. No 
record will be kept matching your name with your code number. Further, your 
participation is voluntary. You are free to stop participating in the research at any time 
or to decline to answer any specific questions without penalty. Finally, this study 
involves minimal risks: that is, no risks to your physical or mental health beyond those 
encountered in the normal course of every day life.
By signing below, you are verifying the following:
I agree to participate in a scientific investigation o f human behaviour in negotiations. I 
understand the above information and I have received answers to any questions I may 
have about the research procedure. I understand and agree to the conditions of this 
study as described. I understand that my participation in this research is voluntary and 
that I may withdraw from this study at any time by notifying the person in charge. 
Finally, I certify that I am at least 18 years of age and that to the best of knowledge I 
have no physical or mental illness that would increase the risk to me o f participation in 
this study.
Signature: Date:
Print Your Name:
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General Negotiation Information
Please imagine the following situation.
There will be a negotiation between an employer and employee about a job contract for 
the post o f Assistant Manager. You will be randomly assigned as either an employer or 
employee. There are six issues of concern in the negotiation: salary, annual leave, 
bonus, starting date, medical coverage and company car. You will negotiate for ‘points’. 
Before you negotiate, you will be given a chart that describes all the possible ways you 
can settle this negotiation and how many points you can get for each alternative 
settlement. Your goal in this negotiation is to maximise the number o f points you gain 
for yourself. You will be given thirty minutes to negotiate and if you are unable to reach 
an agreement during that time, a disagreement will be declared.
Are there any questions so far?
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Appendix A (III)
Confidential Information (Employers)
You are about to negotiate with a potential employee for a job contract that includes 
different options on the following issues: the salary, annual leave, bonus, starting date, 
medical coverage and company car. To aid you in your negotiation, you have 
quantified your preferences with ‘points’. The total value of any deal will be the sum of 
the points for each issue. The more points, the better the deal is for you. Note that you 
can only choose stated options (just the ones shown in the table). Any intermediate 
amounts or imagined alternatives are not allowed.
Issue A: Salary
There are five possible options on the annual salary that you can offer the potential 
employee, as shown in the following table.
Salary Benefit in Points
1) £24,000 0
2) £23,000 500
3) £22,000 1000
4) £21,000 1500
5) £20,000 2000
Issue B: Annual Leave
This issue regards the number of days o f annual holiday that you offer the potential 
employee. Again, you are not allowed to agree on any intermediate numbers of annual 
leave. For example, a 17-day annual leave is not allowed.
Annual Leave Benefit in Points
1) 25 days 0
2) 20 days 1000
3) 15 days 2000
4) 10 days 3000
5)5 days 4000
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Issue C: Bonus
You need to negotiate with the potential employee over the percentages of bonus that 
you will pay him/her at the end of each year.
B o n u s B e n e f it  in  P o in ts
1) 10% 0
2 ) 8% 4 0 0
3 ) 6% 8 0 0
4 ) 4% 12 0 0
5) 2% 1600
Issue D: Starting Date
The current employee in this post will certainly leave your company at the end of June. 
To minimise the adverse effect on the company, you prefer the potential employee to 
start the job as early as possible.
S ta r t in g  D a te B e n e f it  in  P o in ts
1) 1st July 1200
2 ) 15th July 9 0 0
3 ) 1st A ugust 6 0 0
4 ) 15th A ugust 3 0 0
5 ) 1st Septem ber 0
Issue E: Medical Coverage
Your company has always been arranging Medical Insurance for all your employees 
with AIB Insurance Ltd. They have given five different Medical Coverage Plans for 
you and your employees to choose from.
M e d ic a l C o v e r a g e B e n e f it  in  P o in ts
1) P lan A 3 2 0 0
2 ) P lan B 2 4 0 0
3 ) P la n C 1600
4 ) Plan D 8 0 0
5 ) Plan E 0
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Issue F: Company Car
Instead of providing your employees with transportation allowance, your company 
rather gives them company car because you can always get some discounts on the 
company cars with bulk order.
Company Car Benefit in Points
1) B M W  3 3 0 i 0
2) V W  G o lf 20 0
3 ) H on d a  C iv ic 4 0 0
4 ) Ford F ocus 60 0
5) N o  C om pany Car 800
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Your Best Alternative to the Negotiated Agreement (Outside Option)
Mr. Jones, the head o f Human Resources Department, has found a candidate from 
another MBA programme. He is definitely ready to accept an offer from you. This 
candidate would be worth 6,000 points to you. Now if you fail to reach an agreement 
with the employee with whom you are about to negotiate, you will instead hire the 
alternative candidate for a score of 6,000. The employee may or may not know about 
your alternative candidate (your BATNA/Outside Option). Please take a moment to 
consider how might want to negotiate. O f course, your goal is still to maximise the 
number o f points you earn for yourself.
Conduct
During the upcoming negotiation, the interaction is unrestricted except that you are not
i  o
allowed to exchange the pay-off schedules provided .
Quiz
To ensure that everyone understands his/her outside option, please indicate the number 
o f points that the following agreements generate and determine whether it is better than 
your outside option.
Agreement 1 - £22,000 salary, 15-day annual leave, 4% bonus, starting on 15th August, 
Plan C medical coverage and Honda Civic company car 
Number o f Points:
This agreement is worth________  the outside option.
More than the same as less than
38 For those assigned to the control group, they were told not to reveal their own BATNAs to opponents. 
This was to avoid contaminations o f  the manipulation o f  knowledge.
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Agreement 2 - £23,000 salary, 15-day annual leave, 6% bonus, starting on 15th August, 
Plan D medical coverage and VW G olf company car
Number o f Points:
This agreement is worth________  the outside option.
More than the same as less than
Your Pay
Your pay for the experiment will be based on your performance in the upcoming 
negotiation with the potential employee. You will receive lOp for every 100 points you 
earn.
• Notice that it may be the case that the employee’s offer is worth less than your 
outside option. If you fail to reach a negotiated agreement, then you will hire 
the other candidate for 6,000 points and receive a payment o f £6.00.
• If you reach an agreement with the employee that gives you less than 6,000
points, you will NOT receive any money at all. Your pay for the negotiation
would be £0.00.
• If you reach an agreement with the opponent that generates more than 6,000
points, you will receive O.lp for every point you earn. So, for instance, if you
were to settle an agreement generating 7,500 points, you would therefore 
receive a payment of £7.50.
In order to make sure that everyone understands how you will be paid, please answer 
the following questions.
How much would you earn if  you reached an agreement with the employee that gives 
you 8,000 points? £-----------------------
How much would you earn if you reached an agreement that is worth 4,500 points?
£ ____________
How much would you earn if you do not reach an agreement? £________________
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Confidential Score Sheet -  Employer
Issue Option Benefit for employee 
(in points)
Selected option 
(transfer payoff of 
selected option)
Salary £ 2 4 ,0 0 0 0
£ 2 3 ,0 0 0 5 0 0
£ 2 2 ,0 0 0 1000
£ 2 1 ,0 0 0 1500
£ 2 0 ,0 0 0 2 0 0 0
Annual Leave 25  days 0
2 0  days 1000
15 days 2 0 0 0
10 days 3 0 0 0
5 days 4 0 0 0
Bonus 10% 0
8% 4 0 0
6% 80 0
4% 1200
2% 1600
Starting Date 1st July 1200
15th July 9 0 0
1st A u gu st 6 0 0
15 th A u gu st 3 0 0
1st Septem ber 0
Medial Coverage Plan A 3 2 0 0
Plan B 2 4 0 0
P la n C 1600
Plan D 80 0
Plan E 0
Company Car B M W  3 30 i 0
V W  G o lf 2 0 0
H onda C iv ic 4 0 0
Ford F ocus 60 0
N o  C om pany Car 800
Total Value of 
Agreement
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Contract
Issue Option Selected Option
Salary £ 2 4 ,0 0 0
£ 2 3 ,0 0 0
£ 2 2 ,0 0 0
£ 2 1 ,0 0 0
£ 2 0 ,0 0 0
Annual Leave 25  days
2 0  days
15 days
10 days
5 days
Bonus 10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
Starting Date 1st July
15th July
1st A u gu st
15th A u gu st
1511 Septem ber
Medial Coverage Plan A
P lan B
P la n C
P lan D
Plan E
Company Car B M W  330 i
V W  G o lf
H onda C iv ic
Ford F ocu s
N o  C om pany Car
Signature Employer Representative Signature Em ployee Representative
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Additional Information (Available to Employers in Relevant Conditions)
You have just received word that another company, ABC Ltd., has offered a job to the 
employee you are about to negotiate with. This job offer would be worth 1,200 points 
to the employee. In the case o f no agreement reached, s/he will take this job offer for a 
score o f 1,200. However, it still does not change the fact that s/he may or may not 
know about your alternative candidate.
Please answer the following questions:
How many points would the employee receive if no agreement had been reached?
Given that the employee also receive lOp for every 100 points s/he earns, how much 
would s/he receive if no agreement had been reached?
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Confidential Information (Employees)
You are about to negotiate with a potential employer for a job contract that includes 
different options on the following issues: the salary, annual leave, bonus, starting date, 
medical coverage and company car. To aid you in your negotiation, you have 
quantified your preferences with ‘points’. The total value o f any deal will be the sum of 
the points for each issue. The more points, the better the deal is for you. Note that you 
can only agree on stated options (just the ones shown in the table). Any intermediate 
amounts or imagined alternatives are not allowed.
Issue A: Salary
There are five possible options on the annual salary that the potential employer can pay 
you, as shown in the following table.
S a la r y B e n e f it  in  P o in ts
1) £ 2 4 ,0 0 0 2 0 0 0
2 ) £ 2 3 ,0 0 0 1500
3 ) £ 2 2 ,0 0 0 1000
4 ) £ 2 1 ,0 0 0 5 0 0
5) £ 2 0 ,0 0 0 0
Issue B: Annual Leave
This issue regards the number of days of your annual holiday. Again, you are not 
allowed to agree on any intermediate numbers of annual leave. For example, a 17-day 
annual leave is not allowed.
A n n u a l L ea v e B e n e f it  in  P o in ts
1) 2 5  days 1600
2 ) 2 0  days 1200
3 ) 15 days 800
4 ) 10 days 4 0 0
5 ) 5  days 0
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Issue C: Bonus
You need to negotiate with the potential employer over the percentages o f bonus that 
s/he will pay you at the end of each year.
B o n u s B e n e f it  in  P o in ts
1) 10% 4 0 0 0
'P0s
OO 3 0 0 0
3) 6% 2 0 0 0
4 ) 4% 10 0 0
5) 2% 0
Issu e  D : S ta r t in g  D a te
Since you have been looking for a job for a couple o f weeks, you would like to settle in 
a new job as soon as possible. You therefore prefer an early starting date to a late one.
S ta r t in g  D a te B e n e f it  in  P o in ts
1) 1st Septem ber 0
2 ) 15th A u gu st 3 0 0
3 ) 1st A u gu st 6 0 0
4 ) 15th July 9 0 0
5 ) 1st July 1200
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Issue E: Medical Coverage
You are expecting to obtain some medical coverage to give you peace of mind. There 
are five different Medical Coverage Plans available from AIB Insurance Ltd with which 
the company has a strong link. Plan E is the most comprehensive health insurance plan 
that covers you for all consultation costs, regular body check, any costs incurred from 
surgery, etc. Plan A is the least comprehensive.
Medical Coverage Benefit in Points
1) P lan A 0
2 ) P lan B 20 0
3) P lan C 4 0 0
4) P lan D 6 0 0
5) P lan  E 800
Issue F: Com pany C ar
Instead of providing the employees with transportation allowance, the company rather 
gives them company car. You are expecting that you will benefit from having a 
company car because you live quite far from the office.
Company Car Benefit in Points
1) B M W  330i 3 2 0 0
2 ) V W  G o lf 2 4 0 0
3 ) H onda C iv ic 1600
4 ) Ford F ocu s 800
5) N o  C om pany Car 0
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Your Best Alternative to the Negotiated Agreement (Outside Option)
You have just received a phone call from another company, ABC Ltd that you 
interviewed with last week. They are definitely ready to take you onboard. Their offer 
is worth 1,200 points to you. If you fail to reach an agreement with the employer with 
whom you are about to negotiate, you will instead work for ABC Ltd. for a score of 
1,200. The employer you are about to negotiate with may or may not know about your 
recent job offer from ABC Ltd. (your BATNA/Outside Option).
Please take a moment now to read over all the information available to you and to 
consider how you might want to negotiate. Of course, your goal is still to maximise the 
number o f points you earn for yourself.
Conduct
During the upcoming negotiation, the interaction is unrestricted except that you are not 
allowed to exchange the pay-off schedules provided39.
Quiz
To ensure that everyone understands his/her outside option, please indicate the number 
of points that the following agreements generate and determine whether it is better than 
your outside option.
Agreement 1 - £22,000 salary, 15-day annual leave, 4% bonus, starting on 15th August, 
Plan C medical coverage and Honda Civic company car
Number of Points:
This agreement is worth________  the outside option.
More than the same as less than
39 For those assigned to the control group, they were told not to reveal their own BATNAs to opponents.
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Agreement 2 - £20,000 salary; 5-day annual leave, 4% bonus, starting on 1st September, 
Plan B medical coverage and No company car offered
Number of Points:
This agreement is worth________  the outside option.
More than the same as less than
Your Pay
Your pay for the experiment will be based on your performance in the upcoming 
negotiation with the potential employer. You will receive lOp for every 100 points you 
earn.
• Notice that it may be the case that the employer’s offer is worth less than your 
outside option. If you fail to reach a negotiated agreement, then you will work 
for ABC Ltd. for 1,200 points and receive a payment of £1.20.
• If you reach an agreement with the employee that gives you less than 1,200
points, you will NOT receive any money at all. Your pay for the negotiation
would be £0.00.
• If you reach an agreement with the opponent that generates more than 1,200
points, you will receive O.lp for every point you earn. So, for instance, if you
.were to settle an agreement generating 4,000 points, you would therefore 
receive a payment of £4.00.
In order to make sure that everyone understands how you will be paid, please answer 
the following questions.
How much would you earn if you reached an agreement with the employer that gives 
you 3,500 points? £-----------------------
How much would you earn if you reached an agreement that is worth 1,000 points?
£ ___________________
How much would you earn if you do not reach an agreement? £________________
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Confidential Score Sheet -  Employee
Issue Option Benefit for 
employee (in points)
Selected option 
(transfer payoff of 
selected option)
Salary £ 2 4 ,0 0 0 2 0 0 0
£ 2 3 ,0 0 0 1500
£ 2 2 ,0 0 0 1000
£ 2 1 ,0 0 0 5 0 0
£ 2 0 ,0 0 0 0
Annual Leave 25  d ays 1600
20  d ays 1200
15 days 8 0 0
10 days 4 0 0
5 d ays 0
Bonus 10% 4 0 0 0
8% 3 0 0 0
6% 2 0 0 0
4% 1000
2% 0
Starting Date 1st Septem ber 0
15th A u gu st 3 0 0
1st A u gu st 6 0 0
15th July 9 0 0
1st July 1200
Medial Coverage Plan A 0
P lan B 2 0 0
P la n C 4 0 0
Plan D 6 0 0
P lan  E 80 0
Company Car B M W  3 3 0 i 3 2 0 0
V W  G o lf 2 4 0 0
H on d a  C iv ic 1600
Ford F ocus 80 0
N o  C om pany Car 0
Total Value of 
Agreement
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Contract
Issue Option Selected Option
Salary £ 2 4 ,0 0 0
£ 2 3 ,0 0 0
£ 2 2 ,0 0 0
£ 2 1 ,0 0 0
£ 2 0 ,0 0 0
Annual Leave 25  days
2 0  days
15 days
10 days
5 days
Bonus 10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
Starting Date 1st Septem ber
15th A u gu st
1st A u gu st
15th July
1st July
Medial Coverage Plan A
P lan B
P la n C
Plan D
P lan E
Company Car B M W  330i
V W  G o lf
H onda C iv ic
Ford F ocus
N o  C om pany Car
Signature E m p loyer  R epresen tative Signature E m p lo y ee  R ep resentative
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Additional Information (Available to Employees in Relevant Condition)
You have just received word that a candidate from another MBA programme is 
definitely ready to accept an offer from the employer with whom you are about to 
negotiate. This other candidate is worth 6,000 points to the employer. S/he will 
therefore hire the alternative candidate instead for a score o f 6,000 if no agreement is 
reached. However, this still does not change the fact that s/he may or may not know 
about your recent job offer from ABC Ltd.
Please answer the following questions:
How many points would the employer receive if no agreement had been reached? ___
Given that the employer also receive lOp for every 100 points s/he earns, how much 
would s/he receive if no agreement had been reached?
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Appendix A (IV)
Pre-Negotiation Questionnaire 1
1. My identification letter is R/C ________ .
2. I am a male/female.
3. I am __________ years old.
4. I am currently studying ____________________ at _____________ university.
Please circle your answer
5. Do you think that you will reach a negotiated agreement?
Yes No
6. Do you think that the employee (or employer) also has an outside option 
(BATNA)?
Yes No
7. Please state your nationality. __________________
8. Is English your native language?
Yes No
9. If you answered Yes to Question 6, please answer the following question.
a) There is a 100% chance that their outside option (BATNA) is greater than
b) There is a 100% chance that their outside option (BATNA) is less than
c) What is your estimate of others’ outside option 
(BATNA)? _______________________ L
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Subjects were asked to answer the alternative Question 9 when the range of opponents’ 
BATNAs was available.
9. If you answered Yes to Question 6, please answer the following question.
In your opinion, there is_a_____% chance that the other has an outside option greater
than 0.
In your opinion, there is_a_____% chance that the other has an outside option greater
than 1000.
In your opinion, there is_a_____% chance that the other has an outside option greater
than 2000.
In your opinion, there is_a_____% chance that the other has an outside option greater
than 3000.
In your opinion, there is a_____ % chance that the other has an outside option greater
than 4000.
In your opinion, there is a_____ % chance that the other has an outside option greater
than 5000.
In your opinion, there is a_____ % chance that the other has an outside option greater
than 6000.
In your opinion, there is a_____ % chance that the other has an outside option greater
than 7000.
In your opinion, there is a_____ % chance that the other has an outside option greater
than 8000.
In your opinion, there is a_____ % chance that the other has an outside option greater
than 9000.
In your opinion, there is a_____ % chance that the other has an outside option greater
than 10000.
In your opinion, there is a_____ % chance that the other has an outside option greater
than 11000.
In your opinion, there is a % chance that the other has an outside option greater
than 12000.
In your opinion, there is a % chance that the other has an outside option greater
than 12800.
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Pre-Negotiation Questionnaire 2 
Please circle your answer
1. Overall, I expect that I am likely to do   the employee (employer).
better than about the same as worse than
2. Overall, I expect that I am likely to do ____________  the other employers
(employees).
better than about the same as worse than
3. Do you think you are likely to reach an agreement?
Yes No
Below is a payoff chart similar to the one that has been given to you. Now, we would 
like you to fill in the boxes in this chart to indicate what your ideal settlement would be 
on each issue. Please note that only one alternative can be ticked for each issue.
Annual Starting Medical Company
Salary Bonus
Leave Date Coverage Car
Alternatives for the to-be-negotiated issues
£ 2 4 ,0 0 0  □ 25  days □ 10% □ 1st July P lan A B M W  3 3 0 i
□ □ □
£ 2 3 ,0 0 0  □ 2 0  days □ 8% □ 15th July P lan B V W  G o lf
□ □ □
£ 2 2 ,0 0 0  □ 15 d ays □ 6%  □ . 1st Aug P la n C H onda
□ □ □
£ 2 1 ,0 0 0  □ 10 d ays □ 4%  □ 15th A u g P lan D Ford F ocu s
□ □ □
£ 2 0 ,0 0 0  □ 5 d ays □ 2%  □ 1st Sept P lan  E N o  Car
□ □ □
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Post-Negotiation Questionnaires
1. What was the identification letter of the person you negotiated with?
Please circle your answer:
2. Did you negotiate with someone you knew?
Yes No
3. Were you given any information about the other party’s outside option before the 
experiment began?
Yes No
4. If you answered ‘yes’ to Question 3, did you tell your opponent that you knew 
his/her outside option during the experiment?
Yes No
5. If you answered ‘yes’ to Question 3, did you find the information provided useful? 
Yes No
6. Did you tell your opponent the value of your outside option?
Yes No
7. Did your opponent reveal his/her outside option to you?
Yes No
8. If you answered yes to Question 7, do you believe that is true?
Yes No
9. Do you think that your opponent had been given the information about your 
outside option?
Yes No Not sure
10. Did you ask any questions in relation to the preferences of the negotiated issues?
Yes No
11. If you answered ‘yes’ to Question 10, did your opponent answer the questions that 
you raised?
Yes No
12. Did your opponent ask any questions in relation to the preferences o f the negotiated 
issues?
Yes No
13. If you answered ‘yes’ to Question 12, did you answer the questions that s/he raised? 
Yes No
14. If you answered ‘no’ to Question 13, please specify why you did not reveal the 
information asked: _________________________________________________
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15. Did you provide your opponent with information about your preferences across 
issues without being prompted? (E.g. Bonus is way more important to me than 
Medical Coverage, etc.)
Yes No
16. Did your opponent provide you with information about his or her preferences 
across issues without being prompted?
Yes No
17. If you answered ‘yes’ to Question 10, 12, 15, or 16 who asked the first question or 
who first provided information about preferences?
You The opponent N/A
18. Please try to tell us what types o f questions that you asked and/or were asked in 
the negotiation.
The questions you asked:
The questions your opponents asked:
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Judgement Error Measures
Below is a blank payoff schedule similar to the one that has been given to you in this 
negotiation situation. At this time, we would like you to ‘fill in the numbers’ to indicate what 
you think the employee’s payoff schedule looks like. You only hint is that the lowest number on 
his/her chart is zero and the highest is 4000.
Issue Option Benefit for employee (employer)
Salary £24,000
£23,000
£22,000
£21,000
£20,000
Annual Leave 25 days
20 days
15 days
10 days
5 days
Bonus 10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
Starting Date 1st July
15th July
1st August
15 th August
1st September
Medial Coverage Plan A
Plan B
PlanC
Plan D
Plan E
Company Car BMW 330i
VW Golf .
Honda Civic
Ford Focus
No Company Car
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Focus on Distributive Element & Perception o f  Information-Exchange Measures
For each of the statements below, please indicate the extent to which 
you agree or disagree by placing a tick in the appropriate column.
Strongly
agree
Agree
Slightly
agree
Neutral
Slightly
disagree
Disagree
Strongly
disagree
Undecided
1 .1 was veiy concerned if I could outperform the employee.
2. I did not believe that sharing information about preferences with the 
employee would yield a desired outcome.
3. My primary concern in the negotiation task was whether I could claim more 
surplus on the table than the opponent did.
4. 1 tried so hard to split the resources between us in the task.
5. As long as I enjoyed the negotiation, I was not very concerned if the other 
party earned more than I did.
6. I think a fair agreement would be the one that reflected the quality o f my 
BATNA (outside option).
7. I do not think that exchanging information about preferences could improve 
my payoff.
8. The main goal I pursued was to do better than the opponent.
9. I felt that there was not much room in the negotiation for me to reach a deal 
that provided much more surplus than the BATNA I already had.
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Motivation Measures
For each of the statements below, please indicate the extent to which 
you agree or disagree by placing a tick in the appropriate column.
Strongly
agree
Agree
Slightly
agree
Neutral
Slightly
disagree
Disagree
Strongly
disagree
Undecided
1 . I felt that the task was a complex problem to solve.
2 I was concerned about whether the offers I made would satisfy the opponent.
3. I think the task was difficult for me.
4. I seldom thought about whether the opponent was satisfied with the offer(s).
5. The task was relatively simple and straightforward.
6. I was very worried about whether the opponent would claim most o f the 
surplus available on the table.
7. I found the task was something I could do easily, rather than something that 
stretched my abilities.
8. I was concerned about how the opponent was going to react to the 
agreements suggested.
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9. I was keenly aware o f whether I earned something for what I did, while 
keeping the other party at the negotiation table.
10. I found that the negotiation problems tackled were completely new to me.
11. I felt that I was responsible for coming up with agreements that keep the 
opponent at the negotiation table.
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Appendix B Experimental Protocol
All participants were given an ‘Informed Consent Form’ to fill out before negotiations 
began.
All Experimental Conditions
Participants assigned to all four experimental conditions were given the same general 
instructions as follows:
“The purpose of this experiment is to examine negotiation behaviour. There will be 
a negotiation about a job contract between an employer and employee. There are 
six issues o f concern in the negotiation: salary, annual leave, bonus, starting date, 
medical coverage and company car. You will negotiate for ‘points’. Before you 
negotiate, you will be given a chart that describes all the possible ways you can 
settle this negotiation and how many points you can get for each alternative 
settlement. Your goal in this negotiation is to maximise the number o f points you 
gain for yourself. You will be given thirty minutes to negotiate and if you are 
unable to reach an agreement during that time, a disagreement will be declared.”
As an incentive, participants were informed that the money that they received at the 
end o f the experiment was related to the number o f points they earned: they received 
1 Op for every 100 points they earned. They were then randomly assigned as the role of 
either an employer or employee and sent to different rooms.
Strong Negotiators (Employers)
In all conditions, employers were provided with role materials that described the six 
issues in a ‘pay-off schedule (see Table 3.1, top half o f the table) and a short quiz to 
ensure that subjects understood their pay-off schedules. Most importantly, subjects 
were told that their interaction was unrestricted except that they were not to physically 
exchange their pay-off schedules40. The employers in this condition were told the 
following:
“Mr. Jones, the head o f Human Resources Department, has found a candidate from 
another MBA programme. He is definitely ready to accept an offer from you. This
40 In the control group, employers were instructed not to reveal their ow n BATNAs to their opponents to 
avoid contaminations o f  knowledge manipulation.
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candidate would be worth 6,000 points to you. Now if you fail to reach an agreement 
with the employee with whom you are about to negotiate, you will instead hire the 
alternative candidate for a score o f 6,000. The employee may or may not know your 
BATNA. Please take a moment to consider how you might want to negotiate. Of 
course, your goal is still to maximise the number o f points you earn for yourself’.
To ensure that subjects understood their BATNAs, a short quiz was constructed. A 
number of different sample settlements were included in the quiz and subjects were 
asked to indicate which settlement generated more (or less) points than their BATNAs. 
Their answers to every question were checked. Subjects in error were told to attempt 
the item again. After that, the first and second pre-negotiation questionnaires were 
given out to measure their perceptions of others’ BATNAs and aspiration levels (see 
Appendix A (IV)).
Weak Negotiators (Employees)
In all conditions, employees were provided with role materials that described the six 
issues, a pay-off schedule (see Table 3.1, bottom half o f the table), and a short quiz to 
ensure that subjects understand their pay-off schedules. Most importantly, subjects 
were told that their interaction was unrestricted except they were told not to physically 
exchange their pay-off schedules41. The employees in this condition were told the 
following:
“You have just received a phone call from another company, ABC Ltd. They are 
definitely ready to take you onboard. Their offer is worth 1,200 points to you. If 
you fail to reach an agreement with the employer with whom you are about to 
negotiate and you will instead work for ABC Ltd. for a score o f 1,200. The 
employer you are about to negotiate with may or may not know your BATNA.
Please take a moment now to read over all the infonnation available to you and to 
consider how you might want to negotiate. O f course, your goal is still to 
maximise the number o f points you earn for yourself.”
To ensure that subjects understood their BATNAs, a short quiz was constructed. A 
number of different sample settlements were included in this quiz and subjects were 
asked to indicate which settlement generates more (or less) points than their own
41 In the control group, em ployees were instructed not to reveal their own BATNAs to their opponents to 
avoid contaminations o f  knowledge manipulation.
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BATNA. Their answers to every question were checked. Subjects in error were told to 
attempt the item again.
Experimental Condition 1 (Control)
Strong and Weak Negotiators (Employers and Employees)
After completing o f the short quiz, the first and second pre-negotiation questionnaires 
were given out to measure their perceptions o f others’ BATNAs and aspiration levels 
(see Appendix A (IV)).
After completion o f questionnaires, all participants returned to the initial room. 
Employers were randomly assigned to employees. They were given 30 minutes to 
negotiate. If  no deal was reached, an impasse would be declared and the outside option 
(BATNA) would be the result. Final questionnaires were given to all participants to 
elicit strategies adopted, how they approached negotiations, etc. After participants 
completed the final questionnaire, they were debriefed about the purpose of the 
experiment.
Experimental Condition 2 (Strong Negotiators Informed)
All participants were given the same general instructions as in Condition 1. They were 
assigned to the roles o f either an employer or employee and were sent to different 
rooms.
Strong Negotiators (Employers)
Similar to Condition 1, employers in this condition were provided with the role 
materials that described the six issues, a pay-off schedule and information about their 
own BATNAs. We now gave out the first questionnaire to the employers, which were 
used to measure their perceptions of the other’s BATNA (see Appendix A (IV)). 
Employers were then told by the experimenter the following:
“I have just received word that another company, ABC Ltd., has offered a job to the 
employee you are about to negotiate with. This job offer would be worth 1,200 
points to the employee. In the case o f no agreement reached, she will take this job 
offer for a score o f 1,200. The employee does not yet know that you are informed of 
her BATNA but it does not change the fact that she may or may not know your
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BATNA.”
The second questionnaire was given out to employers at this point to measure their 
aspiration levels (see Appendix A (IV)).
Weak Negotiators (Employees)
Similar to Condition 1, employees in this condition were provided with the role 
materials that described the six issues, a pay-off schedule and information about their 
own BATN As. After completing of the short quiz, the first and second pre-negotiation 
questionnaires were given out to measure their perceptions of others’ BATNAs and 
aspiration levels (see Appendix A (IV)).
After completion o f questionnaires, all participants returned to the initial room. 
Employers were randomly assigned to employees. They were given 30 minutes to 
negotiate. If no deal was reached, an impasse would be declared and the outside option 
(BATNA) would be the result. Final questionnaires were given to all participants to 
elicit strategies adopted, how they approached negotiations, etc. After participants 
completed the final questionnaire, they were debriefed about the purpose of the 
experiment.
Experimental Condition 3 (Weak Negotiators Informed)
All participants were provided with the same general instructions as in Condition 1. 
They were assigned as either an employer or employee and were sent to different 
rooms.
Strong Negotiators (Employers)
Similar to Condition 1, employees in this condition were provided with the role 
materials that described the six issues, a pay-off schedule and information about their 
own BATNAs. After completing o f the short quiz, the first and second pre-negotiation 
questionnaires were given out to measure their perceptions o f others’ BATNAs and 
aspiration levels (see Appendix A (IV)).
Weak Negotiators (Employees)
Similar to Condition 1, employees in this condition were provided with the role
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materials that described the six issues, a pay-off schedule and information about their 
own BATNAs. We now gave out the first questionnaire to the employees, which were 
used to measure their perceptions of the other’s BATNA (see Appendix A (IV)). 
Employees were then told by the experimenter the following:
“I have just received word that a candidate from another MBA is definitely ready to 
accept an offer from the employer with whom you are about to negotiate. This other 
candidate is worth 6,000 points to the employer. He will therefore hire the alternative 
candidate instead for a score o f 6,000 if no agreement is reached. The employer does 
not yet know that you are informed o f his BATNA but this does not change the 
change the fact that he may or may not know your BATNA.”
The second questionnaire was given out at this point to employees to measure their 
aspiration levels (see Appendix A (IV)).
After completion o f questionnaires, all participants returned to the initial room. 
Employers were randomly assigned to employees. They were given 30 minutes to 
negotiate. If no deal was reached, an impasse would be declared and the outside option 
(BATNA) would be the result. Final questionnaires were given to all participants to 
elicit strategies adopted, how they approached negotiations, etc. After participants 
completed the final questionnaire, they were debriefed about the purpose of the 
experiment.
Experimental Condition 4 (Complete Knowledge)
All participants were given the same general instructions as in Condition 1. They were 
assigned to the roles o f either an employer or employee and were sent to different 
rooms.
Strong Negotiators (Employers)
Similar to Condition 1, employers in this condition were provided with the role 
materials that described the six issues, a pay-off schedule and information about their 
own BATNAs. We now gave out the first questionnaire to the employers, which were 
used to measure their perceptions of the other’s BATNA (see Appendix A (IV)). 
Employers were then told by the experimenter the following:
“I have just received word that another company, ABC Ltd., has offered a job to the
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employee you are about to negotiate with. This job offer would be worth 1,200 
points to the employee. In the case of no agreement reached, she will take this job 
offer for a score o f 1,200. The employee does not yet know that you are informed of 
her BATNA but it does not change the fact that she may or may not know your 
BATNA.”
The second questionnaire was given out to employers at this point to measure their 
aspiration levels (see Appendix A (IV)).
Weak Negotiators (Employees)
Similar to Condition 1, employees in this condition were provided with the role 
materials that described the six issues, a pay-off schedule and information about their 
own BATNAs. We now gave out the first questionnaire to the employees, which were 
used to measure their perceptions of the other’s BATNA (see Appendix A (IV)). 
Employees were then told by the experimenter the following:
“I have just received word that a candidate from another MBA is definitely ready to 
accept an offer from the employer with whom you are about to negotiate. This other 
candidate is worth 6,000 points to the employer. He will therefore hire the alternative 
candidate instead for a score o f 6,000 if no agreement is reached. The employer does 
not yet know that you are informed o f his BATNA but this does not change the 
change the fact that he may or may not know your BATNA.”
The second questionnaire was given out at this point to employees to measure their 
aspiration levels (see Appendix A (IV)).
After completion of questionnaires, all participants returned to the initial room. 
Employers were randomly assigned to employees. They were given 30 minutes to 
negotiate. If no deal was reached, an impasse would be declared and the outside option 
(BATNA) would be the result. Final questionnaires were given to all participants to 
elicit strategies adopted, how they approached negotiations, etc. After participants 
completed the final questionnaire, they were debriefed about the purpose of the 
experiment.
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Appendix C Pattern o f Reasons for Excluded Cases
Pattern of reasons for exclusion for Strong Exchange (in Percentage)
Strong negotiators reported Strong negotiators reported that
that they shared information they did not share information
about preferences but their about preferences but their
opponents disagree opponents disagree
Condition 1 
(Control)
0 0
Condition 2
(Strong Negotiators 33.3 0
Informed)
Condition 3
(Weak Negotiators 16.7 33.3
Informed)
Condition 4 
(Both Informed)
0 16.7
Note. Number o f excluded case = 6
Pattern of reasons for exclusion for Weak Exchange (in Percentage)
Weak negotiators reported Weak negotiators reported that 
that they shared information they did not share information 
about preferences but their about preferences but their
opponents disagree opponents disagree
Condition 1
16.7 16.7
(Control) 
Condition 2
(Strong Negotiators 
Informed) 
Condition 3
0 16.7
(Weak Negotiators 
Informed) 
Condition 4
16.7 16.7
(Both Informed)
0 16.7
Note. Number o f excluded case = 6
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Pattern of reasons for exclusion for Weak Initiation (in Percentage)
Weak negotiators reported Weak negotiators reported that
that they initiated they did not initiate
information-exchange but information-exchange but their
their opponents disagree opponents disagree
Condition 1 
(Control)
8.3 8.3
Condition 2
(Strong Negotiators 16.7 0
Informed)
Condition 3
(Weak Negotiators 25 16.7
Informed)
Condition 4 
(Both Informed)
16.7 8.3
Note. Number o f excluded case = 12
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Appendix D (I) Subjects’ Full Responses to Items (Study 3)
Strong Negotiators’ Focus on Distributive Element
Strong Negotiators’ Response to Item 2 (“My prim ary concern in the negotiation 
task was whether I could claim more surplus on the table than the opponent did”)
35
30
4 > 25
Z l.cs
s
4 > 20
za
Cl . 15
10
5
0
□  control 
■  condition 2
I
strongly disagree slightly neutral slightly agree strongly 
disagree disagree agree agree
Strong Negotiators’ Response to Item 3 (“I tried so hard to split the resources 
between us in the task”)
50 
45 
40 
4) 35
<30
£  30
a 25
4)
^  20 
15 
10 
5 
0
□  control 
G condition 2
strongly disagree slightly neutral slightly agree strongly
disagree disagree agree agree
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Strong Negotiators’ Response to Item 4 (“As long as I enjoyed the negotiation, I 
was not very concerned if the other party earned more than I did”)
40
35
30
25W)
§ 20 
«j  £4> ft. 15
10
□  control 
El condition 2
B 1
strongly disagree slightly neutral slightly 
disagree disagree agree
agree strongly
agree
Strong Negotiators’ Response to Item 5 (“I think a fair agreement would be the 
one that reflected the quality of my BATNA (outside option)”)
60
s
a
Su
50
a>
m  40
30
20
10
□  control 
0 condition 2
■
strongly disagree slightly neutral slightly
disagree disagree agree
agree strongly
agree
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Strong Negotiators’ Response to Item 6 (“The main goal I pursued was to do 
better than the opponent”)
50
45
40
W O
c4>oi-
0.
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
□  control 
■  condition 2
I
strongly disagree slightly neutral slightly agree strongly
disagree disagree agree agree
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Weak Negotiators’ Motivation
Weak Negotiators’ Response to Item 2 (“I think the task was difficult for me”)
40
35
30
ox -
2  25
c3a 20 
0-
15
10
5
0
□  control 
Hi condition 3
strongly disagree slightly neutral slightly agree strongly
disagree disagree agree agree
Weak Negotiators’ Response to Item 3 (“The task was relatively simple and 
straightforw ard”)
50
45
40
35
f t  30  ex
|  25qj
£ 20 
o- 15
10
5
0
IS control 
■  condition 3
strongly disagree slightly neutral slightly agree strongly
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Weak Negotiators’ Response to Item 4 (“I found the task was something I could do 
easily, ra ther than something that stretched my abilities”)
40
H  control 
■  condition 3
strongly disagree slightly neutral slightly agree strongly
disagree disagree agree agree
Weak Negotiators’ Response to Item 5 (“I found that the negotiation problems 
tackled were completely new to me”)
35
■  control
■  condition 3
strongly disagree slightly neutral slightly agree strongly
disagree disagree agree agree
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Weak Negotiators’ Response to Item 7 (“I seldom thought about whether the 
opponent was satisfied with the offer(s)”)
B  control 
B condition 3
strongly disagree slightly neutral slightly agree strongly
disagree disagree agree agree
Weak Negotiators’ Response to Item 8 (“I was very worried about whether the 
opponent would claim most of the surplus available on the table”)
B control 
B condition 3
strongly disagree slightly neutral slightly agree strongly
disagree disagree agree agree
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Weak Negotiators’ Response to Item 9 (“I was concerned about how the opponent 
was going to react to the agreements suggested”)
60
■  control
■  condition 3
strongly disagree slightly neutral slightly agree strongly
disagree disagree agree agree
Weak Negotiators’ Response to Item 10 (“ I was keenly aware of w hether I earned 
something for what I did, while keeping the other party at the negotiation table”)
50 
45 
40 
8? 35
1  30
2  25
<U
ft- 20
15 
10 
5 
0
strongly disagree slightly neutral slightly agree strongly
disagree disagree agree agree
■  control
■  condition 3
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Weak Negotiators’ Response to Item 11 (“I felt that I was responsible for coming 
up with agreements that keep the opponent at the negotiation table”)
45
B  control 
■  condition 3
strongly disagree slightly neutral slightly agree strongly
disagree disagree agree agree
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Appendix D (II) A Summary of Pilot Study Results
Strong Negotiators’ Motivation Score in Different Conditions
Experim ental C ondition
Strong Negotiators Weak Negotiators
Neither Informed
Informed Informed
(Control)
(Condition 2) (Condition 3)
M ean
M otivation 38.9fl 39.0a 37.3a
Score
Note. N  = 7 in each condition. Maximum motivation score = 77. Subscripting is based upon 
comparisons o f means within each row; different subscripts indicate means differ at/? < .10 or 
less. In this case, there is no significant difference across different experimental conditions.
Weak Negotiators’ Focus Score in Different Conditions
Experim ental Condition
Strong Negotiators Weak Negotiators
Neither Informed
Informed Informed
(Control)
(Condition 2) (Condition 3)
M ean Focus Score 17.3a 18. \ a 13.3^
Note. N  = 7 in each condition. Maximum focus score = 35. Higher focus scores indicate a 
greater degree to which weak negotiators focus on the distributive element. Subscripting is 
based upon comparisons o f means within each row; different subscripts indicate means differ at 
p  < .10 or less. (e.g. the focus score for Control is given the subscript ‘a ’ and it is significantly 
different to that for Condition 3 given subscript *b’, but the scores for Control and Condition 2 
are not significantly different). Also, one of the items, “I think a fair agreement would be the 
one that reflected the quality o f my BATNA (outside option)”, was removed. This is because 
weak negotiators’ BATNAs were less attractive than their opponents’ and their BATNAs were 
no longer considered as leverage to claim more surplus.
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